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ABSTRACT
A model for motor gasoline demand in Canada is developed 
by household. The model identifies and separates effects of 
several responses by the household to a change in gasoline 
prices such as driving fewer miles, purchasing fewer cars, 
and buying more fuel efficient cars. It also estimates the 
manufacturers' response of improving the technology of new 
automobiles.
The size and the composition of the fleet according to 
the interior volume of four classes of automobiles rather 
than their natural weight is used. Furthermore, two 
components of the average fuel efficiency of new cars were 
identified and estimated. The first is the technical fuel 
efficiency set by the car manufacturers and the second is the 
sales ratio of four classes of new automobiles.
The use of household expenditure survey data make it 
possible to experiment with some socio-economic variables 
such as the percentage of households living in urban areas, 
number of cars per household and the number of persons in the 
household who can drive. The relatively new technique of 
cointegration is also utilized. The results indicate that \
there are certain advantages associated with the elaborate 
treatment of the stock adjustment and the fuel economy of the 
fleet. In general, the estimated coefficients suggest that 
most of the adjustment after a gasoline price increase comes 
from miles driven in the short run and from miles per gallon.
hence fuel efficiency improvements in the long run.
The model gave the total short run (one year) price 
elasticity of gasoline consumption between 0.312 - 0.313 for 
the different provinces which is relatively small range.
One of the more interesting results is that 
approximately 10 percent of the household response to a price 
change in the first year was due to a change in the 
composition of the fleet to a more fuel efficient vehicle. 
Approximately 7 5 percent was due to driving fewer miles while 
the remaining 15 percent was attributed to a change in the 
size of the fleet.
The intermediate run (five year) price elasticities 
range from 0.689 to 0.7 09 and the long run price elasticities 
(ten year) range from 0.97 5 to 1.059. The long run price 
elasticities exceed unity which does not lend support to the 
belief that long run gasoline price elasticities are also 
inelastic.
The short term household income elasticities range from
0.301 to 0.306, the intermediate term range from 0.655 to
0.679, and the long term range from 0.868 - 0.949.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
There have been major changes in the world energy 
situation in recent years. Since 1981 crude oil prices have 
declined dramatically, plunging from U.S. $ 26 per barrel in 
1985 to below $10 per barrel in April 1986. The massive real 
oil price increases which occurred between 1973 and 1980 
caused sufficiently large reductions in world oil demand and 
increases in oil supply so that the 1981 price of $ 34 per 
barrel could not be sustained.
On the demand side, the industrialized oil-importing 
countries implemented various conservation and fuel- 
substitution programmes. Also, different energy-saving 
measures and technologies were introduced. The composition 
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) evolved toward less 
fossil fuel intensive activities. In short, the demand for 
crude oil and other energy resources has been very responsive
to changes in world oil prices.
The supply of oil on world markets has been influenced 
by the varied cost profiles, economic interests and market 
behaviour of producing countries. High crude oil prices 
during the 197 0s induced increased world supply in a growing 
number of countries for all forms of energy. As a result,
OPEC's market share of the world oil supply fell to a record
low of just 24 per cent in 1985.
In consequence, international oil supply management by 
major producers (OPEC and others) has become very difficult. 
The burden of adjustment to falling prices has been shared 
unevenly among producers with different interests and 
adaptability, creating difficult co-ordination and co­
operation challenges for all producing countries. This 
experience certainly raises major questions about the future 
behaviour of world oil prices and the stability of the oil 
markets.
The public and the industry perception of the new 
circumstances in the oil market has been dramatic. The 
concern has been shifted from security of supply and price 
control to one of improving the efficiency of the market 
mechanism. In Canada, the federal government has deregulated 
oil and gas markets so that flexible pricing can balance 
supply and demand. Nevertheless, these new measures add 
major questions about the future of demand, supply, and 
prices in Canada.
These questions include the effect of reduced oil prices 
on energy conservation measures that are already in place and 
on the efficiency of energy use. Further, while the oil 
price shocks of the 197 0s reduced demand for oil over the 
past period, falling prices may not cause a symmetrical 
increase in oil demand in the future. Given the past 
experience, consumers may be reluctant to increase their 
dependence on oil. Also, permanent technical changes have
taken place in response to oil shocks and it may not be 
possible or desirable to reverse these changes.
On the other side, there are questions about the effects 
of reduced oil prices on exploration activities and the more 
expensive oil recovery methods. The future of oil supplies 
will depend on the delicate balance between the cost of 
discovering and producing new oil reserves, the price of oil 
in world markets, and the confidence investors have in future 
revenue estimates.
These questions on both demand and supply sides create 
uncertainty about the future level at which oil prices could 
be sustained. For the most part, it has become especially 
difficult for energy analysts and policy makers to specify an 
outlook for oil prices and demand/supply balance for the 
future.
Canada, a net exporter of energy but a net importer of 
oil, has become very aware of its' reliance on imported oil. 
As early as 197 5, the federal government implemented several 
energy conservation programmes aimed at reducing imported oil 
by shifting to alternative fuels and increasing domestically 
produced oil and gas.
In terms of primary energy consumption, Canada's energy 
needs are met by oil, natural gas, coal, and electricity. 
Table 1-1 below gives the share of each energy use.
TABLE 1 - 1
The Share of Various Primary Energy Consumption 
By source in Canada 
1950 - 1985
Source/years* 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Crude oil 29.8 48 . 6 48 . 2 46.8 46.9 37 . 8 34 . 6
Natural Gas ^ 2 . 5 9 . 0 16.5 18. 8 24 . 2 30.6 33 . 2
Coal 47 . 6 14.7 10.7 8 . 0 14 .1 17.8 ^ 17 . 1
Electricity ^ 20.1 27 . 7 24 . 6 24.9 13 . 8 14 . 3 15.1
Source; Canada Year Book, 1978, 1985, 1988, 1990 and Statistics Canada catalogue 57-207.* Original unites are in Billions of BTUs.
(1) these figures include amount of natural gas used to 
produce electricity.
(2) these figures include both hydro and nuclear power 
produced electricity.
(3) this figure includes 4.2 percent from wood.
As recently as 1950 coal provided close to one-half of 
the energy needs in Canada. However, ten years later, it was 
clear that oil, alone, provided one-half of Canadian needs. 
Electricity came second and provided more than one-quarter of 
Canada's needs. Natural gas constituted only 9.0 percent and 
coal 14.7 percent.
In 1987, however, the share of oil as an energy source 
represented 34.2 percent. It is still the major source of 
energy, but it's share has significantly declined. Natural
gas constituted 3 3.2 percent— which is a dramatic increase 
when compared to only 2.5 percent in 1950. Coal regained 
its' relative importance in the Canadian energy market; its 
share represented 17.3 percent of the needs, up from its 
lowest share of only 8.0 percent in 1975. Finally, about 
15.3 percent of the energy needs were met by hydro and 
nuclear power, down from its peak of 24.9 percent in 1975.
The above discussion suggests that to better understand 
factors affecting demand for energy in Canada it would be 
useful to examine the various components in detail. For 
example, in order to study the consumption of crude oil, the 
demand for various oil products should be examined.
Table 1-2, provides the share of each oil product consumed.
TABLE 1-2
The Share of Different Oil Products in 
The Domestic Demand In Canada 
1965 -1987
Type/year* 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Motor Gasoline 30.5 34 . 9 34 . 3 39.0 41.0 43 .1
Diesel Fuel 8 . 5 9 . 7 10.9 15.2 19 . 2 19 . 8
Fuel Oil 39. 6 33 . 1 31.6 29.2 17.7 16.9
Others 21.4 22 . 3 23 . 2 16 . 6 22 . 1 20.2
Source; Statistics Canada Year Book (various issues) and 
The Canadian Oil Market, 4Q, 1989.
* Original Units are in Millions of Gallons.
From the above table the following remarks can be made:
1 - Motor Gasoline is the most important oil product. Its 
share accounted for 42 percent of total domestic demand in 
1986.
2 - The relative importance of Motor Gasoline is increasing 
over the time period.
3 - The Diesel Fuel share has doubled from only 8.5 percent 
in 1965 to 19,5 percent in 1987.
4 - The Fuel Oil share declined significantly from 39.6 
percent in 1965 to only 16.8 percent in 1987. This was 
mainly due to the substitution of natural gas and coal in the 
generation of electricity and home heating.
Motor Gasoline and Diesel Fuel are mainly used in the 
transportation sector. According to the Statistics Canada 
figures for 1987, the consumption of motor gasoline accounts 
for about 7 3 percent of total oil requirements in the 
transportation sector. Also, the transportation sector 
accounts for about 3 5 per cent of total energy needs and 
about 54 per cent of all crude oil requirements in Canada in 
1987 .
In short, crude oil is the largest energy source
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consumed in Canada and Motor gasoline is the most important 
oil product. Also, since the rapidly changing oil prices 
have been most noticeable to consumers in the gasoline 
market, an understanding of the automotive market demand for
Gasoline is very important. Therefore a study of passenger- 
car gasoline demand is crucial to comprehending the effects 
of the recent changes in the world energy market and their 
impact on consumer behaviour and the setting of the energy 
policy in Canada.
Several econometric studies have estimated the derived 
demand for fuels by different sectors; Khazzom (1973), Denny 
and Pinto (1975), Fuss, Hydman and Waverman (1975), Gorbet 
(1975), Fuss (1975), Berkowitz and Haines (1980). Compared 
with other sectors, very few attempts to measure the price 
responsiveness of gasoline consumption in the transportation 
sector have been made; Dewees, Hydman and Waverman (1975),
NAV (1976), Pindyck-Heide (1979), Shalaby and Waghmare(1980), 
Dahl (1982), Gallini (1983).
The major objective of this thesis is to develop and 
estimate a model for passenger-car demand for gasoline in 
Canada using the theoretical framework suggested by Gallini's 
study. The model for gasoline demand is capable of 
identifying several responses by consumers to changes in 
gasoline prices such as driving fewer miles, purchasing fewer 
automobiles, buying more fuel efficient cars, and the 
automobile manufacturers' response by altering the technology 
of new automobiles produced in the future. The model will be 
simulated to determine future demand as well as to forecast 
future gasoline demand under different circumstances.
The next chapter of the study gives a brief review of 
the energy policy environment in Canada. A review of the 
existing literature is presented in chapter III. The chapters 
from IV to VIII are devoted to the discussion of the model, 
the data, the estimation techniques, and the empirical 
results. chapter IX gives the simulation and testing of the 
model. Finally, chapter X includes the conclusions and some 
policy implications.
CHAPTER II 
Canadian Energy Policies; A Review
"There are many energy deficient countries in the world 
that would like gladly to exchange their problems for ours.
We in Canada are, after all, in possession of remarkable 
energy resources. And though we have exploited some of these 
resources rather heavily - perhaps carelessly at times, in 
the eyes of those less well endowed - we are for the time 
being in a position of overall energy surplus. We also enjoy 
the relative luxury of being able to focus our energy- 
management attentions less on an anxious present than on a 
promising future - both near and distant.
From this perspective, our energy problems have a 
typically Canadian flavour, often involving divided 
jurisdiction over unequally distributed resources. They also 
involve the essentially political question of how best to 
capitalize on our national advantages in ways that will 
ensure the protection of the public interest which in this 
case involves efficient resource management, economic 
development, maximum social benefit and national security."
The Economic Council of Canada 
The social and strategic importance of energy in general 
and oil in particular has led government in modern societies 
to seek some degree of control over its supply and 
distribution either through regulation or through direct 
ownership. The role of oil in the transportation sector
10
alone sustains the everyday functioning of twentieth century 
society in times of peace; and oil has been called as 
necessary as blood in times of war. When modelling energy 
demand it is therefore important to take into account the 
impact of energy policies on the demand for energy.
Historically, Canadian energy policies have been 
influenced by external events. Like most other countries of 
the world, Canada adjusted its energy policies in response to 
changes in the world oil prices of 1973, 1979, and 1986. 
Moreover, the United States’ energy policies influenced 
Canadian energy policies through their strong trade links and 
the dominant presence of many U.S. controlled multinational 
petroleum companies operating in Canada.
There are two levels of government that are jointly 
responsible for forming the Canadian energy policy; the 
Federal government and the governments of the oil and gas 
producing provinces which own the land. Among all the 
producing provinces, the province of Alberta is the most 
important as it produces about eighty-five percent of Canada' 
oil and gas.
During the past decades, Canadian energy policy has 
aimed at achieving a rather wide range of goals, including 
economic development, the efficient use of resources, income 
redistribution, increased Canadian ownership, and the on­
going economic goal of stability through inflation control.
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief review of
11
the issues and the historical development of energy policies 
in Canada, especially those policies pertaining to gasoline. 
But first, issues relating to retail pricing of gasoline in 
Canada are briefly discussed.
The Retail Pricing of Gasoline in Canada:
As a result of lower oil prices in recent years, oil 
companies in Canada claim that they are experiencing 
difficulties. At the same time, it is not clear that 
Canadian consumers have received the full benefit, if any, of 
the fall in oil prices. A number of government reports have 
expressed serious concern about the state of competition in 
the refining industry and retailing sectors, especially with 
the closure trend in the refining industry. During the boom 
years, most of the oil companies built modern and bigger 
refinery facilities in Alberta. These newer refineries enjoy 
a substantial cost reduction resulting from economies of 
scale and improved technology. The refining industry, then, 
suffered from excess capacity and with the reduction in 
demand for oil products, many of the smaller refineries were 
forced to close. The final result is that the Canadian 
market is being served by only a small number of firms in the 
refining end of the industry. The refineries' powers in 
regional markets have been strengthened and now a small 
number of firms in the market can influence the price.
For instance, in the wholesale market, the so-called 
system of Rack Pricing ^, which is implemented by several of
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the major refiners, makes the gasoline wholesale price very 
rigid. The Rack prices are wholesale prices charged to 
various classes of distributors where no discounts are 
permitted from the published Rack Price List.
One might assume that "this one price for all" is a 
desirable and fair arrangement. However, in an oligopolistic 
market such as the refining industry, the ability of the 
buyers to play off one wholesale supplier against another in 
the bargaining process is vital in order to bring about the 
lowest possible price. When the price schedule is published 
and no discounts are allowed, the companies can announce 
their prices, at the same level as those of the price leader, 
knowing that they will not secretly be undercut.
Given such market imperfections the suppliers can trust 
that they will not lose any market share to other 
competitors— unless there is non-price competition. The. 
likely result would be a higher level of wholesale prices to 
be passed on to consumers at the gasoline pump.
It is not within the scope of this study to assess the 
degree of market imperfection in the refining industry in 
Canada. Nevertheless, further investigations of this issue 
are certainly needed.
Figure 2-1  ^ provides an estimated breakdown of the 
retail gasoline price in the Toronto Region, based upon a 
crude cost of $28.00 per barrel in January 1986 and crude 
cost of $15.00 per barrel in April 1986.
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The above figure suggests that the retail price of 
gasoline consists of various components all affected 
directly or indirectly by the petroleum policy. To 
illustrate this point further Table 2-1 below gives the 
change in each component with respect to changes in ' 
crude oil prices before and after 1986.
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Table 2 - 1
Retail Gasoline Price Changes
$28/bbl % of Price $15/bbl % of Price
Dealer 3 . 2 6 . 3 3 . 5 9 .1
Taxes 15.5 30. 6 15.7 41. 1
Refiners 6.0 11.8 9 . 0 23.6
PGRT * 2 . 6 5.1 1.0 2 . 6
Royalty 7 . 8 15.4 3 . 0 7.9
Producer 15. 6 30.8 6 . 0 15.7
Price/Ltr 50.7 c 100 . 0 38.2 c 100.0
* Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax,
Despite the decline in oil prices, dealer and refiners 
take has increased by 0.3 and 3 cents per litre respectively 
Also, direct taxation on gasoline has increased by 2 cents 
per litre and its share represents about 41 percent of the 
price at the pump.
Due to lower world crude prices in 1986, the federal 
government decided to reduce the petroleum and gas revenue 
tax (PRGT) to only one cent per litre and the producing 
provinces reduced their royalties by more than 3 cents per 
litre which amounted to more than 50 percent.
Table 2-2 below gives the average price of gasoline in 
Canada and the amount of taxes as reported by the 
International Energy Agency (lEA) which illustrates that
15
petroleum policy is an important element in determining the
price of gasoline at the pump.
Table 2 - 2
Price of Gasoline and Taxes in Canada
(Canadian $/Litre)
Price Taxes* % of T«
1980 0 .261 0.064 24 . 5
1981 0. 359 0 . 085 23 . 9
1982 0.445 0. 117 26.3
1983 0.479 0 . 130 27.1
1984 0.507 0 . 127 25.1
1985 0.525 0.140 26.7
1986 0.482 0. 159 32 . 9
1987 0.495 0 . 179 36.2
1988 0.500 0 . 196 39.2
Source: lEA Statistics, Energy Prices and Taxes,4th Q, 1989.
* Taxes include excise tax ( fedral & provincial) plus 
fedral gasoline tax.
It is quite noticeable that gasoline taxes have 
increased significantly especially in the last few years. It 
also illustrate how petroleum policy effects the price of 
gasoline in Canada.
Given the vast geographical regions of Canada, it 
appears from previous studies  ^ that while input and
16
operating costs are important factors, the critical factor in 
determining gasoline prices at the pump is the degree of 
competition in the local markets.
Figure 2-2 below shows how the retail price of regular 
gasoline has varied from province to province. As observed, 
the price differences are increasing over time and the gap 
has been widened in recent years reflecting the changes in 
the policy environment.
In the next part of this chapter, a review of Canadian 
energy policies is presented. The review covers the 
following time periods:
1. Pre-1973
2. 1973 to 1979
3. 1980-1984
4. Post-1984
Figure 2 - 2
GASOLINE PRICES AT THE PUMP
IN CANADA
P r i c e s  ( C e n t s / l i t r e )
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
NEWFOUNDLAND
Years
—t— ONTARIO a l b e r t a
18
1. Canadian Energy Policy: Pre-1973
In contrast to the 1973-1979 period, which could be 
described as an age of protecting oil and gas consumers, the 
pre-1973 period clearly can be labelled as an age of 
protecting the oil producers. In 19 61, the Conservative 
government of Sir John Diefenbaker announced the National Oil 
Policy (NOP) in which the Government of Canada drew an 
imaginary line along the Ottawa Valley and retained the 
system of imports to the eastern part of Canada and domestic 
supply to the west of the line. The main goal of the NOP was 
to protect oil producers from losing sales in Ontario to 
less-expensive Venezuelan oil. As the name of the policy 
suggests, it was a policy directed towards oil and its 
products of which gasoline was the most important.
For the most part, the NOP satisfied the multinational 
oil and Gas companies operating in Western Canada as well as 
the U.S. government by fostering the exports of oil to the 
United States through expanding production and permitting 
domestic oil prices to remain higher than those abroad.
Also, the introduction of the oil import quota program in the 
U.S., from which Canadian exports of oil were exempt, 
contributed significantly to the increase of continental 
integration of the Canadian and U.S. oil markets. It is also 
important to note that the NOP won the support of the 
provincial governments affected ^. In return the NOP
19
benefited from this large degree of consensus and there was a 
rapid expansion of oil and gas production during the 1960s 
and early 197 0s. One could conclude that the NOP succeeded 
in achieving its’ main goal of the development of the oil and 
gas industry.
It was also during this period that the National Energy 
Board (NEB) was established as a quasi-independent energy 
agency. Its’ task was to depoliticize energy issues by 
shifting decisions on pipeline routes, export volumes and 
energy pricing out of parliament and to an expert agency.
2. Canadian Energy Policy: 1973-1979
The federal government found itself faced with the 
serious problem of the uncertainty of oil and gas supply 
forecasts following the oil price shock which result from the 
OAPEC embargo in 1973-74 and the Iranian supply disruption of 
1979. These price increases provided a substantial external 
shock to Canada's energy system, for which the NEB relied 
entirely on a foreign-owned industry. In fact, the federal 
government was caught during the 1973 oil shock without any 
means of gathering information about the industry and with 
only limited means for combating the oil crisis. The federal 
government response was two-fold:
1. subsidizing energy users and controlling the well 
head price of oil and gas in order to insulate consumers from 
world oil prices.
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2. attempting to increase security of supply by 
establishing Petro-Canada, a publicly-owned oil company, 
reducing oil exports in favour of the domestic market, and 
exploring the potential for developing Canada’s Arctic 
natural gas supplies and synthetic oil sands.
In particular, the creation of Petro-Canada was seen as 
an indication of the government’s growing frustration over 
the lack of control over the security of supply, the lack of 
solid information on reserves, and a growing discontent 
regarding the industry practices and procedures.
In contrast to pre-197 3 times, Canadian oil exports to 
the United States were almost phased out during the 1973-79 
period, while natural gas exports remained virtually 
constant. In essence, the main goal of Canadian energy 
policy in combating the price shock of 1973, was security of 
energy supply through oil self-sufficiency.
However, by the second half of the 1970’s it was obvious 
that oil self-sufficiency was not possible despite the 
substantial reduction of oil exports, the completion of the 
pipeline extension to Montreal, the rescue of the Syncrude 
oil sands project, and the creation of Petro-Canada. The new 
goal became energy self-reliance described by a governmental 
document  ^ as reducing Canada’s energy vulnerability and 
supplying Canada’s energy requirements as much as possible 
from domestic resources. Most of the emphasis in reaching 
energy self-reliance was placed on appropriate energy
21
pricing, inter-fuel substitution and increased supply.
The focus of appropriate energy pricing was to move 
domestic oil prices toward world levels and to move domestic 
prices for gas to an appropriate competitive relationship for 
oil over a two to four year period.
During this period, the producing provinces saw the 
federal government’s new measures as an intrusion into their 
traditional areas of provincial jurisdiction. They brought 
in new legislation to secure their constitutional control 
over the production, regulation, marketing and pricing of oil 
within provincial boundaries and raised their royalties on 
resources. In reaction, the federal government gave itself 
broader powers over oil and gas pricing through the Petroleum 
Administration Act (PAA), which caused Canadian oil prices to 
be held well below world levels. However, after initially 
resisting Alberta’s call for world prices, the government of 
Canada allowed domestic oil prices to rise to within $3.00 of 
the world price by mid-1978.
Then, with the second oil price shock of 197 9, and the 
doubling of world oil prices to $37.00 a barrel, the Canadian 
energy policy as outlined in the Energy Strategy for 
Canada became outdated and the federal government renounced 
its policy of linking the Canadian prices to the world price. 
Thereafter, the Canadian prices were left far below world 
levels and as a result the relationship between the two 
levels of government deteriorated further.
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This internal disagreement about resource distribution 
in Canada encompassed both inter-regional and inter­
governmental conflicts. On one hand, the provincial 
governments own the resources, but the federal government 
controls inter-provincial and international trade. This 
easily leads to inter-governmental conflict. On the other 
hand, most energy consumers (and hence the political power) 
reside in Central Canada (the provinces of Ontario and 
Quebec), which has no energy resources other than hydro­
electricity, while the oil and gas resources are concentrated 
in Western Canada (especially in the province of Alberta). 
This leads to inter-regional conflict.
In terms of political economy, the disagreements revolve 
around the dividing up of the economic rent attributable to 
oil and gas activity among the oil and gas producers, the 
federal government, the provincial governments and the energy 
consumers.
To complicate matters further, questions were raised 
about the fact that significantly foreign-owned oil and gas 
companies were capturing a large share of the profits in the 
industry. The result was that the second half of the 1970s 
witnessed Petro-Canada’s expansion, through a series of 
takeover acquisitions, to the point where it became Canada's 
sixth largest oil and gas producer.
However, the political will to deal with these 
complicated policy issues was weakened by two federal
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elections held within a year of each other in 1979-1980. The 
Conservative party won the 1979 federal election after 
campaigning successfully for the privatization of Petro- 
Canada. However, the Conservative Government was defeated 
seven months later over a budget dominated by energy policy 
issues such as an excise tax increase of 18 cents a gallon on 
gasoline consumption, among other tax measures.
In consequence, another federal election was held in 
1980 and the Liberal party, after campaigning in defense of 
Petro-Canada, 'made in Canada' prices, and a goal of at least 
50 per cent Canadian ownership of the industry, returned to 
power.
3. Canadian Energy Policies; 1980-1984
As mentioned in the previous section, the oil price 
shock of 1979 heightened the dispute between the two levels 
of government and led to long and difficult negotiations 
between them. At the centre of the dispute were the federal 
government and the main oil and gas producing province, 
Alberta, trying to reach a mutually acceptable pricing and 
taxation scheme. Behind the negotiations lay the major 
political issues of inter-regional and inter-governmental 
revenue sharing, as well as various degrees of concern about 
the dominantly foreign-owned oil and gas industry.
In October 198 0, the deadlocked negotiations on a new 
pricing and taxation arrangement were broken as the federal 
government unilaterally introduced one of the most
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controversial energy policies in the history of Canada, that 
is, the National Energy Programme.
The National Energy Programme (NEP)
The self-proclaimed goals of the NEP are, (1) to 
establish opportunities for Canadian participation in the 
industry, (2) to provide fairness in pricing and revenue- 
sharing, and (3) to foster security of supply ^.
In order to achieve its goal of increased Canadian 
participation, the NEP proposed that Petro-Canada acquire 
several of the foreign-owned companies operating in Canada 
by:
1. Imposing an immediate restriction on development of 
the northern Canada lands to companies that were at least 50 
per cent domestically owned.
2. Reservation of at least a 2 5 per cent interest in any 
Canada lands development to the Crown— represented mainly by 
Petro-Canada.
3. Restructuring of the exploration and development 
incentives so that the level of the incentive grant is 
calculated according to the Canadian ownership rate.
4. A Canadian ownership charge levied on all oil and gas 
consumption to pay for Petro-Canada's takeover acquisitions.
To achieve the second objective, the fairness, the NEP 
imposed the following new taxes and measures:
1. A tax on all natural gas, which in effect was a levy 
on the province of Alberta.
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2. Charges on refined petroleum products to cover the 
costs of import subsidies.
3. A tax on net operating revenues of oil and gas
producers as well as royalty holders.
4. Increasing the federal government's share of 
petroleum rents from 10 per cent to 24 per cent.
5. A proposal to calculate the oil price for consumers 
by using a blending system that combined differently priced 
oil from various sources such as conventional, imported, 
synthetic oil sands, tertiary recovery and frontier oil.
6. An immediate decrease in the user price of natural 
gas from 8 5 per cent to 67 per cent of the btu equivalent
price of oil at the Toronto City Gate.
Moreover, in order to achieve the third objective, 
security of supply, the federal government established the 
goal of reducing oil dependence from 43 per cent to 27 per
cent of Canada's energy needs by 199 0. The third objective
seems inconsistent with the other two goals. For instance, 
the pricing taxation and increasing Canadian participation 
mentioned above had the side-effect of decreasing industry 
activity, reducing potential supply, and increasing demand, 
none of which point in the direction of reducing oil imports
to zero by 1990. In order to avoid some of these side
effects, the NEP proposed that the federal government make 
substantial expenditures on various energy incentive grants 
for exploration, fuel substitution, and pipeline extensions.
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In essence, the NEP established a new philosophy for the 
federal government in its dealings with the oil and gas 
industry. The NEP proposed to bring the largest share of the 
oil and gas sector under state ownership and the use of 
extensive incentive grants as opposed to prices to obtain the 
desired allocation of resources. Moreover, the NEP was 
openly biased in establishing regulations that were 
favourable to the federally-owned oil and gas company, Petro- 
Canada, and also biased in encouraging exploration in the 
federally controlled offshore and arctic regions. Finally, 
it was designed to shift political power in energy away from 
the producing provinces to the consuming central provinces by 
a set of pricing and taxation provisions that favoured the 
federal government and energy consumers at the expense of the 
provincial governments and the energy producers.
The consumers response in Canada was generally positive, 
especially in Central Canada. However, the Alberta 
government and the oil and gas producers reacted with 
alarm to the proposed new taxes and pricing schemes.
Alberta's provincial government charged that the federal 
government had, without agreement, simply taken over control 
of provincial lands, but maintained that it could still 
control production rates. In retaliation, the Alberta 
government instituted an oil production cutback of 15 per 
cent of oil capacity and delayed the development of two major 
synthetic oil sands plants in the province.
27
This dispute lasted until the end of 1981, when the 
federal government signed an energy agreement with each of 
the producing provinces. On the whole, the combined impact 
of the NEP, and the Alberta reaction had damaged industry 
confidence and substantially reduced exploration and 
development activities.
Briefly, the 1981 agreements  ^ made some major 
concessions to the producing provinces, but nevertheless gave 
the federal government most of the revenue it sought. The 
federal government was basically able to increase its tax 
levy on the oil and gas industry, while the producing 
provinces got the export tax on natural gas removed and 
higher well head prices for both oil and gas. For the first 
time, a distinction was made between old and new oil, with 
the latter—  defined as the oil discovered after 1980 — being 
sold at the world price and the price of old oil being set 
for no more than 7 5 percent world price.
In spite of its initial success, this agreement, which 
was supposed to last until 1986, failed after only 18 months. 
The agreements assumed that real world prices would continue 
to rise substantially over the next several years, but the 
world-wide recession in 1982 deepened, causing the demand for 
oil in Canada and abroad to soften and creating an oil glut 
in the world markets. World oil prices began to tumble. The 
combination of the higher level of taxes which were provided 
for in the agreements, and the effects of the NEP led to the
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deterioration of the oil and gas industries cash flow and 
profits, which in turn reduced oil and gas exploration and 
development activities.
In reaction to the new circumstances, both levels of 
government made adjustments to cut back their share of oil 
revenues. The Alberta government initiated the Oil and Gas 
Assistance Programme, which lowered royalties substantially. 
For its' part, the federal government in its NEP Update, 
redefined old oil as the oil discovered before April 1974 and 
thus created another class of oil which was to be rewarded 
with slightly higher prices. It also temporarily reduced tax 
rates for the incremental oil revenue tax and the petroleum 
and gas revenue tax (PGRT).
4. Canadian Energy Policy; Post-1984
In the 1984 general election the Conservatives won by a 
landslide and, surprisingly, won unprecedented support in the 
western provinces. Since then a new phase of federal- 
provincial relations has been established and Canadian energy 
policies have undergone substantial changes. The emphasis is 
now on deregulation of energy prices, profit-based taxation 
of the oil and gas industry, a business investment oriented 
planning environment, and a new regulatory and management 
regime.
In 1985, the federal government effectively repealed the 
NEP, with only the Canadian ownership provisions, which were
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very popular, being retained. Secondly, the newly elected 
Government of Canada, bilaterally with the respective 
producing provinces, announced a number of accords and 
agreements which were to replace the NEP.
The new agreements between the two levels of government 
represented a shift in the philosophy of dealing with the oil 
and gas industry issues by depoliticizing the energy 
decisions through the establishment of independent oil and 
gas boards in each of the producing provinces. These boards 
are to administer and regulate all aspects of oil and gas 
activities in that province. Moreover, in contrast to the 
NEP, the aim of the deregulation policy was to free the oil 
and gas market so that energy prices could play the important 
role of allocating resources efficiently so that consumers 
would receive the full benefits of lower world oil prices. 
Briefly, the accords were:
i. The Atlantic Accord.
This agreement between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of Newfoundland provided a joint-management and 
revenue-sharing regime that allowed Newfoundland to establish 
and collect royalties and provincial taxes for its offshore 
oil as if it was on land. It also established the Canada- 
Newfoundland Offshore Board and a $300 million development 
fund.
ii. The Western Accord.
This is a comprehensive oil and gas agreement between
30
the Government of Canada and the Governments of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and British Columbia. This agreement 
deregulated Canadian crude oil pricing and linked it to the 
world oil prices. It eliminated or phased out some federal 
oil and gas taxes or charges, including the petroleum and gas 
revenue tax (PGRT), the petroleum compensation charge and the 
Canadian ownership special charge. Moreover, the agreement on 
Natural Gas Markets and Prices established transitional 
provisions for moving toward domestic gas deregulation on 
November I, 198 6.
iii. The Nova Scotia Accord.
This is a long-term agreement between the federal 
government and the Government of Nova Scotia on joint 
management of oil and gas exploration, development and 
production in the offshore. It established a new independent 
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Oil and Gas Board to administer 
and regulate all aspects of offshore oil and gas activities.
Following the Accords the oil and gas industry enjoyed a 
period of expansion and stability. However, the world oil 
prices collapsed to a record low of only U.S. $9.0 a barrel 
by April 198 6 and in a space of a few month the boom become a 
crisis. As the world was adjusting to the new price shock, 
the federal government responded quickly by eliminating the 
Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT) and providing some oil 
and gas projects with urgent assistance.
Furthermore, the Government of Alberta reacted by
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reducing its royalties and established a special grant and 
credits scheme as well as a provincial assistance programme.
Summary.
The above brief review of Canadian petroleum policy has 
indicated consistent economic and political goals, namely, 
economic development, efficient allocation of resources, 
security of supply, increasing Canadian participation, and 
the pursuit of solutions to the uniquely Canadian 
intergovernmental and interregional conflicts. Also, it has 
shown that the relative importance of these goals has shifted 
over time, according to the circumstances and the political 
mood of the day.
At the national level, history suggests that throughout 
the early period proceeding the 1973 oil shock, the petroleum 
policy was developed by consensus. There were winners and 
losers, but the losses and the gains were reconciled to serve 
a generally accepted national interest. The early consensus 
was vital to the industry and the investors confidence, and 
thus to building of an increasingly important oil and gas 
industry.
During the oil crises, Canada, as many other industrial 
countries, was very responsive to changes in the external 
energy environment, particularly with its oil production 
being largely concentrated in one province. At that time, 
the long-run economic goals of energy policies had to yield
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to the short-run conflicts of interest between the federal 
and the provincial governments. Detailed agreements were 
hammered out and were subsequently revised to meet changing 
circumstances.
It is beyond dispute that the agreement of the earlier 
years has been seriously weakened. During the energy crises 
years of the 197 0s, the dominant issues in the formulation of 
petroleum policy were those of economic stabilization, 
security of supply, and the sharing of energy revenues. The 
goals of economic development and efficiency were simply 
overshadowed by the pressing political concern arising from 
the oil price shocks.
During the post 198 4 years the country has regained some 
of its consensus and in turn the industry enjoyed a period of 
expansion weakened only by the decline in world oil price of 
198 6 and the subsequent events.
In conclusion, Canadian energy policy has changed 
dramatically in recent years. These changes have certainly 
influenced the prices of all forms of energy in general but 
that of gasoline in particular. Figure 2-1 and Table 2-1 & 
2-2 above have illustrated that the price of gasoline at the 
pump is influenced by taxation. It is also clear that the 
taxation's share of the price of gasoline has been increasing 
in recent years. Therefore, when estimating demand for 
gasoline in Canada one should expect to capture the household 
response to these policy changes.
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CHAPTER III 
MODELS OP GASOLINE DEMAND IN CANADA
Recently a number of studies of gasoline demand 
modelling have been published. This chapter presents 
a review and a discussion of these studies. A wide variety 
of models have been employed to measure the short-run and/or 
the long-run response of gasoline consumption to an increase 
in the prices.
These studies of gasoline demand can be classified into 
two major types, namely, engineering and econometric. The 
engineering studies  ^usually analyse the physical 
relationship between fuel economy and vehicle characteristics 
such as, weight, transmission type, engine power, and 
accessories and then forecast gasoline consumption on the 
basis of assumed projections of vehicles characteristics and 
miles driven by the vehicle. No economic variables are taken 
into consideration.
On the other hand, econometric studies focus on prices, 
income, and other economic variables which would affect the 
demand for gasoline as well as characteristics of the 
vehicle. These studies have used three main approaches:
1. Single-equation Flow-Adjustment Models.
2. Multi-equations Investment-utilization Models that 
explicitly include adjustments in new cars sales and 
total automobile ownership.
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3. Market Models which consider both the demand and the 
supply sides of the market.
The following review of the previous research is classified 
into the these categories.
I. The Flow-Adjustment Models
These models can be divided into two groups :
A. The Full Flow-Adjustment Model (FFAM)
This is a single equation model that provides a direct 
estimate of the price elasticity of demand for gasoline in 
which full adjustment to change in the gasoline price is 
assumed to take one year. The demand for gasoline is derived 
from a classical utility maximization model of consumer 
behaviour under dynamic conditions. Only one study, by 
Dewees, Hyndman, and Waverman (1975) is presented in this 
section. Several dynamic specifications were estimated in 
their paper. However, only the full flow-adjustment model is 
reviewed here. The single equation model they proposed was 
estimated using time series and cross-sectional data for the 
Canadian provinces for the 1956-72 period. The assumption 
that full adjustment to a change in gasoline prices occurs in 
one time period suggests the following log form specification
(1) Ln G = A + B1 Ln Pg + B2 Ln Y + B3 Ln URB + B4 Ln Pc
Where; G = gasoline sales per capita.
Pg = price of gasoline deflated by the CPI.
Y = per capita personal disposable income deflated by CPI.
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URB = degree of urbanization, percentage of population living in cities with population of at least 10,000.
Pc = price index of automobiles deflated by CPI.
The result of the estimation is given below:
(2) Ln G = A - .45 Ln Pg + .83 Ln Y - .13 6 Ln URB (t-statistics) (3.4) (8.0) (1.3)- .66 Ln Pc 
(5.0)
The coefficients have the right signs and all are 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 99 
percent level except for the urbanization index. The 
coefficients of price of gasoline and income are of the 
expected sign and imply elasticities of 0.45 and 0.83 
respectively. However, the coefficient of the price index of 
the automobiles has a negative sign. As the price of new 
automobiles increases the new car sales will decline.
Further, assuming that used cars are a perfect 
substitute for new cars, a rise in new car prices will result 
in an increase in the demand for used cars. In consequence, 
the opportunity cost of scrapping an old car will increase 
and the price of used cars will rise. The final outcome will 
be that less new cars are sold and fewer used cars are 
scrapped. But since new cars are usually expected to be 
driven more than old cars, the net effect of an increase in 
new car prices on gasoline consumption is negative.
The availability of a mass transit system in urban 
centres is expected to have the effect of reducing the 
miles driven in cities compared to rural areas. The
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researchers argued that, although a higher fuel efficiency 
might be achieved in rural areas the over all gasoline 
consumption is expected to be lower in cities and therefore 
the sign is negative.
As for the price of gasoline and the income 
elasticities, it is hard to interpret them in the context of 
full flow-adjustment model. The constraint imposed by the 
full flow-adjustment model, that the entire impact from an 
increase in the price of gasoline is felt in the first time 
period is the most unattractive feature of this model and it 
is difficult to interpret the elasticities as short or long- 
run values.
B. The Partial Flow-Adjustment Model (PFAM).
Several recent attempts to estimate a demand function 
for gasoline based on the classical assumptions of consumer 
behaviour have employed models of the following form :
(3) G = A + B1 Pg + B2 Y + B3 G
t—1Where:
G = gasoline consumption per capita.
Pg = price of gasoline.
Y = income per capita.
Gt_i= gasoline consumption per capita in period t-1.
The partial flow-adjustment model, in its simplest form, 
states that gasoline demand this period is determined by 
gasoline price, real personal income, and gasoline 
consumption in the previous period.
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The term " Partial Flow-Adjustment Model " has been 
applied to this type of model because the dynamics of 
consumption are viewed as an attempt on the part of consumers 
to bring their actual consumption closer to some desired 
level. The rationale for this specification is based on the 
following characterization of the adjustment to change in 
prices. Immediately following a price increase, consumers 
can make only small adjustments, such as forming car-pools or 
foregoing marginal trips. Over longer periods, more 
adjustments can occur. For example, families can purchase 
more fuel efficient automobiles and can move closer to their 
work locations. The most important advantage of the partial 
flow-adjustment model is that it captures the time-phase 
nature of the total adjustment to a change. However, the 
speed of the adjustment is determined by the value of the 
coefficient of the lagged consumption term; the smaller the 
estimated coefficient of this variable, the faster is the 
adjustment to a new equilibrium position. Therefore, when 
the coefficient of the lagged consumption is equal to zero, 
the model is called a pure or full flow-adjustment model as 
has been discussed above.
The partial flow-adjustment model also provides direct 
estimates of long-run fuel price elasticity. This is because 
the coefficient of the lagged consumption term measures the 
proportion of last period's fuel use, which is carried 
forward each period following a price change.
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The basic partial flow-adjustment model has been 
estimated using different definitions of gasoline use, data 
periods, and estimation techniques. Only one study in this 
category is discussed here; the well-known Houthakker, 
Verleger, and Sheehan study (HVS 1974). In this study, 
a single equation was estimated using quarterly time series 
data from 1963 to 1972 and cross-sectional data for the 
United States' gasoline and residential electricity markets. 
Gasoline and electricity are considered to be the two largest 
items in the consumer's energy budget.
The authors assume that short-run demand is influenced 
by the stock of automobiles held and the economic conditions 
which affect the level of the utilization of that stock. The 
desired demand for gasoline is then defined as:
(4) G* = A * PgBl * yB2
where G* = desired per capita gasoline consumption 
Pg = price of gasoline deflated by the CPI 
Y = real per capita disposable income 
The authors suggest the following adjustment process;
(5) G/G = (G* / G )Z 0 < z < 1t-1 t-1
which implies a gasoline demand equation of the 
following form:
(6) In G = z InA + zBl InPg + zB2 InY + (1-z) InG
t“1The results of the econometric estimation are given below:
(7) Ln G = .593 - .075 Ln Pg + .303 Ln Y + .696 G (t-stats) (18.5) (5.8) (17.8) (36.6) t-1
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The short-run own price and income elasticities are, 
respectively, Epg = - .075 and Ey = .303. The long-run price 
and income elasticities are - .24 and .98 respectively.
Two criticisms of the HVS model have been offered by the 
authors themselves. The first criticism was that the price 
elasticities were surprisingly large considering the fuel 
costs form only a small proportion of the total costs of 
owning and operating automobiles. This criticism was more 
appropriate to period of low oil prices. The second 
criticism was that pollution control factors were not taken 
into consideration. Thus, for an increase in the price of 
gasoline, consumption of gasoline might be underpredicted  ^
partly due to less fuel efficient automobiles in the fleet.
Critique of the Flow-Adjustment Models
The flow-adjustment models avoid a difficult problem in 
econometric demand analysis; separating the stock and flow 
effects on the demand for gasoline resulting from a price 
change. However, the approach has two serious limitations. 
One is that these models can be used to study only one type 
of policy— that which involves gasoline price change. They 
can not adequately analyze other fuel conservation measures 
designed to increase average fuel efficiency (miles per 
gallon) of the vehicle stock or to change driving habits 
(e.g. limiting speed). A second and related limitation is 
that these models say nothing about how adjustments to fuel
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price changes occur, nor about the relative strength of the 
adjustment process.
The flow-adjustment models implicitly allow for both 
forms of vehicle uses— the necessary use (miles driven to 
work or school) and the leisure use (miles driven for 
recreation activities). In the short-run only the latter can 
be altered, whereas the necessary use needs more time to 
adjust as individuals move' closer to work, form a car pool or 
buy more fuel efficient cars.
The partial flow-adjustment model are considered to be 
an improvement over the full flow-adjustment model. 
Nevertheless, they do not fully succeed in isolating all of 
the possible adjustments that the individual can undertake in 
response to a gasoline price hike. These deficiencies of the 
flow-adjustment model are corrected by the model discussed in 
the following section, the investment-utilization model.
(see Figure 3-1)
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FIGURE 3 - 1  
The Primary Ways in Which an Individual 
Can Respond to a Change in Gasoline Prices
SHORT-RUN :
(owns automobile)
(New car owners)
. driving fewer miles
. scrap their aged automobiles
. changing driving habits (e.g. drive 
slower)
. use public transportation 
- form a car pool
. postpone their vehicle purchases 
. choose more fuel efficient cars.
LONG-RUN :
. move closer to work
. Buy more fuel efficient cars
. purchase fewer automobiles
. shift to another type of fuel ( e.g. LPG - LNG - diesel)
. manufacturers alter the technology of 
the newly produced automobiles
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II. The Investment-utilization Models
This group of studies includes these which are a 
variation of the following identity :
(8) G = %.2LMSi] * Sij * 1/eij \ jWhere :
G = aggregate gasoline consumption.
MSij = miles driven per car of type i, age j
Sij = number of cars of type i, age j
1/eij = gasoline per mile required for car of type i,
age j .
Most of the recent gasoline demand studies fall under 
this classification including the model presented in this 
thesis. The models discussed in this section are by :
1. Shalaby & Waghmare (1980). 2. Pindyck-Heide (1979).
3. Wildhorn (1976). 4. Burright & Enns (1975)
5. Gallini (1983).
1. Shalaby and Waghmare (NEB).
This study presents a model for forecasting passenger 
car gasoline demand in Canada, by regions, which was 
developed by the Forecast and Market Intelligence Division of 
the National Energy Board (NEB). Equation (8) above defines 
the basic structural identity for the NEB model where i 
refers to two types of automobiles, small and large. The 
partitioning of the stock of automobiles into these two types
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is important in order to capture the effects of the new 
technological changes in the design of new cars, especially 
the light weight more fuel efficient cars which have been 
designed in response ^o the fuel price shocks.
In the estimation of the model, the NEB used a cross- 
sectional provincial data for Canada during the 19 66-197 5 
time period. The model is presented in details below :
(9) New Car Sales Per Capita
NR = - .00413 Pc/Y - .00938 UN - .000422 Pg - .0799 S(t-stats) (1.75) (3.11) (2.1) (5.45)
- 275 * 10"9 ST - .00609 DATL^S-^O - .000938 DSAS^S-?! 
(5.73) (3.58) (4.3)
Where :
X  =  a  s u b s c r i p t  r e f e r r i n g  t o  p r o v i n c e  x .
Pc = real price of automobiles.
UN = regional unemployment rate.
Pg — real price of gasoline in each province.
Y = regional per capita disposable income.
S = regional stock of passenger cars at the beginning
of the year divided by driver age population (16 years of age and over).
ST = man-day lost in strikes in automobile industry
DATL,DSAS = dummy variables for erratic observations for the
Atlantic provinces and Saskatchewan for years 1969-1970 and 1969-1971, respectively.
(10) Share of Standard and Intermediate Sales ^.
I + STD / NR =XBi - .0163 UNR - .429 W/LF + .46 SPc/LPc(t-stats) ' (3.25) (1.0) (3.96)
- .000825 (SE/LE) * Pg + .285 ( I + STD /NR)
(.77) (3.28) t-1
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Where:
SPc/LPc = ratio of the sales-weighted average real
prices of small cars to the sales-weighted 
average real prices of large cars.
SE/LE = ratio of the sales-weighted average fuel
economy of small cars to the sales-weighted 
average fuel economy of large cars.
W/LF = proportion of women in the labour force.
The short-run elasticity with respect to relative car 
prices is 0.6. The price elasticity with respect to the 
gasoline prices is -0.1.
(11) Depreciation Rates  ^ .
The equation below gives the probability of survival of 
a car in each province, given combinations of j, the age of 
the car and t, the median half life time of the car:
P(j) = 1 / { 1 + (j / t)4.7,
For example, a half life of twelve years implies that 
50 percent of the new cars, bought during (t-12), are still 
on the road at the end of year twelve. This equation
appeared to predict the probability of survival of a car
satisfactorily for the period 1972 - 1975.
(12) Miles Travelled Per Car
The model incorporated the assumptions that, on average, 
large cars travel 14,000 miles in the first year, whereas 
small cars travel 13,000 miles in the first year. Data from 
the Environment Canada Survey were utilized to estimate the 
following relationships in the model:
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(a) Small Cars: annual milage per car = 13,000 - 584 * j
(b) Large Cars: annual milage per car = 14,000 - 547 * j 
(where j is the age of the vehicle)
Moreover, the authors obtained estimates of fuel 
economies from an Environment Canada Survey which analyzed 
data on 5857 drivers by type of vehicle, age of vehicle, 
miles travelled per year and fuel economies by province.
The NEB model identifies the price responsiveness of 
gasoline demand through the type (small or large) as well as 
the number of car purchases. It measures the price effect 
only through the size composition of the new car sales.
The major criticism of the NEB model is that miles 
driven per car is taken to be independent of economic 
activity. Therefore, the NEB model does not take into 
account all the possible short-run adjustments to gasoline 
price changes. In contrast to the full flow-adjustment 
models in which milage demand responds quickly to a change in 
gasoline prices, when the stock of automobiles is held fixed 
but the utilization flexible, all the vehicle miles demanded 
in the NEB model appear to be due to automobile adjustments.
The survival rates of the used cars are independent of 
the economic conditions in the NEB model. Thus, the decision 
to scrap or sell a used car depends only upon the age of the 
vehicle and no other economic variables are considered.
One of the major differences between the NEB model and
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the other models is its use of the unemployment rate rather 
than personal disposable income. The authors argue that 
unemployment rate is a better indicator of economic 
conditions since it provides more information on expected 
income ^. The short-run price elasticity, evaluated at the 
average of the observations, are Epc = -.163 and Epg = -.49 
which is in line with other studies findings.
2. Pindyck-Heide Model (P-H) .
This model of gasoline demand explains the annual 
consumption of gasoline as the ratio of the total traffic 
volume, which in turn is the product of average traffic 
volume per car and the stock of cars, to the average fuel 
efficiency of the stock of cars. The P-H model consists of 
six equations estimated with pooled time series data from 
1955 to 1974 and cross-sectional data for eleven industrial 
countries. The authors tried to discover to what extent and 
how rapidly the average fuel efficiency and the use of the 
automobiles will change in response to changes in the price 
of gasoline.
The authors argue that because of the speed of the 
adjustment of the different endogenous variables in the 
model, estimation of the model requires variation in all of 
the variables across time as well as across countries.
These variations may then provide accurate estimates of the 
price and income elasticities. However, careful treatment of
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the inter-country differences in regulations and behaviour 
which may affect the transportation sector is required.
The model for gasoline demand is given below (countries 
are subscribed by i).
(13) The Basic Identity is :
G = MS * S * 1/e
Where :
G = Aggregate gasoline demand 
MS = miles driven per car
S = stock of cars per capita at the end of each year
e = miles per gallon of gasoline
(note that no age or size distinction is made among cars)
(14) Stock of Cars ;
S = S (1 - Q) + NR
t—1Where ;
Q = depreciation rate
NR = new car registration per capita
(15) New Car Registration Per Capita :
NR = Ai + B1 Pc + B2 Pg + B3 Y - (V - Q) S + V NRt-1 t-1where:
Pg = price of gasoline divided by the GDP deflator.
Pc = price index of automobiles ^.
Y = GDP per capita.
The above equation is derived under the assumption of a 
stock adjustment hypothesis where S* is the number of 
automobiles desired at time t and
(16) S - St_i = V ( S* - St_i )
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Then, (15) is derived from equation (14) and (16)— the 
specification of the desired stock as a function of economic 
variables  ^ .
(17) Depreciation Rate :
Q = Ci + D1 Y + D2 Pc
(18) Traffic Volume Per Car :
Ln MS = Ei + FI Ln Y + F2 Ln Pg + F3 Ln MSt—1(19) Fuel Efficiency :
Ln 1/e = Gi + HI Ln Pg + H2 Ln (1/e)
t—1
The estimation results for equations (15), (17), (18),
and (19) which were obtained by Heide are reported below :
(20) NR = Ai - 79.9 Pc - .299 Pg + 1.05 Y + .589 NR
(-2.39) (-2.85) (1.56) (8.95) t-1
(21) Q = Ci - .000293 Pc ^
(-2.23)
(22) Ln MS = Ei + .06 Ln Y + .909 Ln MS
(1.97) (21.4) t-1
(23) Ln 1/e = Gi - .11 Ln Pg + .923 Ln (1/e)
(-2.3) (2.6) t-1
In order to find the long-run elasticities the model was 
simulated for a base case for the exogenous variables. 
Population was assumed to grow at 4 percent from 1976 levels, 
Pg was increased at 2 percent per annum, and Pc was assumed 
to be constant. The exogenous variables Pg and Y were 
increased 10 percent above the base case to determine the 
respective elasticities.
The price elasticity for the eleven countries combined 
is equal to 0.5 after five years. It is equal to unity after
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15 years and rises to 1.31 after 2 5 years. On the other 
hand, the income elasticity is equal to 0.5 after 11 years, 
implying that short-run fluctuations in income have little 
effect on consumption of gasoline; this gives support to the 
permanent income hypothesis.
There are a few points worth mentioning about the P-H 
model. First, the price of gasoline was removed from the 
miles driven equation (22) after it was found to be 
statistically insignificant. In consequence, there is no 
short-run price elasticity reported for this study and the 
model fails to capture the individual's immediate response to 
a rise in gasoline prices by driving less. It might be the 
case that the price of gasoline was found insignificant 
because the fuel efficiency was not included in the equation. 
In other words, as equation (23) suggested, the fuel economy 
of the fleet will increase in response to an increase in the 
price of gasoline per gallon and thus keep the price of 
gasoline per mile  ^ reasonably constant.
Second, equation (23) represents an improvement on 
previous models since it attempts to estimate the fuel 
efficiency of the fleet. However, this equation may 
suffer from a mis-specification problem. That is, the 
estimation of the fuel efficiency of the stock of automobiles 
rather than the flow of new car sales, tends to bias 
downwards the impact of a change in gasoline price on the 
fuel efficiency. To explain this point further, consider the
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following; the change in the fuel efficiency of the fleet due 
to a change in gasoline prices will initially occur in the 
new cars market as individuals shift to more fuel efficient 
automobiles. Gradually the effect of the new, more fuel 
efficient car sales becomes significant enough to be 
reflected in the average fuel economy of the fleet.
A final remark worth making is that the model's method 
of estimation of pooling together all eleven countries in one 
sample is highly controversial.
3. Wildhorn, Burright, Enns, and Kirkwood (NAV)
This model is known as the New Car Sales/Automobile 
Ownership/Vehicle Miles (NAV) model. The basic identity of 
the model is:
(24) G = M * 1/e 
Where:
G == aggregate gasoline consumption.
M = total miles driven.
1/e = gasoline required per mile travelled.
The two variables on the right hand side are estimated 
as functions of economic variables as in the Pindyck-Heide 
model. Time series data for the U.S. from 1954 to 1972 are 
used.
(25) Used Car Price :
Pu = - .896 + 1.726 Pn + .44809 Yp - .02959 ST - 1.4041 S
(-2.052) (5.94) (3.89) (-2.44) (-2.565) t-1
Where:
Pu = price of used cars.
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Pn = new car price (component of the CPI).
Pg = price of gasoline (component of CPI).
Yp = permanent income (weighted average of current and 
previous disposable income).
S = stock of cars from previous period. t-1
ST = strike in automobile industry; it takes the value
-1 in the year of the strike; 1 for the year afterthe strike; 0 elsewhere.
The most significant feature of this model is that
market conditions in the used car market are modelled
separately. The price of new cars is exogenous, as in the
other models. That is, the supply of new cars is perfectly
elastic. However, the stock of used cars is bounded above by
the total stock of cars in the previous period. The price of
used cars is determined by the demand and the supply of used
cars in the current period.
(26) New Car Sales Per Household :
NR = - .508 - .2086 Pn + .931 Pu + .0173 ST + .7305 (Y/Y^-i)(1.98) (-5.512) (1.532) (3.406) (2.757)
(27) Used Car Ownership Per Household :
UC = - .05894 - .26645 Pu + .63665 Pn + .22529 Yp
(-.264) (-2.795) (3.406) (10.669)
- .01186 ST - .59339 Pg 
(-2.068) (-4.526)
for UC < S otherwise UC = S
t-1 t-1
(28) Average Miles Per Gallon :
Ln e = 2.656 + .17015 Ln Pg - .02228 D
Where D = dummy variable for federal regulation on safety andpollution equipment.
53
(29) Automobile Miles Driven Per Household :
Ln MH = 9.176 - .3685 In Pg + .02543 D + .86405 Ln S
(752.6) (3.52) (2.316) (13.35)
The researchers assumed that there is symmetry between
the impact of an increase in the price of fuel and the impact
of a decrease in fuel efficiency on total miles driven, given
the price per mile is changed by the same amount in both
cases. That is :
M M
(30) E = - E
Pg e
Where E^ is the elasticity of miles driven with respect to
price of gasoline, and E^ is the elasticity of miles driven 
with respect to fuel efficiency.
The relationship in (30) is used with equation (28) and
(29) to get the total miles equation that is used to produce 
the forecasts.
(31) Ln MH = 7.996 + .86405 In S - .44409 Ln Pg - .44409 Ln e
+ .03532 D
Finally, the gasoline forecast is made from the 
following identity:
(32) Ln G = Ln M - Ln e
The fuel efficiency equation (28), attempts to measure 
the rate at which gasoline can be substituted for other 
inputs (e.g. time, driving slower). The elasticity of 
substitution estimated is 0.17. Rather than estimating miles 
per vehicle as in the Pindyck-Heide study, miles per 
household is the dependent variable. Since the stock
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coefficient is less than one, the implication is that the 
second car is not driven as much as the first car.
The elasticity of miles with respect to the price of 
gasoline in equation (29), is smaller than in equation (31). 
This phenomenon occurs since miles per gallon are accounted 
for in equation (31) and not in Equation (29). When the 
price of gasoline per gallon increases and if miles per 
gallon also increases (that is fuel efficiency improves) then 
the number of miles driven will not decrease as much as when 
fuel efficiency is constant. However, the total short-run 
gasoline price elasticity can be simply calculated as 
follows :
G M M e e(33) E = E - [ E . ( E ) ] - E
Pg Pg e Pg Pg
= -0.44409 + 0.44409 (0.17015) -0.17015 = -0.539
There are a few problems which are evident in the NAV 
model. First, the permanent income variable is omitted from 
equation (31) and thus the model fails to estimate the income 
elasticity for miles.
Second, the price of used cars and the demand for used 
cars are modelled recursively. However, it is highly likely 
that the permanent income and the price of new car variables 
which are used to explain the used car sales in equation (27) 
are correlated with the price of used cars in equation (25). 
The same argument can be made for the miles driven equation
(31) and the new cars equation (26). In other words.
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variables not accounted for which explain the variation in 
the number of miles demand equation (31) may also explain the 
demand for new cars in equation (26).
Third, the model implicitly allows for a dynamic 
adjustment process in the automobiles market. For instance, 
fewer new cars will be sold and lower prices of used cars 
will prevail given that the fleet of cars got larger in the 
previous year. Moreover, the criticisms of the flow- 
adjustment model are also relevant to NAV model since it 
assumed that demand for miles responds immediately to 
a change in gasoline price.
IV. Burright and Enns - Rand Corporation (RC).
This study is divided into two parts. The first deals 
with a short run demand for the fixed automobiles stock, and 
the second part models the investment decision in new and 
used cars. In the short-run the consumer is assumed to have 
a utility function over two goods, vehicle miles and some 
other good. The vehicle miles are produced with the input of 
fuel, time, and the fixed stock of automobiles. One result 
of the utility maximization, constrained by income, is the 
demand for gasoline .
(34) G = f( Pg/Px , w/Px , T , Y/Px , Pc/Px }
Where :
Pg/Px = price of gasoline relative to price of other goods.
w/Px = nominal wage relative to price of other goods.
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T = fixed amount of time available.
Y/Px = income deflated by the price of other goods.
Pc/Px = cost of transportation services deflated by 
price of other goods.
The authors recognize two basic ways to reduce fuel
consumption, namely driving less, which they call a scale
effect, and driving slower, which they call the substitution
effect. The latter implies that the fuel efficiency will
increase, and is described by
(35) e = f( Pg, W, C l , ........ Cn )
Where :
e = miles per gallon.
Cl ...C2 = characteristics of the automobile environment. 
Then the relationship in (34), for per capita gasoline 
demand , can be written as
(36) Gp = f{ Pg, W, f(Pg, W, C l , ........ Cn) . . }
Following in the footsteps of the previous models, the
supply of gasoline is assumed to be perfectly elastic. The
supply and the demand equations are given below, after
assuming a log-linear functional form :
(37) Ln Gs = a + b Ln Pg + c Ln Y + d Ln S + f Ln URB
(38) Ln Gd = A + B Ln Pg + C Ln Y + D Ln S + F Ln e
Where :
URB = percent of population residing in urban areas.
Y = real per capita personal disposable income.
S = automobiles stock per capita.
These two equations were estimated using U.S. data for
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the 1950-1972 period. When problems of correlation of errors 
across different states arose they were treated with a 
Generalized Least Squares procedure. A GLS estimation of 
equation (37) is given below :
(39) Gs = -.66 + .19 Ln Y + .93 Ln S - .09 Ln URB - .27 Ln Pg(3.5) (9.50 (42.3) (1.8) (11.5)
which gives a short-run price elasticity of -.27, assuming 
that S is constant. The GLS estimation for equation (38) is 
given below:
(40) Gd =.94 +.18 Ln Y +.88 Ln S +.29 PT -.22 Ln Pg -.78 Ln e
(6.2) (10.4) (41.2) (3.7) (10.3) (10.3)
(where PT = total state vehicle registration as trucks) 
From equation (40) the short-run price elasticity of demand 
is -.22 but this is not the total short-run effect of a 
change in the price of gasoline. In order to measure the 
entire effect, an equation for the fuel efficiency was 
estimated. The results are reported as follows :
(41) Ln e = 2.2 + .058 Ln Pg + .001 Ln Y - .06 PT
(21.2) (11.2) (3.8) (1.9)
Thus, the short-run price elasticity of demand estimated 
from equations (40) & (41) is:
= - .22 - (-.78) * (.058) = - .265Pg
On the other hand, in the long-run model, the authors 
attempted to capture the changes in the scrappage rates in 
reaction to change in gasoline price. They assumed that used 
and new automobiles are not perfect substitutes. They 
treated them as different goods, but cars with the same age 
have the same fuel efficiency. Moreover, while the supply of
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new cars is assumed to be perfectly elastic, the supply of 
used cars is constrained by the previous year's stock.
The model of automobile ownership is :
(42) New Car Sales
NR = f( Pn, Pu, Y, Pg )
(43) Used Cars
UC = f( Pn, Pu, Pg, Y )
(44) Used Cars Prices
Pu = f( Pn, Pg, Y, St_i)The researchers have tried several specification and 
estimation techniques using U.S. data for 1954-1972 time 
period. They also normalized the variables by household, 
per capita, and driving age population. In addition, they 
estimated the used car equation using both price of gasoline 
per mile and per gallon as separate explanatory variables.
In order to calculate the long-run elasticity, the two 
models, the short and long-run, were combined. The authors 
claim that in the first year about 8 0 percent of the change 
in the consumption of gasoline was caused by driving fewer 
miles ( e.g. leisure miles ) and 2 0 percent was caused by 
changing driving habits (e.g. driving slower). Moreover, 
they found that the long-run effect of buying more fuel 
efficient cars or fewer cars yields a long-run price 
elasticity between -.64 and -.68 after consumers have fully 
adjusted to a price change.
The major feature of RC model is the treatment of time
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from short-run to long-run. The short-run and the long-run 
are defined as the time before and after automobile holdings 
change, respectively. Therefore, the short-run gasoline 
price elasticity reported in this study does not include the 
changes in automobile purchases in the first year after a 
price hike. When comparing the short-run and the long-run 
price elasticities of gasoline consumption estimated by other 
models with those estimated by the RC model, the difference 
in definition should be kept in mind.
(V) Gallini's Model (GM)
In this study a detailed model of gasoline demand and of 
technical changes in the automobile industry is developed.
The GM model identifies several responses by individuals to
an increase in gasoline price. One major feature of the GM
model is that it considers the automobile manufacturers' 
response to a gasoline price increase. The manufacturers are 
assumed to alter the technology of the automobiles to be 
produced in the future in response to expectations about 
consumers' demand for more fuel efficient cars.
In the model manufacturers are assumed to choose vehicle 
designs three years before the marketing of the vehicle.
Given these designs, the price of the automobiles, and the 
expected milage costs, individuals decide on the ownership 
and the characteristics of the vehicle. The utilization of
the vehicle is modelled as the outcome of a utility-
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maximization problem, conditional on vehicle choice. Vehicle 
holding, used car scrappage equations, and new cars sales 
ratio equations for three categories of automobiles, 
differentiated by their natural weight are then estimated.
(45) The Vehicle Utilization Decision
The consumer's problem in the GM model is to choose the 
amount of miles or utilization of vehicle conditional on the 
automobile holding decision. The consumer wants to maximize 
his utility function which is defined over vehicle miles and 
all other commodities subject to his budget constraint. The 
results of the maximization is a demand for gasoline per 
automobile as follows :
G = g( Pg/e, Pc, w, v ) / e 
Where:
G = the input of gasoline per car.
Pg/e = average gasoline cost per mile.
Pc = vehicle cost (rental cost of owning a car).
w = wage rate which measures both a component of full
income (v + wt) and the opportunity cost of time 
spent in consumption.
V = non-labour income.
e = average fuel efficiency or miles per gallon of 
gasoline achieved in the vehicle.
(46) The Automobile Holding Decision
The choice among automobiles or an alternative mode of 
transportation is modelled in this part of the study. 
Initially, the individual is assumed to decide whether or not
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to hold a vehicle during the current period. He is assumed
to consider the characteristics of the available vehicle,
expected gasoline prices in the following period and his car
holding in the previous period.
S/D = f{ Pc, Pg/e, Y, UN, ST, (S/D)}
t—1Where :
S/D = the proportion of the driving age population that choose to own an automobile during the current 
period.
Y = per capita income.
UN = unemployment rate.
ST = man-days lost in the automobile industry due to strike.
(47) The Scrap - Sell or Keep Used Car Decision 
Simultaneous to the decision of whether or not to own a
vehicle is the decision of whether or not to scrap a used
vehicle by last period's car owner. In addition to economic
variables, the age of the vehicle is expected to explain most
of the variation in scrappage.
U/D = f{ Pn, Ps, Pg/eu , Pg/en, Y, UN, (S/D)}
t-1Where:
U/D = the proportion of the driving age population that 
owns a used car.
Pn = average price of new car.
Ps = scrappage price of a used car.
eu = average fuel economy of used cars.
en = average fuel economy of new cars.
(48) Sales Ratio of New Automobiles
The author employed a new car choice model using the
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multinomial logit framework suggested in Cox (1970) for 
aggregate data. In this model, the probability that a driver 
with particular characteristics chooses one type of new car 
over another is estimated as follows :
= f{ Y, UN, ST, (Pn% “ Pnb), (en% - en^)}
Where:
N^ / N^ = the relative sales of a car of type k to the 
sales of a car type b.
(Pn^ - Pn^) = difference in price between the two types.
(en^ - en^) = difference in fuel efficiency of the two 
types (reflecting the cost of running the car ) .
(49) The Producer's Decision
Automobile manufacturers are assumed to make decisions 
on the design of ten categories of new cars several years 
prior to the marketing year. The categories were adopted by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The fuel 
economies chosen for the future models are those levels that 
maximize the present value of the profit stream. The 
producers' expected revenues are directly related to the 
expected consumers' demand for fuel economy. To capture the 
costs of designing a more fuel efficient automobile in a 
given weight class, dummy variables for the weight classes, 
DWi where i=l, ....10, are used. Moreover, the costs of 
meeting fuel economy standards imposed by the EPA are 
represented by dummy variables, DST.
The manufacturers' profit maximization behaviour 
suggests that the relationship for the technical fuel economy
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of new vehicles in a given class of model year t is given by
en = f( DTs75-77^ DWI . . DWIO, Pg , Pg , Pg )
t-1 t-2 t-3Where :
Pg = composite U.S. and Canadian prices of gasoline, t-i
(50) The Aggregate Gasoline Demand Identity is :
AG = G(e) * S 
Where :
AG = aggregate gasoline.
G(e) = gallons of gasoline consumption per car.
S = stock of automobiles.
All the equations in the model are estimated by Ordinary 
Least Squares (GLS) using pooled time series and cross- 
sectional data. The short run price elasticity estimated by 
the model ranges from -0.3 to -0.4 across Canada. The author 
estimated that 84 percent of this response is due to 
individuals driving fewer miles, 15 percent due to a change 
in the size of the fleet and less than 1 percent due to the 
shift in the composition of the fleet towards more fuel 
efficient vehicles. The five-year intermediate-run price 
elasticity ranges from -.6 to -.8 and the ten-year long-run 
price elasticity ranges from -.7 to -.9.
The most important contribution of Gallini's study to 
the current literature on gasoline demand is the detailed 
treatment of the fuel economy of passenger cars. In the 
model, two components of the sales-weighted fuel economy of 
new cars are estimated separately (i) the technical fuel
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efficiency set by the automobile manufacturers (ii) the sales 
ratio for three classes of new cars, differentiated according 
to natural weight of the vehicles. As the new car fuel 
economy gradually changes, this causes the average fuel 
economy of the fleet to change and hence the gasoline demand 
per mile to decrease.
The greatest shortcoming of Gallini's work is a lack of 
data. Because of data deficiency all used cars are 
aggregated into one category, which is the main weakness of 
the model. Another deficiency in the model is its analysis 
of the individual driver's rather than the household's 
decision.
III. Market Models
This category includes those models in which both the 
demand and supply sides of the market are considered.
(i) Ramsey, Raasche, Allen Model (RRA).
This model is presented in a well-known paper (1974).
The authors used a sophisticated model in which they 
introduced gasoline supply and commercial demand as well as 
household gasoline demand. Moreover, their model is static 
in nature, and assumes that market equilibrium is achieved in 
the first time period. On the supply side of the market, the 
share of motor gasoline to total crude supplied is a function 
of the wholesale price of distillates. Prices of the 
distillates are assumed to be exogenous to the gasoline
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market. Letting Pwg be the wholesale price of gasoline 
deflated by a principal components index of distillate price 
PI, P2, and P3, Gs be the quantity of motor gasoline 
supplied, and Co be the annual crude oil supply, the supply 
curve becomes :
(51) Gs - Co = f ( Pwg , PI, P2, P3 )
t-1
The demand side of the market is divided into private 
and commercial demands. The estimated equations, using time 
series data from 1947 to 1970 for the U.S. are given below.
(52) Private Demand :
Gp = f ( Prg, Pt, Tp, Y )t—1Where :
Gp = annual private gasoline demand per household.
Prg = retail price of gasoline.
Pt = price index of train travel cost deflated by CPI.
Tp = proportion of population in 16 - 26 age groups.
Y = real disposable income.
(53) Commercial Demand
Gc = f( Peg , Pd, Fc )
Where :
Peg = commercial price of gasoline deflated by the 
price index of the truck freight rates.
Pd = diesel price divided by the truck freight rate 
index.
Fc = index of the total ton miles demanded of all 
freight carriers.
One of the improvements of the RRA model is its
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decomposition of the demand side into private and commercial 
demands with the use of public transportation costs and the 
population age distribution as explanatory variables for the 
demand equations. Furthermore, the specification of the 
supply side is considered both realistic and sensible.
The criticisms of the flow-adjustment model are also 
relevant to RRA model. Also, the dynamic process of the 
adjustment to changes in economic conditions is difficult to 
comprehend from the model.
(ii) Dahl Model (DM)
This is another study in which both the consumer's and 
producer's decision problems are modelled. In this case the 
purpose of the study was to examine the validity of the 
charge that the U.S. would consume more energy per capita 
than other industrial nations when faced with their relative 
prices. The author extended the results by estimating the 
same model using U.S., Canadian, and EEC data to allow a 
comparison of robustness of the model and elasticities 
results.
The DM model is a simultaneous system model similar to 
the RRA model. However, the DM model was chosen in order to 
avoid simultaneous system bias. The consumer's problem is to 
choose a quantity of gasoline which will maximize the utility 
of vehicle services, which is produced by a combination of 
gasoline and automobiles, subject to the consumer's income
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constraint. The outcome of the maximization problem is a 
demand for gasoline, GD, as a function of the price of
gasoline, Pg, income, Y, and the price of automobile
services. Since information on the price of car services was 
not available, the stock of automobiles, SA, was used as a 
proxy. Assuming a log-linear functional form, the model 
yields the following demand equation:
(54) GD = a + b Pg + c Y + d SA
The next equation is the stock adjustment equation which 
gives the stock of automobiles as a function of the price of 
automobiles, PA, the price of gasoline, income and lagged 
stock of automobiles SA^.^. The stock of automobiles was 
specified as follows :
(55) SA = e + f Pg + h PA + k Y + g SA
t-1
Estimating demand using OLS when the price of gasoline 
is not exogenous leads to simultaneous system bias. For this 
reason the author considered the supply side of the market. 
The producer's problem is to maximize profit by choosing the 
best combination of gasoline and heavy distillates to produce 
from a barrel of crude oil. On the average, gasoline, 
residual fuel oil, kerosine, and distillate fuel oil account 
for nearly 80 percent of a barrel of crude oil. The supply 
equation was the share of gasoline in a barrel of crude oil 
as a function of relative wholesale price of kerosine, PK, 
distillate fuel oil, PD, and residual fuel oil, PR, and a
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variable to represent technical improvement over the sample 
time period, TI. The supply equation is given below :
(56) GS = m + n PK + q PD + u PR + V TI
Where PK, Pd, and PR are the prices of kerosine , diesel and
residual oil respectively, deflated by the wholesale gasoline 
price. The wholesale gasoline price, PWg, is used to deflate 
the distillate prices, but in the demand equation (54) the 
retail price of gasoline is used.
The author introduced equation (57) below to define the 
retail price of gasoline as the wholesale price of gasoline 
plus the gasoline tax, TX.
(57) Pg = PWg + TX
Using U.S. time series date for 1953-1972, Canadian data
for 1954-1973, and EEC data for 1960-1970 the following 
results for the elasticities of demand were reported.
TABLE 3 - 1  
The Long-Run Elasticity of Demand
Variables Pg Y SA r2 DW
U.S.A -1.0480 . 322 . 545 .88 1. 98
(7.3) (6.8) (7.7)
Canada -0.460 . 334 . 662 .99 1. 89
(1.4) (8.1) (8.4)
E.E.C -0.358 .480 . 188 . 88 1. 88
(5.4) (7.4) (2.6)
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Two comments may be made. First the DM model may be 
mis-specifled since it does not recognize exports and imports 
as well as domestically produced fuels as separate regressors 
in the supply equation (56). Second, the total gasoline 
price elasticity of demand for the U.S. in the short-run is 
-.442, larger than the EEC's long-run price elasticity. The 
long-run U.S. price elasticity of -1.048 is twice as large as 
Canada's and three times as large as the EEC's.
All the gasoline demand models reviewed in this chapter 
are summarized in Table 3 - 2  and Table 3 - 3  below. The 
data used in the estimation, a brief model description and 
the short & long-run elasticities are all reported.
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IV. SUMMARY
In recent years, gasoline demand has become the focus of 
a considerable amount of econometric work. A variety of 
models, data sets, and time periods have been used to 
estimate gasoline demand elasticities. The studies show 
substantial variation between these elasticities. Also, the 
studies suggest that most of the adjustment to a change in 
the price of gasoline comes from number of miles driven in 
the short-run and from miles per gallon in the long-run.
The flow-adjustment models do not seem to pick up long- 
run price elasticities since these models do not include 
stock adjustment variables in their specification. On the 
other hand, the investment-utilization models solve this 
problem by employing technical variables, such as fuel 
economy and vehicle characteristics, along with economic 
variables, such as prices, income, unemployment, interest 
rates and so on. Each model has its own limitations.
However, a detailed and careful specification of all the 
technical features of the stock of cars along with the 
prevailing economic conditions could certainly produce a 
significant improvement in estimating elasticities of the 
demand for gasoline in Canada
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Table 3 - 2
Summary of statistics of Gasoline Demand Models
Auther Method of Estimation Goodness of Fit Used for Simulation
1Uesd for Forecast
DHW OLS r 2 = 0.97 
(high level 
of autocor)
No No
HVS ErrorComponent r 2 = 0.92 Yes No
NEB OLS r2 = 0.91 DW = 2.09 Yes Yes
P-H Zellner Ef f icient Method N/A N/A N/A
NAV N/A N/A N/A N/A
RC GLS r 2 = 0.95 
DW = 2.2 5 Yes Yes
GM OLS r 2 = 0.97 
DW = 1.98 Yes No
RRA TSLS r 2 = 0.98
DW = 0.9 6 Yes No
DM OLS r 2 = 0.99 Yes Yes
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NOTES
1. An example of this type of models can be fond in the 
the Society of Automotive Engineers' publications.
2. The model did take account of the significant changes 
designed to reduce air pollution that had been introduced 
into new cars since 1969 in the U.S. The underprediction 
of gasoline consumption could be the result of the 
increased percentage of new vehicles with their 
associated air pollution devices and resulting in poor 
fuel efficiency.
3. The model includes only two classes; small (subcompact 
and compact) and large (intermediate and standard). The 
authors estimated equation (10) for the market share of 
large car models and use it with the new car sales 
equation (9) to obtain the share of small category 
residually.
4. The authors were not successful in estimating an equation 
that related the scrappage rates to variables such as 
income, unemployment, gasoline price , and fuel 
efficiency mainly because of a lack of data at the 
provincial level. After surveying work in this area they 
borrowed from the International Research and Technology 
Corporation (1976). The equation (11) relates 
probability of survival of a vehicle to the median life 
and age of the vehicle.
5. Westin, R., " Empirical Implication of Infrequent
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Purchase Behaviour in a Stock Adjustment Models " , 
American Economic Review, June 1975. He suggested that 
not only unemployment rate , permanent income and 
transitory income should be included in the new car 
registrations, but also lagged values for discretionary 
variables.
6. Price index of automobiles is defined as the ratio of 
expenditures of personal transportation equipment in 
current purchaser value to the expenditures of a base 
year, divided by the GDP deflator.
7. If equation (15) was derived from a stock adjustment 
model, it should not contain the lagged new registration 
term. The model and the results are reported directly 
from the referenced study.
8. Y variable found to be statistically insignificant.
9. The price of the gasoline per mile rather than per gallon 
should have been used to explain miles driven per car.
10. In equation (34) the demand for gasoline is normalized, 
implying homogeneity of demand, which is a classic 
assumption of the consumer theory. The homogeneity of 
degree zero in the demand function suggests that if 
prices and income increase by the same proportion, there 
is no change in the quantity demanded.
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Chapter IV 
A Gasoline Demand Model
The model presented in this study is of the investment- 
utilization type discussed earlier in section 2 of Chapter 
III. The basic identity for aggregate gasoline demand, G, in 
the model is given by
(1) G = MS . S . 1/e
where MS = miles driven per car (vehicle miles)
S = Total automobiles in the fleet
e = average fuel economy of the fleet
This model has its theoretical basis in the household 
production literature, i.e.. Baker (1960), Lancaster (1966), 
Pollack and Wachter (1975). The household production theory 
is briefly reviewed in the next section.
1. Review of the household production theory
In the conventional consumer theory, an individual or 
household purchases goods and services in the market to 
maximize utility subject to the constraint that the 
expenditures on those goods and services do not exceed the 
resources available to the individual or household. The 
household production theory was originally developed to 
determine the properties of demand for non-marketed 
commodities which are produced from marketed goods or inputs 
that are not desired for their own sake. For example, most 
households derive utility from consuming gasoline only 
because it is an input into the production of vehicle miles.
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not because it is a source of utility in itself. That is why
the demand for gasoline is called a derived demand.
There is a two-step procedure for deriving the demand
function for non-marketed commodities. First, let these
commodities be denoted by the vector C = (Cl,...,Cm). Let
the n inputs or goods which are used to produce the
commodities be denoted by the vector G = (Gl,...,Gn).
Furthermore, the quantity of input or good i used to produce
commodity is given by Therefore, the production
/  /  /function for commodity JL is given by f"^ : = f'^ (G 1,...G n)
(2) Gi = 5 1  G
A zThat is to say, the total amount of input i consumed,
Gi, equals the sum of the quantities of that input used to 
produce the commodities. For example, let the ith input be 
gasoline. Let Gli be the quantity of gasoline used in the 
production of commodity 1 which is, let us say, driving a 
car. Let G2i be the gasoline used to power home equipment 
and so on. The total quantity of gasoline consumed, Gi, 
equals the sum of all its uses, Gli + G2i + ....+Gmi.
Then, in the procedure for deriving the commodities' 
demand function, the minimum cost of producing vector C must 
be found. Let P denote the vector of input prices and E(P,C) 
denote the cost function. Then the problem is to minimize 
the cost function subject to the set of production functions 
or technology.
n(3) E(P,C) = Min 2 H P i  Gi
Gl,...,Gn 1—1
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The solution to the problem yields the implicit 
commodity prices for the vector of Cl commodities. These 
prices are called implicit prices because they are not 
realized in the marketplace. Letting denote those 
implicit prices, K^ are given by:
(4) (P,C) = h E(P,C) / & C
Under constant returns to scale and no joint production 
the.^-th implicit commodity price is simply the marginal cost 
of producing an additional unit of c o m m o d i t y T h a t  is, the 
implicit commodity price is independent of the level of the 
commodity consumed.
The second step in deriving the commodity demand 
function is to maximize the household utility function over 
the commodities subject to the budget constraint, or
m(5) Max U(C) subject to 5Z~ (P) C'^ ^  Y
where Y is the income of the household. The solution to 
this maximization problem yields the demand functions for the 
commodities C f'^ (K,Y) .
The above two assumptions— that the household production 
functions exhibit constant returns to scale and that there is 
no joint production— are necessary and sufficient conditions 
for ensuring that the implicit commodity prices are 
independent of the level of the commodity consumed. That is, 
these commodity prices reflect only opportunities available 
and not the tastes of the consumers ^. Under such
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conditions, the derived commodity demand functions preserve 
traditional demand theory results homogeneity and symmetry ^.
For the purpose of this research the validity of the 
basic properties of demand function is not investigated. As 
Gilbert (1989)  ^has argued " We can test emperical models, 
but can not directly test theories " P. 4; although whether 
we can indirectly test theories is a controversial issue.
Nevertheless, in the case where one of these two 
conditions is violated. Pollack and Wachter argue that 
commodity demands should be estimated as a function of input 
prices rather than commodity prices. As long as the 
production functions do not exhibit strong increasing returns 
to scale, the input demand curves behave according to the 
conventional theory, even with joint production.
The dependence of commodity prices on the commodity consumed, 
or joint production, occurs when an input can be used to 
produce two activities and the household's utility depends 
upon the amount of that input used in each activity. A 
classic example for that type of input is time. To quote 
Pollack and Wachter  ^ :
"Households with different tastes will select different 
commodity bundles, the commodity bundles they select will 
imply different commodity prices. The unwary economist might 
attribute some part of the difference in the consumption 
patterns of different households to these differences in 
commodity prices, but such an interpretation would be highly
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misleading, the differences in commodity prices are a 
reflection of differences in tastes, not of differences in 
opportunities."
2. The Model : The Gasoline per Car Equation
A well-defined preference ordering over commodities, 
vehicle miles, Ms, all other commodities, X, time spent 
driving, TI, and time spent in leisure, T2, conditional on 
automobile ownership, is assumed to exist for the household. 
The bundle of characteristics describing the vehicle which 
produces vehicle miles is assumed to enter the utility 
function and is given by the vector C = (Cl,...,Cn).
The utility function is:
(6) U = U( MS, X, TI, T2; C)
A production function describes the relationship between
the output of miles from a particular automobile, and the 
inputs of gasoline, GS, and time, TI, conditional on the 
automobile's characteristics. That is:
(7) MS - f( GS, TI; C)
Following the convention of earlier models, the 
production function in equation (7) could be re-defined as
(8) MS = GS . E(T1)
Where GS = gasoline input per automobile and E(T1) is the 
fuel economy of the vehicle as a function of time spent 
driving the MS miles. The budget constraint faced by the 
household is given by:
(9) Pg GS + Ps(C) + Px X + W(T1 + T2) .< V + WT
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Where
Pg = price of gasoline per gallon
Ps(C) = rental cost of the automobile services
Px = price of all other goods— the consumer price index
W = wage rate per unit of time
V = non-labour income
T = available hours per period where T = TI + T2
The relationships in (6), (8) and (9) are sufficient to
produce the household's decision of whether or not to 
purchase a vehicle, the type of vehicle, the number of miles 
to be driven, and finally, gasoline consumption. There are 
two main approaches to describing the gasoline consumption 
decision. One approach has been to assume the household 
first purchases an automobile of particular characteristics, 
then chooses the number of miles to drive. Alternatively, 
there is the argument that the number of vehicle miles 
desired encourages automobile ownership. The approach 
outlined in this derivation of demand for miles recognizes 
the simultaneity of the utilization-investment decision.
That is, the number of vehicle miles desired encourages 
automobile ownership.
It is assumed that the household has already made its 
decisions regarding the allocation of available income 
between saving and current expenditure. Then the household 
is assumed to make its decisions in the following order. At 
the beginning of each year the household reassesses its stock
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of holdings of automobiles. Conditional on car ownership and 
accounting for the type of car (used or new, large or small, 
power... etc.), the household chooses the utility-maximizing 
number of miles to drive the automobile. Then the household 
chooses the type of car which maximizes utility given the 
usage factor of the automobile or the expected number of 
miles. For example, if the household's utility of miles and 
automobile ownership exceeds the utility of driving zero 
vehicle miles, the household chooses to purchase the desired 
vehicle.
More formally, the first step in solving the problem is 
to find the commodity price of miles. This is obtained from 
equation (8) by the following equation:
(10) Pm = Pg / E(T1)
which gives the gasoline cost per mile. The second step is 
to derive the commodity demand function as follows:
(11) Maximize U( MS, X, TI, T2, C)
MS,X,T1,T2;C 
Subject to the budget constraint
Pm . MS + Ps(C) + Px X + W(T1 + T2) ^ V + wf 5 
Derivation of Demand Function
L(MS,X,T1,T2, ) = U(MS,X,T1,T2;C) - (Pm MS + Ps(C)+ Px X +
W(T1 + T2) - V + WT)
The first order conditions :
&U(MS) / ^  MS = XPm (i)
Xu(X) / Xx = X px (ii)
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&U(T1) / è T l  = \W(T1) (iii)
XU(T2) /XT2 = X w (T2) (iv)
Pm MS + Ps(C) + Px X + W(T1 + T2) - V + WT = 0 (v)
Or
^U(MS) /à MS Pm (.i)
à U(X ) / 6 X Px (ii)
and ,
Xu(Tl) / X TI W(T1) (iii)
6 U(T2) / ^  T2 W(T2) (iv)
and the equation in (v).
The solution value of each of the amounts consumed of 
MS, X, TI, T2 depends, of course, upon the values of the 
exogenous variables Pm, Px, Ps, W, and V. Hence, the optimum 
amount consumed of each commodity can be expressed as a 
function of all prices and income, i.e.:
(12) MS = g( Pm, Ps(C), Px, W, V; C)
The gasoline costs per mile depend upon the fuel economy 
characteristic of the car. That is, cost per mile is the per 
gallon price of gasoline divided by the fuel economy of the 
automobile. The other characteristics of the automobile are 
assumed not to be important determinants of the number of 
miles demanded and therefore the C variable can be removed 
from equation (12). Also, all prices can be expressed 
relative to the price of other goods, Px, and by homogeneity 
of degree zero the relationship in equation (12) is
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preserved. Then, the relationship in equation (12) can be 
re-written as follows:
(13) MS = g( Pm, Ps(C), W, V)
Moreover, in most previous gasoline demand studies, 
household disposable income, YH, has been substituted for the 
wage rate and the non-labour income because data on these 
variables are not available. Further, the wage rate 
represents the opportunity cost of not working for those 
households earning W. But the opportunity cost of unemployed 
household is not observable, and therefore the unemployment 
rate, UN, could be used to proxy this effect ^.
By changing the notation of Pm = Pg/E(T1) to Pm = Pg/e
(where e = E(T1) = fuel efficiency) and re-writing equation
(13), the following relationship for miles per car is 
obtained.
(14) MS = g( Pg/e, Ps, YH, UN)
In order to obtain gasoline demand per car, the
production function in (8) can be re-expressed as:
GS = MS . 1/e
Then, by substitution of equation (14) the relationship 
yields :
(15) GS = g( Pg/e, Ps, YH, UN) . 1/e
which gives the gallons of gasoline consumed per automobile.
Previous studies have experimented with a number of 
demographic variables. The current study includes the 
following demographic variables: the percentage of population
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living in metropolitan areas (RU) , the percentage of 
population of driving age (16-65) (POP) , and the number of 
automobiles per household (AH) from recently published survey 
data.
On the issue of the choice of the functional form, as it 
has been mentioned in chapter 3, the linear and log-linear 
functional forms are the most frequently used. However, 
statistical work by Dahl (1986) suggests that the log-linear 
is often favoured over the linear specification ^. In 
Dahl's survey, when Box-Cox tests were used, the results 
tended to favour the log-linear form more often for gasoline 
demand and miles travelled equations because of the following 
reasons :
1. the tests suggest that the elasticities do not vary 
over prices and incomes, thus favouring a log-linear 
form.
2. there is no systematic variation detected between the 
two forms.
3. when a semi-log form with inverted income variable is 
used, the income elasticity is significantly lower.
Taking these results into consideration and knowing that most 
recent work on gasoline demand has been using the log-linear 
form, the log-linear functional form is adopted for the 
current study.
The method of estimation used for most of the equations 
in the model is the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with
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Autoregression correction when necessary. Other estimation 
techniques were also tried such as Two Stages Least Square 
(TSLS) and Generalized Least Square (GLS) but produced very 
similar results to those of OLS estimation. Dahl (1986) has 
noted that single equation estimation techniques, which 
assume that price of gasoline is exogenous, are the most 
common among studies of gasoline demand. She also has argued 
that estimating demand for gasoline in the U.S.A. using 
single equation techniques might lead to simultaneous system 
bias toward zero. This may be true for the U.S. but since 
Canada represents only small part of world market, it is 
quite acceptable to assume that price of gasoline is 
exogenous. That is to say there may be no bias when 
estimating price elasticities using single equation 
techniques.
Then, the log-linear relationship for equation (15) can 
be written as:
(16) Ln GS = Ai + B1 Ln Pg/e + B2 Ln Ps + B3 Ln YH + B4 Ln UN 
+ B5 Ln RU + B6 Ln POP + B7 Ln AH + B8 Ln e
The average costs of owning, operating and maintaining 
an automobile, Ps, net of gasoline costs, are not available. 
In the presence of this data deficiency, one of two 
approaches have been suggested by previous studies. The 
first is to proxy the average cost of vehicle services by the 
stock of cars, as in Dahl's model. The second is to simply 
enter the rental cost of the automobile services into the Px
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vector— the consumer price index, as in Gallini's model. In 
this case, the rental cost of the automobile services is 
assumed to affect the miles driven only through its' 
influence on total expenditure. The second approach is 
adopted for the gasoline equation and the rental cost 
variable is not explicitly included in the estimated 
equation.
The coefficient for the gasoline cost per mile, Pg/e, is 
expected to be negative as an increase in the gasoline price 
is likely to reduce demand for gasoline per car. As for the 
coefficient for the income variable, the expected sign is 
positive.
The sign for the estimated coefficient on the 
unemployment rate is expected to be negative. The
coefficient for both the percentage of population living in
urban areas, RU, and the percentage of the population of
driving age, POP, are ambiguous. A household is expected to
drive less if it is located in a city or the vicinity than in 
a rural area because of congestion, the availability of 
public transportation, or shorter travelling distances. 
However, fuel efficiency in urban areas is lowered because of 
congestion and traffic lights. Therefore the sign on this 
variable will depend on the relative strength of these two 
factors.
The driving age population consists of different age 
groups. The 16-44 age group appears to be more active and
87
therefore drives more heavily than the rest of the age groups 
of 45 and over. Hence the sign on this variable will depend 
on the age composition of the drivers.
The sign for the estimated coefficient on number of 
vehicles per household is expected to be negative. The 
previous empirical evidence suggests that as the number of 
cars per household increases the household tends to use the 
more fuel efficient vehicle more extensively than the other 
vehicles, resulting in less gasoline consumption per car.
The sign for the fuel efficiency variable, e, is expected to 
be negative, as an increase in the fuel efficiency of a 
vehicle will result in less consumption of gasoline.
The estimation results of the modified equation (15) are 
given in Tables 4-1. However, before discussing the results 
in detail, an account of the data and data sources is given 
below.
The Data;
Pooled time-series and cross-section data on the 
Canadian provinces from 1969-1988 were used. All prices and 
income are expressed relative to the consumer price index 
(1981 = 100). Statistics Canada published reports provided 
the data on stock of cars, regional unemployment rates, net 
gasoline sales ^, price of gasoline at the pump in several 
major Canadian cities, and the consumer price index in major 
cities. The household income was obtained from Statistics
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Canada's Household Expenditure Survey, The number of 
automobiles per household is obtained from the Household 
Facilities and Equipment Survey conducted by Statistics 
Canada. The average fuel efficiency data are obtained from 
the Household Fuel Consumption Survey, also conducted by 
Statistics Canada since 1978. The earlier fuel efficiency 
series were gathered from the Canadian Automobile Survey, the 
Economic and Technical Review Report, published by 
Environment Canada. Finally, the data on the percentage of 
population living in urban areas, and the percentage of 
population of driving age were obtained from several issues 
of Canada's Year Book. The full data set is given in 
Appendix I.
Estimation of the Gasoline Equation:
A variance components model ^, which allows separate 
provincial intercepts, is assumed. The estimation procedure 
employed is Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with auto-correlation 
correction where necessary. Table 4-1 below gives the best 
results amongst numerous trials. Also, another model has 
been tried where the relatively new procedure of 
cointegration is used. A full discussion of this procedure 
and its results are given in chapter 9 for the Province of 
Ontario.
The signs of the estimated coefficient on income, 
unemployment rate, price of gasoline per mile, fuel
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efficiency of the fleet and the number of vehicles per 
household are consistent with economic theory in the three 
equations. Furthermore, the price of gasoline per mile, the 
fuel economy of the fleet, the household disposable income, 
the unemployment rate and the number of vehicles per 
household are all significantly different from zero at the 99 
percent level in the third equation.
The intercept terms account for the differences among 
provinces which can not be quantified, i.e., the availability 
of public transportation systems, degree of urbanization 
etc., are captured by the separate intercepts. All of the 
intercept terms yield a high T-statistic. More results are 
given in Appendix II.
The short-run gasoline price elasticities per car, 
holding the fuel economy constant is in the range of -.19 to 
-.22. This estimate is smaller than those given in Chapter 
III of this study; perhaps because partial adjustment models 
do not allow the adjustment process to respond to changes in 
the economic environment and/or too much explanatory power is 
given to the price of gasoline. The results give a short-run 
income elasticity in the range of 0.15 to 0.25, which are 
very similar to those presented in Chapter III.
A problem of colinearity arises when using UN and YH 
in the same equation. However, the correlation coefficient 
for these two variables is only -0.0761 which does not 
suggest colinearity.
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Notes
1. For further discussion of this point see Pollack and 
Wachter - 1975, P 261 - 266.
2. Where for two different commodities Xi and Xj with
respective prices Pi and Pj, the following relationship 
holds for the same level of utility U.
à Xi/ à Xj } U = h Xj/à Xi } U (Slutsky Symmetry)
3. A good discussion of the validity of the underlying 
theories is given by Christopher L. Gilbert in his paper 
" Do Economists Test Theories? - Demand Analysis and 
Consumption Analysis as Tests of theories of Economic 
Methodology" which was prepared for the conference:
" Transitions in Recent Economics: Studies in Alternative 
Research Programmes" held in Capri, Italy, 15 - 18 October 
1989. He investigated the claim that in doing 
econometrics we are testing economic theory. He stated 
" In the first instance, one is always testing 
an empirical model and not a theory. The interesting 
question is the implication of rejection of an empirical 
model for the status of the theoretical model. In demand 
analysis econometricians have been happy to reject 
additive and rank two demand systems in favour of more 
general alternatives, but regard satisfaction of the 
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions as specification 
tests on the empirical model."
He argued that in demand analysis frequent rejection of
I
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particular models has not in any way threatened demand 
theory.
" The homogeneity and symmetry restrictions in 
demand theory are, at the level of the individual agent, 
direct implications of individualistic optimization in the 
context of a free market. There is no significant rival 
paradigm for the description of consumers' allocations 
over goods in the developed market economies,"
4. Pollack and Wachter , M. L, " The Relevance of the 
household production function and its implications for 
allocation of time " , Journal of Political Economy 1975. 
P. 340 - 349.
5. From equation (8) GS = MS/E(T1) by substituting this 
value in equation (9) in the first term yields
Pg * MS/E(T1) or Pm * MS.
6. Shalaby and Waghmare in their model-NEB, and Gallini's
model, both used the same approach to this problem.
7. Gasoline Demand Survey by Carol A. Dahl, the Energy 
Journal Vol. 7 No. 1, 1986.
8. For example, the taxable gasoline which is primarily sold 
to the drivers of cars, buses and trucks at the gas pump.
9. Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Econometric Models and Economic 
Forecasts, 1976 by McGraw-Hill. P. 203 - 206.
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CHAPTER V 
STOCK OP AUTOMOBILES
In the previous section the sequence of the decisions 
facing the household was outlined. Recall that each 
household is assumed to reassess its holding of cars in the 
current period depending upon expectations of gasoline costs 
and the average characteristics of available vehicles. Also, 
at the beginning of every period, the manufacturers are 
assumed to announce the prices of new cars and the design,
i.e., the fuel economy of the new cars. Given these designs, 
the prices of the automobiles, and the expected milage costs, 
the household decide on the ownership and the type of the 
vehicle. Conditional on car ownership, the household then 
choose the bundle of vehicle miles to drive as shown in 
Figure 5 - 1 .
Previous studies have used the lagged values of the 
stock of cars, along with the cost of gasoline per mile and 
the average price of new cars, as explanatory variables for 
the stock holding decision. However, since strikes in the 
automobile industry may delay the purchase of a new vehicle, 
a variable which represents the man-days lost in the 
automobile industry due to strikes, ST, is included. Also, 
an income per household variable, YH, the unemployment rate, 
UN, the percentage of population in the driving age, POP, the 
percentage of population living in urban areas, RU, and the 
prime interest rate in Canada, are all tested.
,
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Figure 5 - 1  
Gasoline Demand Flow Chart
Total Gasoline
Consumption
Demand for Miles per Automobile
Fuel Efficiency
of The Fleet
Consumers' Choice of Automobile Holdings
Manufacturers ' Choice of Fuel Economy for the New Automobiles
Economic and Environmental Variables
* Price of Gasoline * Price of Cars
* Fuel Economy Standard * Income* Unemployment * Strikes * Population
* Automobile Holding * Interest Rates
* Environmental Control
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The basic equation for estimating the car holdings per 
household is given as:
(17) (S/H) = g( Pn, Pg/e, (S/H), YH, UN, ST, POP)t-1
The log-linear functional form will be:
(18) Ln (S/H) = Ci + D1 Ln Pn + D2 Ln Pg/e + D3 Ln YH +D4 Ln
(S/H) + D5 Ln UN + D6 Ln ST + D7 Ln POPt-1
The coefficient for the cost of gasoline per mile is 
expected to have a negative sign as a reflection of the fact 
that gasoline and automobiles are complementary goods. It 
has been argued by Dahl (1986) that the gasoline cost per 
gallon, rather than per miles, is a more appropriate 
regressor for the stock of automobiles equation. Researchers
have reported that the price of gasoline and the price of new
cars tend to be correlated. This is because other 
characteristics of the automobile which are related with fuel 
efficiency, e.g. power and size, are not accounted for.
Thus, the estimated coefficient on price of gasoline per mile 
may actually be explaining the effect of a change in the 
power or size of an automobile which in return will be 
reflected in the price of new cars and create a problem of 
collinearity between the two prices.
This is typically an empirical matter. Nevertheless, 
both appoaches have been explored in this section and the 
price of gasoline per gallon behaved rather well.
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The Data:
The price of new cars from four categories, classified 
by the interior volume of the vehicle- which will be 
discussed in great details in the next chapter - are weighted 
averages of the prices of the four largest sellers in Canada 
for that year. The source of these prices is the Canadian 
Golden Book of Used Car Prices 1968-1989.
All the other sources of the variables remain the same 
as in the previous chapters. The prime interest rate in 
Canada is obtained from different issues of the Statistics 
Canada Year Book. Stock of cars is obtained from Statistics 
Canada's Catalogue 53-219 and the number of households in 
each province is obtained from Statistics Canada's Household 
Facilities and Equipment Survey which is conducted in May of 
each year and published annually in catalogue 64-202.
Estimation of Car Holdings Per Household Equation:
After extensive experimentation with this equation, a 
few number of satisfactory results were obtained. Because of 
the problem of collinearity between the price of gasoline and 
the price of new cars, none of the specifications tried 
produced statistically significant coefficients for both 
prices in the same equation. The best results for equation
(17) are reported in Table 5-1 below. The estimation 
procedure employed is the Ordinary Least Square (OLS). Two 
Stages Least Square (TSLS), Generalized Least Square (GLS),
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Autoregressive and Zellner methods were all tried but did not 
improve the results.
The price of gasoline per gallon was found empirically 
to be more appropriate for the stock of automobiles equation. 
However, the best results were obtained when the price of 
gasoline per gallon, lagged one time period, was included in 
the regression equation. This may indicate that, regarding 
the stock-holding decision, the household forms a static 
expectation of gasoline prices.
The strikes in the automobile industry variable was 
found to be insignificant for the stock of cars equation and 
has been removed. The unemployment rate and the percentage 
of population living in urban areas have been dropped from 
the equation on the grounds that they displayed a wrong sign 
or were found to be consistently insignificant.
Regarding the new car price, one possible reason why it 
did not behave well in the stock equation is that the new car 
price is not the flow costs of the services, the latter 
depending on the financing of the automobile, and 
approximately the real interest rate times the price of the 
car, plus maintenance costs. If the real interest rate were 
relatively constant and maintenance costs were a constant 
proportion of the automobile price over the estimation 
period, then the price of cars represents a good proxy for 
the desired variable.
The prime interest rate in Canada was included in an
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alternative specification. Its' estimated coefficient has 
the right sign and it was found to be statistically 
significant. However, the price of new cars remained 
insignificant.
Moreover, in the results, the gasoline price 
elasticities of the stock of cars per household were found to 
be small. It should be noted that these are short run 
elasticity since in the long run, the household could switch 
to smaller more fuel efficient cars or current owners could 
use their more fuel efficient cars more extensively. The 
results suggest that in the short run, the response to 
gasoline price changes is not expected to be large.
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CHAPTER VI 
THE NEW AUTOMOBILE SALES EQUATION
In the next sections the decision among new car types 
and fuel economies are modelled. The choice among new car 
types is only a sub-problem of a more general decision among 
various new cars, used automobiles, or non-ownership of a 
vehicle. In this section, the possibility of households
choosing the new car option is discussed. The basic
relationship is given by:
(19) (NR/H) = f( Pn, Pg/e, YH, UN, (S/H), ST)
t-1Where NR/H = new car sales divided by the number of 
households in each province.
Assuming a log-linear functional form, equation (19) 
gives the following relation:
(20) Ln (NR/H) = Ei + FI Ln Pg/e + F2 Ln Pn + F3 Ln YH
+ F4 Ln UN + F5 Ln ST + F6 Ln (S/H)
t-1
The coefficient for the cost of gasoline per mile is 
expected to have a negative sign, as gasoline and automobiles 
are complementary goods. One of the possible consumer 
adjustments to a gasoline price increase is to buy fewer 
automobiles or to buy more fuel efficient cars. It has been 
argued before that the gasoline cost per gallon, rather than
per mile is a more appropriate regressor for the new
automobiles equation. This is because other characteristics 
of the automobile which are correlated with fuel economy, 
e.g., engine power and size, are not accounted for. Thus,
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the estimated coefficients on fuel economy may actually be 
explaining the effect of a change in the engine power or the 
size of an automobile on new car sales. This is an empirical 
matter; both approaches have been explored in the current 
section but the gasoline cost per mile was chosen.
The coefficient of the new car prices variable is 
expected to have a negative sign, as an increase in own-price 
should reduce purchases. Income per household is expected to 
have a positive sign, since automobiles are considered normal 
goods. Shalaby and Waghmar's (NEB) model used the ratio of 
automobile price to disposable income in their new car sales 
equation. They argued that the implication of using the 
ratio variable is that the elasticity of demand for new car 
sales with respect to car price varies inversely with income. 
This specification was also tried but it was difficult to 
interpret the size of the coefficient.
Moreover, Westin (1975) suggested that lagged transitory 
income and unemployment should be included in the list of 
regressors explaining new car sales. As the permanent income 
hypothesis indicates, the timing of transitory income gains 
is more effective than permanent income in determining the 
timing of new car purchases. In Westin's model, the 
coefficient on current transitory income was assumed to be 
the negative value of the coefficient on lagged transitory 
income, holding permanent income constant. To account for 
this effect in the new car sales equation, the household
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disposable income lagged one time period was included. The 
expected sign on lagged income is negative since an increase 
in income one year prior to the year in which a household 
planned to purchase a new automobile may have provided the 
flexibility to purchase the vehicle early, thus decreasing 
purchases in the current period. The coefficients on current 
and lagged income are not expected to be equal in absolute 
value since household income is a composite of permanent and 
transitory income. The results of this alternative 
specification of the new car sales equation are given in 
Table 6-1. However, the specification in equation (20) was 
chosen since it gave more reasonable results.
The coefficient for the unemployment rate (UN) is 
expected to exhibit a negative sign since at lower levels of 
unemployment, new car sales are expected to increase. The 
unemployment rate variable has been included as a cyclical 
indicator of economic conditions. It provides information 
about the phase of the business cycle and the expected income 
which would not be provided by the inclusion of only the 
disposable income variable.
The variable man-days lost due to strikes in the 
automobile industry (ST) represents a supply constraint on 
the availability of new cars and the coefficient for this 
variable is expected to have a negative sign. Some 
researchers have argued that the coefficient of this variable 
should be zero since any problems with the availability of
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domestic cars could be made up by an increase in imports.
This is certainly plausible. However, if imported cars are 
not a perfect substitute for domestic ones, then the argument 
is weak.
Finally, the new car sales could be regarded partly as 
the net addition to the stock and partly as replacements for 
scrapped vehicles, the number of which depend on the stock of 
cars. Therefore, the stock of cars per household lagged one 
time period (S/H) has been included as a determinant of new 
car sales. The coefficient for this variable is expected to 
have a negative sign since the higher the number of vehicles 
available to the household during the past period, the less 
likely that the household will purchase a new car in the 
current period.
The best results from the estimation of variations of 
equation (20) are given in the tables below.
The Data:
The new car registration data is obtained from 
Statistics Canada's catalogue 63-007. The sources for all 
other variables in the equation remain the same as in the 
previous sections.
The Estimation Results:
The results in Table 6-1 are consistent with the 
theoretical model outlined at the beginning of this chapter.
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However, a few interesting remarks can be made. First, the 
gasoline price elasticities of new car sales all have a 
the expected coefficient size and are statistically 
significant at the 99 percent level. There are no 
significant differences between the cost of gasoline per mile 
and the cost of gasoline per gallon. Both produced very 
similar results and therefore the cost per mile was chosen. 
Second, the ,own price elasticities of new car sales are 
statistically significant and the estimated coefficient 
exhibits the expected sign.
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CHAPTER VII 
The New Car Fuel Efficiency
The fuel economy of new cars in the model is defined by 
the sales weighted average as follows :
(21) EN = ^  ENj . Nj/NR
Where :
ENj : Technical fuel economy for the j-th size class of automobiles ^.
Nj/NR : Ratio of cars j sold to total new sales in Canada.
The relationship in the equation above identifies the 
two determinants of a change in the fuel economy; first the 
change in the technology of the automobiles and the change in 
the distribution of new cars sales by size. The first change 
is determined by the manufacturers; and is the subject of the 
current chapter. The second is the result of households 
preference and is discussed in the next chapter.
A comparison of the fuel economy of different classes of 
automobiles by their size rather than their weight has been 
suggested by both the U.S. Environment Protection Agency 
(EPA) -1984 and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)- 
1985. Both argued that the consumers are probably more 
interested in the size and utility of a vehicle rather than 
its weight. The EPA developed a vehicle size classification 
based on the interior volume of the automobile and this 
classification method can be utilized to compare the fuel
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economy of vehicles within the same size classes.
One of the significant improvements of the current 
model are its detailed treatment of fuel economy of the fleet 
of automobiles. In particular the fuel economy of new cars 
is classified by the EPA's proposed interior volume classes. 
In the current model, four different categories were 
established based on the interior volume of new cars.
Table 7-1 below gives a description of these classes.
Table 7-1
The Interior Volume Classes of New Cars 
Type* FT^
1. Sub-Compact < 85 - 100 < 2.41 -2.84
2. Compact 100 - 110 2.83 - 3.11
3. Mid-Size 110 - 120 3.11 - 3.40
4. Large > 1 2  0 >3.40
* Unites are in Cubic Feet & Cubic Metres.
One of the advantages of using the above classification 
is the ability to relate the fuel efficiency of a new 
automobile to its size and utility. The recent use of new 
ultra-light materials in the manufacturing of automobiles has 
made it possible to build a vehicle with more, or at least 
the same, interior space but with less weight and thus more 
fuel efficient engine. The above classes capture these 
technological advances rather well.
The new automobile fuel efficiency equation in the model
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follows the same approach adapted by the NAV and Gallini's 
models reviewed in chapter III. In particular, because of 
the relatively small Canadian market, automobile 
manufacturers are primarily concerned with economic 
conditions in the United States, especially the gasoline 
prices.
Automobile manufacturers are assumed to make decisions 
on the design of four interior volume classes of new cars 
several years prior to the commercialization of the model.
The fuel economy chosen for the future model is that level 
which maximizes the present value of revenues less costs.
The manufacturers believe that consumers' demand for fuel 
efficiency in year t depends upon the price of gasoline that 
year subject to a particular size car. That is to say, the 
manufacturers are assumed to hold static expectations for the 
real price of gasoline; that is future gasoline prices are 
expected to be very close to current values. Therefore, 
different lag structures were tried for the U.S. gasoline 
prices. A polynomial distributed lag  ^has been found to be 
the most successful.
Furthermore, in order to capture the costs of designing 
a more fuel efficient automobile in the interior volume class 
j, dummy variables for the size classes Zj j=l,...,4 are 
imposed. In 1975 fuel efficiency standards were passed in 
the U.S. which set sales-weighted fuel economy levels for 
1978-1990 and failure to meet these standards meant a
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monetary penalty ^. To capture the response by producers to 
these standards, several dummy variables were tested.
The new car fuel efficiency equation in the log-linear 
functional form is given as :
(22) Ln ENj = K1 Zj + K2 DST + K3, i Ln Pg
t-i
Where :
Zj : Dummy variable for each j-th interior volume class.
DST : dummy variable for fuel efficiency standards 1975-1985.
Pg ; U.S. gasoline prices lagged i time periods, t-i
The results of the estimation of new car technical fuel 
efficiency, ENj, are reported in table 7-2 below.
The Data
Sales of all models of automobiles in Canada were made 
available by R. L. Polk & Co. (Toronto). The sales data were 
used to construct the sales ratios for fuel categories of 
automobiles classified by their interior volume. The fuel 
economies for these four classes of automobiles are published 
annually in the Gas Mileage Guide, the Environmental 
Protection Agency by the U.S. Department of Energy. The fuel 
economies data and the sales ratios for the different classes 
were used to create the sales-weighted average fuel economy 
for new cars (ENj) as defined in Equation (21) above.
Several issues of the United States Statistical Abstract
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1968-1988 were used as the source for the information on 
gasoline retail prices and for the consumer price index in 
the U.S.
The Estimation Results
As expected, the higher the interior volume class, the 
lower the fuel economy of the new car. The fuel efficiency 
standard restrictions caused the fuel efficiency of new cars 
to improve.
A polynomial distributed lag of degree 1 is imposed on 
the gasoline price with zero restriction on the coefficient 
of the current period price. On the basis of both R-square 
and Minimum Standard Error criteria, the optimum lag length 
is 4. This indicates that design changes are made 1 to 4 
years prior to the year of marketing the final product.
There is evidence from the industry in support of this 
finding. According to the international Business Week  ^
Magazine, several automobile manufacturers spend about 3 to 4 
years in designing a new model before the commercialization 
year.
The coefficients of the gasoline price are of almost the 
same size, indicating that the design of the new model can be 
altered up to the last year before the marketing which 
contradicts with Gallini's result. Further, the gasoline 
price elasticity of new car fuel efficiency is about 0.8 
percent over the four years designing period.
Ill
The results for the dummy variables for size classes 
illustrate that the larger the interior volume of the 
automobile the lower the fuel economy. Also, the dummy 
variable for the fuel economy standards indicates a positive 
effect on the fuel efficiency of new cars of all classes.
Table 7-2 
The New Cars Technical Fuel Efficiency Equation
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4
LEN 4.0061 3.9380 3.7232 3.5491
(29.763) (29.583) (27.969) (26.662)
LEN DST Pt-1 Pt-2 Pt-3 Pt-4
0.082372 0.20138 0.19829 0.19519 0.19209
(2.0329) (3.0178) (5.3147) (7.9252) (4.1945)
r2 = 0.9991 S.E.R = 0.0091 F = 9621.9
At this point two important identities that relate the 
new car registrations and the technical fuel efficiency of 
these new cars on one hand and the stock of automobiles in 
the fleet and their fuel economy on the other, should be 
introduced.
The estimates in Table 7-2 are required in order to 
determine the sales-weighted new fuel economy as specified in 
equation (21). The fuel economy of the fleet, E, is defined 
as the harmonic mean of the new car fuel economy, EN, and the
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fuel economy of last year's stock (UC).
(23) E = EN . NR/S + E . UC/S
t-1
The proportions of new cars, NR/S, and used cars, UC/S, 
can be determined from the following relationship:
(24) S = NR + UC
which simply states that the addition of used cars, UC,
and New cars, NR, is equal to the current stock of
automobiles in the fleet. In Chapter 5 the stock of cars in 
the fleet was estimated while in chapter 6 the new car sales 
was estimated. Therefore, the proportions of new car sales 
and used cars, over the fleet, can be determined by the 
following equation:
(25) NR/S = NR/(NR + UC) and
UC/S = UC/(NR + UC) = 1 - (NR/S)
By substituting the resulting estimates for NR and S 
from the previous chapters into the above relation, we obtain 
the required proportions for determining the value of E in 
equation (23). However, before doing that, the consumer 
choice of new car type, Nj/NR, is modelled and estimated in 
the following chapter.
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Notes
1. The technical fuel economy of automobiles is the fuel 
economy under test driving conditions. A reliable source 
for this information is provided by the Environment 
protection Agency's publications for all models of new 
cars.
2. Econometrics, by G. S. Maddala. McGraw-Hill, 1977.
Chapter 16, Distributed-Lag Models
3. The fuel economy standards set in the United States were:
Year U.S. Fuel Economy Standard
1978 18 mpg
1979 19 mpg
1980 20 mpg
1981 22 mpg
1982 24 mpg
198 3 2 6 mpg
1984 27 mpg
1985 and after 27,5 mpg
The penalty for not achieving the standard is $5,oo per 
vehicle for each 1/10 of a mile per gallon below the mandated 
level. However, due to the failure of the 1985 - 1987 model 
year cars in achieving these standards, the E.P.A. has 
modified the standards for 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 to 26, 
26, 26.5, 27.5 mpg respectively.
4. The Potholes In Ford's Road to Riches, Nov 27, 1989
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For Hyundai, There is no place Like Home, Nov 20, 1989, 
Infinite and Lexus: characters in German Nightmare Oct 9, 
1989, Japanese Carmakers Flash Their Cash, Feb 13 1989, 
How Ford And Mazda Shared The Driver's Seat, Mar. 2 6 1990 
- in The International Business Week Magazine, Published 
by McGraw-Hill Publication Co.
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CHAPTER VIII 
Sales Ratio of New Automobiles
In this chapter the choice of new car types is modelled 
and estimated. Also, at the end of the chapter, a summary of 
the model is given. The classification of automobiles by 
their interior volume is utilized. Following the discussion 
in the previous chapter, there are four classes of new 
automobiles to choose from; namely, Sub-Compact, Compact, 
Mid-size, and Large.
Because there are four alternatives available, of which 
one is chosen by the consumer, the decision can best be 
modelled in a framework similar to the multinomial quantitive 
choice model ^. In this type of model, the household is 
assumed to choose among several alternatives and the decision 
depends upon characteristics of the household and of the 
alternatives. The objective of the model is to provide a 
prediction of the probability that a household with 
particular characteristics will choose one type of car over 
another.
Let the ratio of the probability of choosing alternative 
z to the probability of choosing alternative x by household i 
be Piz/Pix. Let Ki denote a bundle of characteristics of 
the household and Li represent characteristics of the 
alternative.
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Then, the model of new car choice can be described by 
the following equation:
Az + Bz Ki + C Lz Ax + Bx Ki + C Lx(26) Piz/Pix = e / e
Taking the logarithems of both sides of the above 
equation yields
(27) Ln (Piz/Pix) = (Az - Ax) + (Bz - Bx) Ki + C (Lz - Lx)
for z = 2, 3, 4
Data on the basis of household choice of the type of new 
automobile is not readily available; however, the 
probabilities can be substituted by the relative frequencies
of the households with attribute bundle Ki choosing
alternative Z. Then substituting the relative frequencies 
for the probabilities and suppressing the household subscript 
yields the following equation:
(28) Ln (Nz/Nx) = (Az - Ax) + (Bz - Bx) K + C (Lz - Lx)
for z = 2, 3, 4
In order to be able to estimate the equations in a 
manner similar to logit  ^ estimation, the coefficient on the 
automobile variable, x, should be constrained to be equal 
across the equations. To explain this point further, 
consider the following set of equations:
(i) Ln (N2/N1) = (A2 - Al) + (B2 - Bl) K + C21 (L2 - LI)
(ii) Ln (N3/N1) = (A3 - Al) + (B3 - Bl) K + C31 (L3 - LI)
(iii) Ln (N4/N1) = (A4 - Al) + (B4 - Bl) K = C41 (L4 - LI)
From (i) & (ii), Ln (N2/N3) can be found. That is
(iv) Ln (N2/N3) = (A2 - Al) + (B2 - Bl) K + C21 (L2 - LI)
- (A3 - Al) - (B3 - Bl) K - C31 (L3 - LI)
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If C31 = C21 = C then
( V )  Ln (N2/N3) = (A2 - A3) + (B2 - B3) K + C (L2 - L3 )
The same argument holds for Ln (N2/N4) from (i) & (iii)
and all other possible combinations.
In the estimation of the equations the household 
disposable income, the regional unemployment rate, the number 
of man-days last due to strikes in the automotive industry 
and the percentage of driving age population are the 
characteristics of the household, Ki.
The difference in the car prices, (Pnz - Pnx), and in 
the gasoline cost per mile, Pg (1/enz -1/enx) are the 
characteristics of the new automobile type, Li. The equation
(28) can be re-stated as follows:
(29) Ln (Nz/Nx) = A + B Y H + C U N + D S T + E  POP
+ F (Pnz - Pnx) + G Pg(1/enz - 1/enx) 
for z = 2, 3, 4
Where :
A = (Az - Ax)B = (Bz - Bx)
C = (Cz - Cx)
D = (Dz - Dx)
E = (Ez - Ex)
Three equations with cross restrictions on the
estimates of the new car price variable (Pnz - Pnx) and
gasoline cost per mile variable (Pgz - Pgx) are estimated
simultaneously. The three equations estimated for the sales
in categories 2, 3 and 4 relative to the sales in category 1.
The expected sign on the estimated coefficient for the
fhousehold disposable income is ambiguous. This is because
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when income rises the number of cars purchased in the 
categories 2, 3, 4 relative to the sales in categories 1 
rises. However, when income rises, the households who 
previously had not owned a car may enter the market, but in 
the lower cost categories, e.g., 1, 2. Further, an increase 
in the unemployment rate pushes households down the interior 
volume scale, decreasing the ratio of car sales in each 
category relative to category 1. Man-days lost due to 
strikes in the automobile industry is expected to have a 
negative effect on the sales in categories 2, 3, and 4 
relative to category 1. This is because a large proportion 
of the smallest category automobiles are imported and thus 
would not be affected much by domestic strikes.
The sign for the estimated coefficient on the price of 
cars is expected to be negative, since the higher the 
price of cars difference between categories 2, 3, or 4 and 
the price of cars in category 1, the lower will be the ratio 
between the large car sales and the sales of cars in category 
1, The same relationship holds for the costs of gasoline per 
mile for other categories.
The Data
The price of new cars for each of the four categories in 
each year are the weighted average of the price of the four 
largest sellers in that year, taken from the Canadian Golden 
Book of Used Car Prices. The weights are the sales weight
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for those models in Canada for each year of the study time 
period. The prices are the manufacturers' suggested retail 
prices for the model years. Sales of all models of cars are 
obtained from R. L. Polk & Co, Toronto. The new cars 
technical fuel efficiency for each class of automobile are 
available from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
- Gas Mileage Guide. All data sources for the other 
variables remain the same as in the previous sections. Table 
8-1 below presents the estimated results for the equations.
The Estimation Results :
The estimation results for the new car sales ratios are 
given in Table 8-1 below. However, as expected, the larger 
the difference between the price of new cars in category 1, 
the smallest size, and that of the other categories, the 
smaller is the ratio of small to larger car sales. This is 
clearly indicated by the negative sign for the price of new 
cars variables. The same argument holds for the cost of 
gasoline per mile across different new cars categories. As 
the gasoline cost increase, the sales of smaller cars is more 
frequent than the larger ones. The results also demonstrated 
that both variables of car prices and gasoline cost are 
significant different from zero at the 99 percent level.
Moreover, as the household disposable income rises, the 
number of cars sold in categories 2, 3, and 4 relative to 
sales in category 1 rises, which is evidenced by the positive
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sign for the household income variable in all three 
equations. The results illustrate that it is more common for 
households to be moving to the larger, more expensive new 
cars than to be buying a car for the first time. As 
expected, a rise in the unemployment rate induces households 
to move down the size spectrum, decreasing the ratio of car 
sales in each category relative to the smallest automobiles.
Furthermore, man-days spent on strike in the Canadian 
automobile industry appears to have a negative effect on the 
sales in categories 2, 3, and 4 relative to category 1.
This result is intuitively appealing since a large proportion 
of the automobiles in the smallest category are imported, and 
thus, would not be subject to domestic strikes.
Another interesting result are the coefficients for the 
driving age population, POP. The results illustrate that 
this variable has a negative effect on the sales in category 
2, 3, and 4 relative to sales in category 1. This finding 
is also intuitively appealing because new drivers who had not 
owned a car before are more likely to enter the market at the 
lower cost categories, e.g., category 1 and 2.
Finally, all the household characteristics variables are 
statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
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Table 8 -1 Sales Ratios for the New Cars
Categories 2 3 4
Pg/e -11.738 -11.738 -11.738(-8.105) (-5.272) (-5.996)— 3 — 3 — 3Pn -.1073 * 10 -.1073 * 10 -.1073 * 10(—4.684) (-3.047) (-3.465)— 4 -4 -4YH .56133 * 10 .6720 * 10 .19093 * 10(5.728) (4.496) (1.876)
UN . 0428 . 0668 -.0443(3.582) (3.629) (-2.676)— 6 — 7 -7ST -.14345 * 10 -.99303 * 10 -.41328 * 10(-3.109) (-2.409) (-1.656)
POP -.08312 -.20643 -.1797(-6.671) (-10.613) (-10.634)
NFLD 3 . 6621 11.482 12.327(6.333) (11.98) (14.101)
PEI 4.3113 12.873 13.257(6.324) (11.624) (13.335)
NS 4.3874 13.040 13.163(6.261) (11.469) (12.903)
NB 4,2971 12.837 13.465(6.399) (11.737) (13.686)
QUE 4.4644 13.224 13.553(6.292) (11.482) (13.086)
ONT 4.4766 13.423 13.703(6.189) (11.452) (12.935)
MAN 4.4798 13.568 13.775(6.128) (11.493) (12.98)
SASK 4 . 4935 13.426 13.899(6.175) (11.444) (13.184)
ALTA 4.1269 12.710 13.316(5.926) (11.256) (12.993)
EC 4.2509 12.585 12.926(6.033) (10.973) (12.442)
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SUMMARY OP THE MODEL :
The entire set of equations and identities are given below:
(1) Aggregate Gasoline Demand Identity
AG = GS * S * H where H = number of households
(2) Gasoline per car Equation
Ln GS = ai + bl Ln Pg/e + b2 Ln YH + b3 Ln UN + b4 Ln RU
+ b5 Ln POP + b6 Ln AH + b7 Ln e
(3) Stock of Automobiles per Household Equation
Ln S/H = ci + dl Ln Pn + d2 Ln Pgt-i + d3 Ln YH + d4 Ln POP
+ d5 Ln Ca.r + d6 Ln (S/H)t-i
(4) The New Automobiles Sales per Household Equation
Ln NR/H = ei + fl Ln Pg/e + f2 Ln Pn + f3 Ln YH + f4 Ln UN
+ f5 Ln ST + f6 Ln (S/H)t_i
(5) The used Automobiles per Household Identity
UC = S “ NR
(6) Technical Fuel Economy Equation
Ln Enj = KI Zj + K2 DST + K3,i Ln Pgt-f
where j = 1,..,4 and f = 1,..,4
(7) Sales Ratio of New Automobile Equation
Ln (Nz/Nx) = Ti + VI YH + V2 UN + V3 ST + V4 POP
+ V5 (Pz - Px) + V6 Pg (l/en% - l/en% )
where z = 2, 3, 4(8) Fuel Economy of New Cars
1/en = ^  1/enj * Nj/NR
(9) Fuel Economy of The Fleet
1/e = 1/en * NR/S + V^t-i * UC/S
123
(10) New Car Categories M'
Nz/NR = (Nz/Nx) / 21 Nj/Nx where z = 2, 3, 4
and j = 1,.., 4
(11) Average Price of New Automobilesg
Pn = IE Pnj * Nj/NR 
The equations 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 are the general 
relationships which were estimated using cross-section 
provincial data for the period 1969 - 1988. The remaining 
relationships are identities in the model.
The main improvement in the current model over the 
previous studies :
(1) The estimation of gasoline consumption at the household 
level rather than the individual,
(2) The use of recently published survey data on family 
expenditure, and Household Equipment.
(3) The use of the interior volume classification for new car 
sales rather than the automobiles curb weight classes.
(4) The use of recently made available survey data on fuel 
consumption survey in order to construct the fleet fuel 
efficiency figures.
(5) The inclusion of several demographic and socio-economic 
variables in the estimation of the model, such as the 
percentage of population living in urban areas, the 
driving age population, and the average number of 
vehicles per household from survey data.
(6) The time period covers the most recent data including the 
sharp drop in world crude oil prices in 1986.
I
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Notation Unites
AG = aggregate gasoline consumption (thousends of gallons)
GS = gasoline per car (thousends of gallons)
S = stock of cars (thousends)
H = number of households (thousends)
AH = number of cars per household from survey data
POP = Percetage of driving age in the household
RU = percentage of household living in urban areas
Pg = price of gasoline per gallon at 1981 prices(cents per gallon)
e = average fuel economy of the fleet (miles per gallon)
Enj = technical fuel economy of interior volume class j.
YH = household disposable income at 1981 prices(thousends of dollars)
Pn = average price of new cars at 1981 prices(thousends of dollars)
en = average fuel economy of new cars (miles per gallon)
UN = regional unemployment rate (percentage)
ST = strikes in the Canadian automobile industry (man-day)
Ca.r = prime interest rate in Canada (percentage)
NR = new car registrations (thousends of cars)
UC = used cars (thousends of cars)
DST = dummy variables for fuel economy standards
Nz/Nx= new car sales from class z divided by sales in class x
Pnj = price of new cars for category j at 1981 prices
Nj/NR = proportion of new cars sales from category j
Pg-t-f = U.S. price of gasoline per gallon at time t-f.
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1. McFadden, D. " Conditional Logit Analysis of Quantitative 
Choice Behaviour" in Zarembka, Frontiers in Econometrics, 
New York: Academic Press - 1973.
2. Amemiya, T., " Qualitative Response Models: A Survey. " 
Journal of Economic Literature, December 1981,
P. 1483 -1536.
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CHAPTER IX 
Validation And Simulation Of The Model
Validation is an important phase of the econometric 
model building process. When considering the validity of a 
system of equations, the goal is not a simple matter of 
whether to accept or reject the model, but rather to gain an 
understanding of the general performance of the model as 
an interdependent system and to obtain an indication of those 
parts or equations in the model which are in greatest need 
of improvement. It is also important to realize that the 
validation process is usually determined by the purpose for 
which the model is intended. Thus, for instance, the 
criteria by which a forecasting model may be evaluated may 
differ from the criteria used to assess a model intended for 
use in policy analysis.
In general, validation may be thought to involve two 
steps. First, there is the question of how well the model 
tracks the actual values used in estimating the model.
For example, some measures of the distance between the actual 
and the fitted values for the estimation period are needed. 
This typically involves the generation of fitted values for 
the model over the estimation period. Secondly, in order to 
use the model as an economic tool for either testing economic 
theory or for policy evaluation, some means of assessing the 
overall dynamic structure of the model are needed. This 
usually is carried out by means of some simulation
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experiments and the analysis of dynamic response, e.g, the 
response over time of the model to changes in particular 
exogenous variables. Finally, the relatively new technique 
of cointegration is used to test the stationarity assumption 
in the model estimation.
1. The Tracking Performance Of The Model
In this section the model is simulated over the 
historical period 1969-1988. A typical first step is to gain 
a quick subjective impression by examining graphs plotting 
the fitted values against the actual observations. For this 
purpose three provinces where used namely, Quebec, Ontario 
and British Columbia. These provinces include the most 
heavily populated cities in Canada. Their combined 
population amounts to approximately 8 3 percent of the entire 
population of Canada of which 47 percent are living in 
metropolitan areas.
The simulated results, or fitted values, for gasoline 
consumption per car are plotted in Figure 9-1 below. 
Furthermore, the stock of cars and the average fuel economy 
of the fleet are also plotted in Figure 9-2 and Figure 9-3 
respectively. The three estimated variables are combined to 
get aggregate gasoline consumptions. The model's ability to 
track the historical values of the aggregate variable is then 
illustrated in Figure 9-4.
Actual gasoline consumption per car for the three
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provinces has shown considerable variation throughout the 
historical period of estimation. It rose from 1969 to a peak 
in 1973, then fell and reached a trough in 1975, There was a 
partial gain in 1976 but further declines in 1979 and after. 
Looking at Figures 9-1 to 9-4, we observe that the simulated 
values do seem to reproduce the general long-run behaviour of 
the actual observations, although short-run fluctuations in 
the actual series are not reproduced accurately, and some 
turning points are missed altogether. One may conclude that 
in general, the model tracks the major events of the 
historical period rather well. Also the model succeeded in 
capturing most of the turning points over the estimation 
period. This is an important feature which gives an 
indication of the model's forecasting potential.
Figure 9 - 1
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The second step in the process of the assessment of the 
model's tracking performance is to determine how the 
endogenous variables follow the historical values. A 
commonly used criterion for this purpose is the root mean 
square error or percentage error which is defined as
(1) RMS = 1/T x i  -Xh-
where X^. = fitted value of
AX^ = actual value of X^.
T = the number of periods in the simulation.
The RMS percent error results are shown in Table 9-1
below for the endogenous variables, gasoline per car, G,
stock of cars, S, fuel efficiency of the fleet, E, and 
aggregate gasoline consumption, AG.
Table 9 - 1  
The Root-Mean-Square Errors
- ---------- — —  — —1 Variables | G ! s ! E ! ag 1+ ------------------------------ + -+----------------- - 4 - -------------------- +
1 Mean |1 1 764,875 1 946526 1 1 18.159 1 1676015.31 1 11 1 1 RMS error |1 1 34.7182
11 56027.7 1
11 0.4959 1
1 1 1 41345.81
1 1 1 RMS percent | 0.4527 11 0.5251 11 0.3387 1 1 I 0.4940 1
+• - + • ■ +
The results shown in Table 9-1 indicate that the root- 
mean-square percentage error is less than 1.0 percent for the 
endogenous variables which are very reasonable, given
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the detailed nature of the model and given that the model 
was estimated using ordinary least squares.
Another common basis for judging model performance is to 
test the overall sensitivity of the model to such factors as 
changes in the time period used for estimation. When the 
parameters of the model were first estimated, the 1969 to 
1986 time period was used. When data for 1987-88 became 
available, the model was re-estimated and there were no 
drastic changes in the sign, the size or the level of the 
statistical significance of the coefficients ( see Appendex 3 
for these results ). This is a good indication of the 
stability of the model and illustrates that the size of 
coefficients seems relatively insensitive to small changes in 
the time period.
2. The Assessment Of The Overall Dynamic Structure
The tracking performance is by no means the whole story. 
One of the important tasks of the model building process is 
to be able to understand the structure of the model and the 
way in which the different economic variables are 
inter-related within the framework of the equation system.
In any case, the model should be used to make a statement 
about the dynamic response; for example, the response over 
time of the endogenous variables to external shocks imposed 
upon the exogenous variables or upon the parameters of the 
system.
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A common method of measuring such responses is by the 
use of the dynamic elasticity. The dynamic elasticity tells 
how the demand for a good would change over time in response 
to a change in prices or incomes. Often statements about the 
price or income elasticity of some good are made without 
explicitly recognizing that the value of the elasticity 
depends on how much time is allowed to elapse after price or 
income has changed.
A major objective of developing the model was to 
determine the transportation sector's potential for 
conserving gasoline. One widely used economic indicator of 
conservation potential is the elasticity of demand for 
gasoline with respect to the price of gasoline. By 
simulating the model over the desired time horizon, 1989- 
2000, the price elasticities were detemined. A base case was 
specified in which real household income, the unemployment 
rate, the real price of new cars, the interest rate, and the 
real price of gasoline per gallon in Canada and United States 
are assumed to equal the 198 8 values and remain constant 
for the rest of the time horizon.
In an alternative solution of the model, the disturbed 
solution, only the real prices of gasoline in Canada and the 
U.S. are assumed to increase by 10 percent. The two 
dynamically controlled solutions of the model were obtained 
and the dynamic price elasticity at time t was calculated by 
applying the following formula :
136
B A( AGt - AGt )(2) Ep —  %-----2---- /  0.1
Ag “ + AGg
2
BWhere AG.^  = aggregate gasoline consumption under the base case at time t.AAG.J. = aggregate gasoline consumption under the 
alternative scenario at time t.
The price elasticity as defined above includes all 
direct and indirect effects on gasoline consumption due to 
a 10 percent change in the price of gasoline per gallon. The 
increase in the price of gasoline has a direct effect on the 
number of miles driven per car, the average fuel economy of 
the fleet, new car sales, and on the stock of cars. All 
these effects are captured in the price elasticity estimates. 
Table 9-2 below gives the short-run (one-year) price 
elasticity and the longer-run price elasticity estimates for 
2 to 10 years for the ten provinces and Canada.
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Because the intercept term is the only parameter that is 
allowed to vary across provinces, there is little variation 
in the price elasticities across provinces. However, the 
estimated price elasticities in Table 9-2 are relatively 
larger than some of those reported in the studies reviewed in 
chapter III.
The short-run (one year) elasticities appear larger than 
expected. Recall that from Table 4-1 the direct response to 
an increase in the price of gasoline, holding the stock of 
cars and the fuel economy of the fleet constant, ranges from 
-0.1881 to -0.2095. When the changes in the fuel economy of 
the vehicles on the road and the fleet size through new car 
sales and the scrapping of used cars are included, -0.1 is 
added to the price elasticity. This is significantly higher 
than Gallini's result of -0.06 and indicates that at least 25 
percent of the decrease in gasoline consumption in the first 
year is due to changes in the average fuel economy of the 
fleet, new car sales, and the stock of cars. The rest is due 
to changes in driving habits.
The adjustment to the price increase appears to be 
rapid, which is indicated by the rise in the price elasticity 
within the first four to six years after a price shock. 
Furthermore, ten years after the 10 percent increase in the 
gasoline price, the reduction in consumption settles to 
approximately 10 percent of the consumption level under no 
price increase.
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It is also useful to carry out the same exercise of 
price elasticity on the household income. This would be 
helpful in understanding the effect of stock adjustment as 
well as the short-run factors.
By solving the model over the 1989 - 2000 time horizon, 
the income elasticities were estimated. The base case 
assumptions remain as before but in the alternative case
solution, the real household income is assumed to increase by
10 percent. Then, the same formula as in (2) was used to
calculate " Ey ". The results for the income elasticity are
reported in Table 9-3 below.
The increase in real income has a direct effect on the 
number of miles driven per car, the stock of cars and the new 
car sales. It also has indirect effect on the fuel 
efficiency of the fleet. All these effects are included in 
the income elasticity figures.
The short-run (one year) income elasticity is 
approximately 0.3 which is significantly larger than the 
income coefficient of about 0.15 for the gasoline demand per 
car equation reported in Table 4-1. When stock adjustment 
and new car sales and hence fuel economy of the fleet were 
included, the resulting income elasticity is higher by at 
least 50 percent. This finding does agree, however, with 
most of results of the previous work. It also points out the 
importance of including stock and fuel economy adjustments in 
any explanation of the demand for gasoline.
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The long-run (ten years) income elasticity is about 0.9 
which is in line with the previous findings. Therefore, the 
affect of a change in income on gasoline demand is greater in 
the long-run than the short-run. This may be explained 
partly by the argument that when income increases, the 
households move up the ladder to the larger class of cars or 
households with one car will buy a second car.
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The Cointegration Tests
Recently econometrics research has emphasized the 
importance of the stationarity assumption in model 
estimation. A set of methods known as the cointegration 
techniques have been developed to test for stationarity and 
to allow the proper estimation of the dynamic models.
It has shown by Engle and Granger (1987) that if the 
time series are not stationary, that is, the means and the 
variances are increasing over time, there is always the 
possibility that spurious regressions will result, possibly 
causing the long run equilibrium to be invalid. However, if 
the variables are cointegrated, that is to say a linear 
combination of the individually non-stationary time series is 
itself stationary, then the long run equilibrium could be 
valid.
Engle and Granger have suggested several statistical 
tests that should all be used since these test are not 
currently well-developed. The main purpose of using these 
tests is to identify the relevant time series and to 
determine whether or not they are stationary of degree one so 
they can potentially form a cointegrating set. Furthermore, 
to establish that the error term from the estimated equation 
is stationary of degree zero so those variables actually 
cointegrate.
L
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The commonly used tests are the Cointegrating Regression 
Durbin-Watson Test (GROW), the Dickey-Fuller Test (DF) and 
Inspection of the Correlogram. The null hypothesis of these 
tests is that the time series is integrated of degree one, 
i.e. non-stationary, or
Ho : 1(1)
When applying this concept to the current study, a few 
comments about the relevance of the procedure should be 
mentioned. Since this technique is relatively new and not 
well-developed it may be inappropriate for the following 
reasons :
1. The procedure so far has been developed to apply to 
time series whereas the model is a cross-sectional time- 
series.
2. The equations of the model are estimated 
simultaneously, whereas the procedure is applicable to single 
equations only.
3. Most of the work on cointegration has been developed 
under the hypothesis that the time series are integrated of 
degree one and the error correction of a degree zero which 
restricts its applicability.
In spite of its limitations, an attempt to use the 
cointegration procedure was made. If an examination of the 
properties of the relevant time series is to be carried out, 
it must be for one province at a time. However, it is 
believed to be sufficient to choose one of the major
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provinces and apply these tests. The province of Ontario has 
been chosen to represent this study because it represents 
about 3 7 percent of population and it consumes about 39 
percent of the gasoline.
Tables 9-4, 9-5 and 9-6 below give the results of the 
previously mentioned tests.
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The results indicate that the null hypothesis can not be 
rejected for some of the variables. When the same test is 
applied to the first difference the null hypotheses can be 
rejected. Similar conclusions may drawn for the DF test and 
the examination of the correlograms for the levels and the 
first difference of the series. This conclusion encourages 
the use of the Engle-Granger 2-step method.
The first step of this procedure is to run OLS 
regression of the levels of the variables for the gasoline 
per car equation and then consider whether the residuals from 
this regression are stationary. The results for two 
specifications, with and without fuel efficiency variable, 
are given in Table 9-7 below.
Table 9 - 7Cointegrating Gasoline Demand Per Car Equation ( Ontario ) 
Variable Constant LYH LPg/e LE
1. LGS 8.2881 0.0552 -0.1052 -0.8747t-statistics (4.478) (1.304) (-1.107) (-9.728)
= 0.8557 S.E.E = 0.0449 = 38.57
Residuals: CROW =1.42 61 DF = -3.1647 Correlogram 1 to 50.2688 0.0466 -0.1391 -0.3057 -0.1719
2. LGS -2.2888 0.7238 -0.2139t-statistics (-.387) (1.407) (-1.306)
r2 = 0.8672 S.E.E = 0.0287 = 40.18
Residuals: CRWD = 1.8856 DP = -2.3782 Correlogram l to 50.1267 0.0342 -0.1476 -0.3916 -0.2365
The CRDW test for the residuals in both equations indicate
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that the cointegration hypothesis can not be decisively 
rejected. However, the DF and the examination of the 
correlogram suggest cointegration since the first is 
reasonably large in both equations and has a negative sign. 
The correlogram indicates integration of order zero. It 
worth mentioning here that the size of the price coefficient 
in equation (1) is half that of equation (2). This is mainly 
because of the presence of the fuel efficiency as 
explanatory variable in the first equation.
The next step of the Engle-Granger method is to estimate 
an error correcting model for the gasoline per car equation. 
This basically can be achieved by using the residuals (EC) 
from the previous results in Table 9-7 as explanatory 
variables. Table 9-8 below gives the best results among 
numerous trials.
Table 9 - 8Error Correcting Gasoline Per Car Equations ( Ontario) 
Variable Constant DLYH DLPg/e DLE EC1. DLGS -0.0219 1.0046 -0,3979 -0.3172 0.7784t-Stat. (-2.203) (2.653) (-3.457) (3.968) (3.968)
r2 = 0.6204 S.E.E = 0.0307 DW = 1.9534 {^5, 14) = 5.19
2. DLGS -0.6096 0.6009 -0.2857----- ----- 0.0892t-Stat. (-0.792) (1.249) (-1.796)   (0.763)
r 2 = 0.6199 S.E.E = 0.0271 DW = 2.1446 = 4.10
The coefficients are statistically significant
especially the coefficient for the error correction (EC) in
the first equation which indicates the acceptance of the
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cointegration hypothesis.
There are two remarks worth mentioning here. The first 
is that the long run price elasticity from Table 9-7 is 
smaller than the short run price elasticity given in Table
9-8 which is contrary to expectations. This may be partly 
explained by the inclusion of the fuel efficiency variable in 
the equations. It also points out the importance of the fuel 
efficiency changes in recent years.
Secondly, when comparing the short run price elasticity 
with the results from the model of about 0.312 for Canada 
with the results from Table 9-8, the latter is slightly 
higher but still in line with the findings of other studies. 
The long run elasticity of only 0.105 or 0.211 is rather 
small especially when compared with 1.024 for Canada from the 
model.
Although the cointegration method enables us to 
understand the properties of the variables used, it needs to 
be fully developed before it can be utilized in the case of 
the cross-sectional time-series models. As stated earlier, 
the aim of the above exercise is to understand the properties 
of the variables used in estimating the model using the 
relatively new advances in the literature. The results 
suggest that the residuals from the cointegrating regression 
for the gasoline per car equation in Ontario are stationary, 
that is to say they are intergated of order zero and this 
indicates cointegration of the variables involved.
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Chapter X
Conclusions And Some Policy Implications
The model presented in this study is one of the few 
econometric studies that has attempted to model the gasoline 
demand exclusively for Canada. The attempt was made to 
improve upon the existing models through careful description 
of the underlying decision making process that faces the 
household, making the household rather than the individual 
the focus of the model and significantly extending the time 
series beyond the scope of existing studies. Recall that the 
main objective of the model was to identify and separate the 
effects of the several responses by the household to changes 
in gasoline prices such as driving fewer miles, purchasing 
fewer cars, buying more fuel efficient cars, and the 
manufacturers' response by improving the technology of new 
automobiles produced in the future.
In the model, the household which already owns a car can 
react immediately to a price increase by driving fewer miles 
(e.g. leisure miles). The household which is planning to buy 
a new car can either postpone their vehicle purchases or 
choose a more fuel efficient new car. Finally, the household 
which owns an aged car can scrap their automobile in response 
to higher gasoline price.
In the long run, the size and composition of the fleet 
according to the interior volume of the vehicles can continue 
to change and necessary miles may fall as households move
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doser to work or use public transportation. Also, in the 
long run, car manufacturers can modify the technology of the 
new cars according to their expectations regarding the future 
levels of gasoline prices and consumers' demand for more fuel 
efficient cars.
Among the most significant contributions of the model to 
the current literature is the use of the household 
expenditure survey data which have been published by 
Statistics Canada. These data have led to the inclusion of 
such variables as number of persons in the household who can 
drive, percentage of household living in urban areas, number 
of cars per household and the household income.
The detailed treatment of the fuel efficiency of the new 
cars where the automobiles were categorized according to 
their interior volume rather than their natural weight is 
significant improvement over the previous models. Two 
components of the average fuel efficiency of new cars were 
estimated ;
1- the technical fuel efficiency set by the automobile 
manufacturers and,
2“ the sales ratio of four categories of new cars.
The change in the new cars technical fuel efficiency combined 
with the changes in sales ratio of four car size categories 
gradually cause the average fuel economy of the fleet to 
shift. The average fuel economy of the fleet determines the 
aggregate gasoline demand for a given number of miles
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travelled and a given stock of cars.
The results of estimating the model provided revealing 
information about elasticity of gasoline demand in Canada.
The short run dynamic own price elasticity of gasoline demand 
ranged between 0.311 to 0.313 in absolute value across the 
provinces. Close to 7 5 percent of the household response to 
price change in the first year was due to driving fewer 
miles. While these results are in line with Gallini's and 
the Rand Corporation study findings, they exhibit a unique 
feature. That is, at least 10 percent of the first year 
response is due to an alteration in the composition of the 
fleet to more fuel efficient vehicles, a response that 
accounted for only 4 percent in Gallini's study. The 
remaining 15 percent is attributed to the change in the size 
of the fleet, which is very much the same results as 
Gallini's. The intermediate run (five years) price 
elasticities range from .689 to .709 and the long term 
elasticities (ten years) range from 0.975 to 1.059.
Moreover, the dynamic elasticities imply that the adjustment 
seems to take place very rapidly during the first four years. 
These results suggest that while no one disputes that 
gasoline demand iis inelastic in the short run, the belief 
that it is also inelastic in the long run is unsupported.
The short run household income elasticity is about 0.31. 
The intermediate run income elasticity is around 0.67 and the 
long run is about 0.91. That long run household income
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elasticity is greater than the short run which is in line 
with most of the previous findings.
There are two policy instruments that have been used 
with regard to gasoline consumption, namely fuel efficiency 
standards for new vehicles and gasoline taxes. The fuel 
efficiency standards are set by the E.P.A. in the U.S.A., but 
since all car companies in Canada are subsidiaries of the 
U.S. based parent firms, these standards are effective in 
Canada too. The present model could be used to assess the 
influence of these fuel efficiency standards. Under the 
base and the alternative cases discussed in chapter 9, most 
of these standards are met. The results also indicate that 
in many cases the households were able to keep their 
favourite car size because the manufacturers instituted 
significant improvements.
These findings point to the importance of improving fuel 
efficiency as an effective means of reducing household 
gasoline consumption. They also show that the detailed 
treatment of the fuel efficiency of the fleet was justified. 
As an explanatory variable, the fuel efficiency variable was 
found to possess the right sign and to be highly significant 
in all equations. This reinforces the earlier conclusion 
that fuel efficiency improvements have significant impact on 
energy conservation.
The empirical evidence from the model has indicated that 
the 1986 oil price collapse has not substantially affected
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the incentive for conservation in gasoline demand in Canada 
since the reduction on gasoline prices was not sustained and 
because the high rate of return on fuel efficiency investment 
meant that it remains cost effective.
The relatively new technique of cointegration was also 
used to test the stationarity assumption required for time 
series analysis. The results suggest that the residuals 
from the cointegrating regression for the gasoline per car 
equation in Ontario are stationary, that is to say the long 
run equilibrium could be valid. However, cointegration 
techniques are not yet available for mixed cross-sectional 
time-series models so that their applicability to the present 
work remains problematic.
In recent years, the world has experienced a growing 
concern over environmental problems. At the centre of the 
current debate is the burning of fossil fuels and in 
particular motor gasoline consumption in highly polluted 
urban areas. Several policy options have been suggested. 
These policy options include, improving fuel efficiency, fuel 
switching and the " green " tax options.
The findings of this study have already pointed out the 
significance of improving fuel efficiency as an effective 
tool of reducing household gasoline consumption. Fuel 
switching would require an accelerated pace of technological 
advancement and extensive fuel substitution programmmes. In 
a free market economy like Canada, the price of the
156
alternative fuel along with the direct and indirect costs 
which are associated with converting the household car from 
consuming gasoline to an alternative fuel, would be the main 
factors and the decisive elements.
The final option, the green tax, is based on the 
principle that " the polluter pays ". Several tax schemes 
are currently under consideration. One of these schemes may 
be implemented by taxing goods that are complementary with 
the polluting fuel. In case of gasoline, an extra tax could 
be imposed on cars or tires. The present model could be 
extended to evaluate and compare the consequences of such 
taxes.
Another green tax scheme is a further tax on gasoline. 
This could well lead to a reduction in gasoline consumption 
as implied by the present model. Future research can build 
upon the present model to further investigate these policy 
options.
APPENDIX I
Appendix 1
NFLD = Newfoundland 
P.E.1= Prince Edward Island 
NS = Nova Scotia 
NB = New Brunswick 
Que = Quebec 
ont = Ontario 
Man = Manitoba 
Sask = Saskatchewan 
Alta = Alberta
B.C. = British Columbia 
The Appendix consists of three groubs:
First group of data contains the following variables: 
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B . C
YH CA . R UN ST1 9 6 9  . 0 . 0 6 7  5 2 3 7 9 8 7 . 9 6 0 0 5 . 0 0 0 0 3 5 3 8 0 . 01 9 7 0 . 0 . 0 6 6 1 2 4 0 2 9 6 8 . 1 7 0 0 7 . 7 0 0 0 1 7 5 5 9 9 51 9 7 1 . 0 . 0 7 1 9 2 5 2 5 7 8 6 . 4 8 0 0 7 . 2 0 0 0 8 4 3 3 0 . 01 9 7 2  . 0 . 0 6 9 5 2 6 8 1 6 3 6 . 0 0 0 0 7 . 8 0 0 0 1 7 0 0 . 01 9 7 3 . 0 . 0 6 7 8 7 . 6 5 0 0 6 . 7 0 0 0 2 2 1 2 5 0 . 01 9 7  4 . Cl . 0 6 7 7 2 9 5 4 9 6 1 0 . 7 5 0 0 6 . 2 0 0 0 8 6 8 4 0 . 01 9 7 5 . 0 . 0 6 6 4 2 9 8 7 8 3 9 . 4 2 0 0 8 . 5 0 0 0 9 0 1 0 . 01 9 7  6 . Ü . 0 6 7 1 3 1 0 . 0 4 0 0 8 . 6 0 0 0 9 8 1 0 0 . 01 9 7 7  . 0 . 0 6 7 8 3 2 5 4 7 8 . 5 0 0 0 8 . 5 0 0 0 1 3 7 0 0 . 01 9 7 3 . 0 . 0 6 6 1 3 2 0 1 8 8 9 . 6 9 0 0 8 . 3 0 0 0 2 5 0 5 0 . 01 9 7 9  . 0 . 0 7 0 9 3 2 6 3 6 3 1 2 . 9 0 0 0 7 . 6 0 0 0 7 5 0 5 0 . 01 9 8 0  . 0 . 0 8 2 5 3 3 4 6 9 1 4 . 2 5 0 0 6 . 8 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 01 9 8 1  . 0 . 0 9 6 2 3 3 0 3 6 0 1 9 . 2 9 0 0 6 . 7 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 01 9 8 2  . 0 . 0 9 8 3 3 1 0 1 7 1 5 . 8 1 0 0 1 2 . 1 0 0 0 2 3 3 1 1 0 . 01 9 8 3 . 0 . 0 9 6 8 2 9 5 8 6 ci 1 1 . 1 7 0 0 1 3 . 8 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 01 9 8 4  . 0 . 0 9 6 0 2 8 2 3 9 1 1 2 . 0 6 0 0 1 4 . 7 0 0 0 3 2 8 1 8 0 . 01 9 8 5  . . 0 9 6 3 2 8 1 9 3 1 1 0 . 5 8 0 0 1 4 . 2 0 0 0 3 8 7 2 0 . 01 9 8 6 . 0 . 0 7 9 2 27426 9 1 0 . 5 2 0 0 1 2 . 6 0 0 0 2010 . 01 9 3 7  . 0 . 0 7 5 9 2 8 5 0 1 1 8 . 3 4 7 0 1 2 . 5 0 0 0 6 1 5 9 0 - 01 9 8 8 . 0 . 0 6 8 8 2 8 4 8 3 7 9 . 6 8 6 0 1 1 . 1000 4 3 2 0 . 0
Gr o LL p (  3  J )
NFLD
YEAR T?
1 9 6 9  . 0 16 6001'-
1 9 7 0  . 0 16 3 0 0 0
1 9 7 1  . 0 17 3000
1 9 7  2 . 0 16 9000
1 9 7 3 . 0 16 GO 0 0
1 9 7 4  . 0 16 5 0 0 0
1 9 7  5 . 0 16 2 0 0 0
1 9 7 6 . 0 16 2 0 0 0
1 9 7 7  . 0 16 5000
1 9 7 8  . 0 15 9 0 0 0
1 97  9 . 0 16 4 0 0 0
1 9 8 0  . 0 0000
1 9 8 1  . 0 1 .1 1 0 0 0
1 9 8 2  . O' 2 ‘1' 0 0 0 0
1 9 8 3 . 0 2 0 300':.'
1 9 8 4  . 0 2 0 0 0
1 9 8 5  . 0 2' ' 0 0 0 0
198 ,6 . 0 21 6000
1 9 8 7  . 0 2 (}
1 9 8 8
YEAR
1 9 6 9 . 0
1 9 7 0 . 0
1 9 7 1 . 0  
1 97  2 . 0  
1 97  3 . 0
1 9 7 4 . 0  
1 9 7  5 . 0  
1 9 7  6 . 0
1 9 7 7 . 0
1 9 7 8 . 0
1 3 7 9 . 0
1 9 8 0 . 0
1981.0
1 9 8 2 . 0
1 9 8 3 . 0
1 9 8 4 . 0
1 9 8 5 . 0
1 9 8 6 . 0
1 9 8 7 . 0
1 9 8 8 . 0
1 7 . 3 0 0 0  
1.7 . 5 0 0 0
10.3000 
1.6. 7 0 0 0
1 7 . 1 0 0 0
1 7 . 0 0 0 0
1 6 . 9 0 0 0
16.8000
1 6 . 7 0 0 0
1 6 . 6 0 0 0
1 7 . 5 0 0 0
1 8 . 6 0 0 0  
19 - 2 0 0 020.0000
2 0 . 3 0 0 0
2 1 . 9 0 0 0
2 2 . 8 0 0 0
2 3 . 9 0 0 0
2 4 . 4 0 0 0
2 3 . 0 0 0 0
EH H AH POP1 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 5 9 0 6 1 . 9 0 0 0
1 8 . 3 6 9 9 1 0 3 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 7 7 0 6 2 . 3 0 0 0
I S . 9 4 5 3 1 0 5 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 0 4 0 6 2 . 7 0 0 0
1 1 4 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 0 1 0 6 3 . 3 0 0 0
1 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 7  3 0 6 3 . 9 0 0 0
1 1 8 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 3 2 0 6 4 . 5 0 0 0IS 7 1 2 5 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 6 3 0 6 5 . 4 0 0 01 8 . 7  4 2 1 1 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 2 4 0 6 6 . 3 0 0 01 9 . 4 2  51 1 3 5 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 3 5 3 0 6 7 . 0 0 0 02 0 . 1 8 6 6 137.0000 1 . 3 8 0 0 6 7 . 3 0 0 0
1 8 . 9 0 8 5 1 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 3 3 0 6 6 . 5 0 0 0
1 4 4 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 2 5 0 6 9 . 5 0 0 0
1 4 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 3 2 3 0 7 0 . 5 0 0 02 4 . 0  4 7 2 1 4 8 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 2 0 9 0 7 1 . 3 0 0 02 4  9 2 1 5 1 5 1 . 0000 1 . 1 9 3 0 7 2 . 0 0 0 0
1 5 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 2 3 6 0 72:9000
1 6 2 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 3 5 8 0 7 3 . 7 0 0 0
1 6 5 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 3 7 8 0 7 4 . 6 0 0 0
1 6 8 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 3 8 9 0 7 4 . 7 0 0 0169 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 3 9 6 4 7 5 . 4 0 0 0
P.E.I.
EH H AH POP19  . 060 ' : ; 2 6 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 3 7  4 0 6 7 . 5 0 0 01 9 . 3 0 6 7 2 6 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 3 3 0 6 7 . 9 0 0 01 9 . 3 1 2 3 26.0000 1 . 5 9 0 0 6 8 . 4 0 0 01 6 . 3 7 0 8 2 8 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 5 3 2 0 68.80001 7 . 6 4 7 7 2 8 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 7 8 0 6 9 . 6 0 0 0
1 7 . 8 1 7 9 29.0000 1 . 6 1 7 0 7 0 . 2 0 0 0I S . 3 3 3 7 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 8 3 0 7 1 . 1 0 0 01 3 . 3 8 4 2 3 2 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 6 8 0 71.90001 9 . 6 6 6 3 3 1 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 6 2 0 7 2 . 5 0 0 02 1 . 2 0 6 3 3 4 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 7 6 2 0 7 3 . 2 0 0 0I S . 5 6 8 4 3 4 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 7 5 2 0 7 4 . 0 0 0 0
2 0 . 7 1 0 5 3 4 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 4 0 0 7 4 . 7 0 0 02 2 . 6 7 0 6 3 5 . 0 0 0 0 1.6660 7 5 . 2 0 0 02 3 . 8 1 4 9 3 6 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 1 0 0 75.50002 4 . 3 0 6 7 3 8 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 5 5 9 0 7 5 . 7 0 0 02 5 . 0 3 5 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 3 0 0 0 7 6 . 2 0 0 02 4 . 9 1 1 8 4 2 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 2 8 6 0 7 6 . 5 0 0 02 4 . 7 6 7 0 4 3 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 4 6 8 0 7 6 . 0 0 0 02 5 . 3 4 5 6 4 3 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 4 7 9 0 77 . 3 0 0 02 5 . 9 8 7 5 4 4 . 0 0 0 0 1-4827 77 . 4 0 0 0
YEAR
1 9 6 9 0 1 8 . 2 0 0 0
1 9 7 0 0 1 3 . 5 0 0 0
1 9 7 1 0 1 6 . 2 0 0 0
1 9 7 2 0 1 6 . 7 0 0 0
1 9 7  3 0 1 7 . 2 0 0 0
1 9 7 4 0 1 7 . 4 0 0 0
1 9 7 5 0 1 7 . 5 0 0 0
1 9 7  6 0 1 7 . 6 0 0 0
1 9 7 7 0 1 7 . 3 0 0 0
1 9 7 8 0 1 7 . 9 0 0 0
1 9 7 9 0 1 8 . 2 0 0 0
1 9 8 0 0 1 8 . 3 0 0 0
1 9 8 1 O' 1 9 . 0 0 0 0
1 9 8 2 (■) 2 0 . 5 0 0 0
1 9 8 3 0 2 1 . 1 0 0 0
1 9 8 4 2 1 . 9 0 0 0
1 9 8 5 0 2 3  . 700 ' . '
1 9 6 6 2 4  . 400':. '
1 9 3 7 0 2 4 . 4 0 0 0
1 9 3 8 O' 2 4 . 6 0 0 0
1 9 6 9 . 0
1 9 7 0 . 0  
1 9 7  1 . 0 
1 9 7  2 . 0  
1 9 7  3 . 0  
1 9 7 4  . 0
1 9 7 5 . 0
1 9 7 6 . 0
1 9 7 7 . 0
1 9 7 3 . 0
1 9 7 9 . 0
1 9 8 0 . 0
1 9 8 1 . 0
1 9 3 2 . 0
1 9 8 3 . 0
1 9 6 4 . 0
1 9 8 5 . 0  
1 9 8 6 - 0
1 9 8 7 . 0
1 9 8 8 . 0
1 7 . 8 0 0 0  18. 1000 
15 . 9 0 0 0
1.6 . 4 0 0 0  
1 6 . 9 0 0 0
1.7 . 0 0 0 0
17.200017.3000 17 . 5 0 0 0
1 7 . 6 0 0 013.2000 
1 8 . 4 0 0 0
1 8 . 6000 
3 0 0 0  
8 0 0 0  
5 0 0 0  2000 
9 0 0 0  1000
J. u
1920 21 
21 90
2 3 . 0 0 0 0
NS
EM H AH POP1 9 . 1 7 0 0 1 8 7 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 8 4 0 6 8 . 5 0 0 01 9 . 3 8 6 2 1 8 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 3 3 0 69.00001 9 . 4 2 4 8 1 8 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 9 6 0 6 9 . 5 0 0 01 8 . 6 4 3 7 2 0 7 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 8 7 0 7 0 . 1 0 0 01 7 . 9 9 9 7 2 1 4  . 0 0 0 0 1 - 5 2 5 0 7 0 . 8 0 0 01", . 4 4 0 4 2 1 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 .5550 7 1 . 5 0 0 01 8 . 7 0 3 7 2 2 2 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 7 0 0 7 2 . 2 0 0 01 8 . 8 6 0 0 2 2 7 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 7 0 0 7 3 . 0 0 0 02 0  . 0 1 C O- 2 3 1 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 0 8 0 7 3 . 7 0 0 02 1  . 3 2 5 4 2 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 6 0 8 0 7 4 . 5 0 0 013  . 8 i5 5 5 2 4 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 7 0 1 0 7 5 . 3 0 0 02 0  . 7 47  7 2 5 5 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 8 5 0 0 7 6 . 0 0 0 02 3 . 0 8 0 0 2 5 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 - 8 0 6 0 7 6 . 6 0 0 02 3  . 9' " '9 5 2 6 3 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 7 7 5 0 7 7  . 1 0 OO2 5 . 0 0  15 27  0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 7 4 2 0 7 7 . 6 0 0 0
2 9 2 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 2 9 0 7 8 . 1 0 0 02 5 . 1 5 4 5 3 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 0 7 0 7 8 . 4 0 0 0
3 0 6 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 3 4 3 0 78.70003 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 3 7 0 9 7 9 . 2 0 0 0309.0000 1 . 3 7 3 4 7 9 . 5 0 0 0
NB
EM H AH POP1 8 . 9 2 1 2 145.0000 1 . 4 5 9 0 6 6 . 9 0 0 01 3 . 9 8 l O 1 4 6 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 8 9 0 6 7 . 5 0 0 01 8 . 7  4 8 2 1 4 8 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 7 4 0 6 8 . 0 0 0 01 7 . 8 0 1 0 1 5 7 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 4 3 0 6 8 . 7 0 0 01 7 . 3 9 7 1 1 6 1 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 4 0 0 6 9 . 4 0 0 01 7 . 7 2 3 9 1 6 5 . 0 0 0 0 1 .5650 7 0 . 1 0 0 01 8 . 1 8 7  2 1 6 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 9 8 0 7 0 . 7 0 0 01 3 . 1 1 0 8 17 2 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 9 2 0 7 1 . 5 0 0 01 9 . 3 9 8 7 175.0000 1 . 6 1 0 0 7 2 . 2 0 0 02 1 . 2 8 1 0 1 9 1 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 1 1 0 7 2 . 9 0 0 01 8 . 4 9 2 8 1 9 7 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 0 5 0 7 3 . 7 0 0 02 0 . 4 6 2 9 2 0 4 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 7 1 0 7 4 . 4 0 0 02 2 . 7 1 7 2 2 0 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 0 6 0 7 5 . 1 0 0 02 3 . 7  2 9 2 2 0 6 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 2 3 0 7 5 . 7 0 0 02 4 . 2 6 8 9 2 0 9 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 5 3 8 0 76 . 1 0 0 02 4 . 5 3 0 7 229 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 1 4 0 7 6 . 6 0 0 02 4 . 9 3 8 5 2 3 4 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 1 2 0 7 7 . 0 0 0 02 4 . 6 8 1 9 2 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 0 9 0 7 7 . 4 0 0 02 5 . 2 1 2 1 2 4 6 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 4 8 9 0 77.90002 5 . 7 6 5 2 2 3 8 . 0 0 0 0 1 .4904 7 8 . 4 0 0 0
QUE
YE AR
1 9 6 9 . 0
1 9 7 0 . 0
1 9 7 1 . 0
1 9 7 2 . 0
1 9 7 3 . 0  
1 9 7  -4 . 0 
1 9 7 5 - 0
1 9 7 6 . 0
1 9 7 7  . 0
1978 - 0
1 9 7 9 . 0  
1 9 8 0  . 0 
198.1 . 0
1 9 8 2  . 01983.0 
1 9 8 4  . 0
1 9 8 5 . 0
1 9 8 6 . 0  
1 9 8 7  . 0
1 9 8 3  . 0
E EN H AH POP1 5 . 2 0 0 0 1 8 . 7  6 0 0 1 4 7 5 . 0 1 - 4 7 7 0 6 8  . 8 0 0 01 6 . 5 0 0 0 1 8 . 7 7 8 7 1 5 0 0  . 0 1 . 4 7 9 0 6 9 . 5 0 0 01 3 . 9 0 0 0 1 8 . 8 4 1 7 1 5 3 6 . 0 1 . 5 2 5 0 7 0 . 3 0 0 01 5 . 3 0 0 0 1 8 . 1 7 2 2 1 6 4 1 . 0 1 . 5 9 2 0 7 1 . 4 0 0 01 6 . 6 0 0 0 1 7 . 5 8 9 0 1 6 5 2 . 0 1 . 6 6 4 0 7 2 . 4 0 0 016  . 5 0 0 . ; 1 7 . 6 0 8 3 1 7 2 1 . 0 1 . 7 4 9 0 7 3 . 4 0 0 01 6 . 3 0 0 0 1 7 . 8 7 8 2 1 7 6 4 . 0 1 . 6 9 3 0 7 4 . 3 0 0 01 6 . 2 0 0 0 1 3 . 2 4 8 9 1 8 3 2 . 0 1 . 7 5 7 0 7 5 . 1 0 0 01 6 . 1 0 0 0 1 9 . 3 9 0 1 1 8 6 9 . 0 1 . 8 2 2 0 7 5 . 9 0 0 01 5 . 9 0 0 0 2 1 . 2 1 1 3 1 9 4 4 . 0 1 . 7 1 1 0 7 6 . 6 0 0 01 6 . 2 0 0 0 'El n '  ^ 2 0 1 1 . 0 1 . 7 3 3 0 7 7 . 3 0 0 01 6 . 3 0 0 0 2 0 . 4 1 7 5 2 0 4 6 . 0 1 . 6 1 3 0 7 7  . 9 0 0 01 3 . 0 0 0 0 2 3 . 0 1 7 7 2 1 1 7  . 0 1 - 4 7 1 0 7 8 . 3 0 0 02 0 . 8 0 0 0 2 4 . 2 7 6 1 2 1 9 0 . 0 1 . 4 1 6 0 7 8 . 7 0 0 02 1 . 2 0 0 0 2 5 . 3 7  5 1. 2 2 4 1 . 0 1 . 4 5 6 0 7 9 . 1 0 0 02 1 . 6 0 0 0 2 5  . 4 8 3 9 2 3 2 4 . 0 1 . 3 8 4 0 7 9 . 3 0 0 02 2 . 1 0 0 0 2 5 . 4 4 7 0 2 3 7  6 . 0 1 . 3 8 0 0 7 9  . 500C)2 3 . 6 0 0 0 2 4 6 1 . 0 1 . 3 9 4 0 7 9 . 8 0 0 02 3  . 9 00 i0 2 5 . 6 3 4 5 2 5 3 0 . 0 1 . 4 0 6 2 8 0 . 3 0 0 02 4 .  1 0 0 0 2 4 1 6 . 0 1 - 4 1 5 3 8 0 . 4 0 0 0
ONT
YEAR EN H AH POP1 9 6 9 . 0 1 6 . 8 0 0 0 1 5 . 4  4 0 0 2 0 4 0 . 0 1 . 5 1 7 0 7 0 . 3 0 0 01 9 7 0 . 0 1 7 . 4 0 0 0 1 8 . 4 5 1 6 2 1 0 6 . 0 1 . 5 1 0 0 7 0 . 8 0 0 01 9 7 1 .  0 1 6 . 1 0 0 0 1 8 . 3 7 3 9 2 1 6 3 . 0 1 . 5 5 7 0 7 1 . 3 0 0 01 9 7 2 . 0 1 5 . 9 0 0 0 1 7 . 9 9 2 7 2 2 8 0  . 0 1 . 5 5 8 0 7 2 . 0 0 0 01 9 7  3 . 0 1 5 . 7 0 0 0 1 7 . 3 7 0 4 2 3 7  2 . 0 1 . 5 7 2 0 7 2  . 7 0 0 01 9 7  4 . 0 1 5 . 9 0 0 0 1 7 . 8 1 2 2 2 4 5 3 . 0 1 . 6 6 0 0 7 3 . 4 0 0 01 9 7  5 . 0 1 6 . 3 0 0 0 1 8 . 1 4 8 9 2 5 4 0 . 0 1 . 6 9 1 0 7 4 . 1 0 0 01 9 7 6 . 0 1 6 . 6 0 0 0 1 8 . 5 0 8 4 2 6 2 2 . 0 1 .  6 1 6 0 . 7 4 . 9 0 0 01 9 7 7  . 0 1 6 . 9 0 0 0 1 9 . 4  4 3  L 2 6 3 7 . 0 1 . 1 7 3 0 7 5 . 6 0 0 01 9 7 8 . 0 1 7 . 2 0 0 0 2 0 . 5 4 9 5 2 7 4 1 . 0 1 . 6 5 0 0 7 6 . 3 0 0 01 9 7 9  . 0 1 7 . 6 0 0 0 1 8 . 4 7 7 8 2 8 1 3 . 0 1 . 5 1 5 0 7 7 . 0 0 0 01 9 8 0 . 0 1 7 . 7 0 0 0 2 0 . 4 3 5 6 2 9 1 0 . 0 1 . 5 8 7 0 7 7 . 6 0 0 01 9 8 1 . 0 1 9 . 0 0 0 0 2 2 . 7 7 3 1 2 9 8 7  . 0 1 . 5 7 5 0 7 8 . 1 0 0 01 9 8 2 . 0 1 8 . 6 0 0 0 2 3 . 7  2 3 3 3 0 0 3 . 0 1 . 5 9 7 0 7 8 . 6 0 0 01 9 8 3 . 0 1 9 . 6 0 0 0 2 4 . 4 3 4 0 3 0 7 8 . 0 1 . 5 8 5 0 7 9 . 0 0 0 01 9 8 4 . 0 2 0 . 9 0 0 0 2 4 . 7 1 9 6 3 1 7 9 . 0 1 . 4 9 5 0 7 9 . 3 0 0 01 9 3 5 . 0 2 1 . 4 0 0 0 2 4 . 9 6 5 4 3 2 6 8 . 0 1 - 5 0 7 0 7 9 . 5 0 0 01 9 8 6 . 0 2 2 . 5 0 0 0 2 4 . 7 1 9 2 3 3 7 1 . 0 1 - 5 2 3 0 7 9 . 8 0 0 01 9 8 7  . 0 2 2 . 6 0 0 0 2 5 . 1 0 0 8 3 4 5 1 . 0 1 . 5 3 5 8 8 0 . 1 0 0 01 9 8 8 . 0 2 3 . 1 0 0 0 2 5 . 6 4 3 2 3 3 4 1 . 0 1 . 5 6 4 0 8 0 . 3 0 0 0
MAN
YEAR E1969.0 15 80001970.0 16 70001971.0 14 90001972.0 14 8000197 3.0 14 7000197 4.0 14 8uOO1975.0 14 9000197 6.0 15 10001977.0 15 30001978.0 15 40001979.0 15 8 0001980.0 15 90001981.0 16 50001982.0 13 20 001983.0 19 OC'OO1984.0 19 30001985.0 19 60001986.0 2 1 20001987.0 2 1 400':'1988.0 21 6000
EM H AH POP18.0300 263.0000 1.4670 70.200017.7939 266.0000 1.4900 70.600017.7599 270.0000 1.5150 71.000017.6264 237.0000 1.4900 71.500017.0714 292.0000 1.6070 7 2.100017.0255 306.0000 1.6640 72.7 00017 . 5823 311.0000 1.6910 73.400018.4050 314.0000 1.7090 7 4.000019.3857 319 . 0000 1.7270 7 4.600021.0499 324.0000 1.7310 75.200018.1936 335.0000 1.7110 7 5.800019.9650 342.0000 1.7400 7 6 . 3'00022 . 24 7 -i 343.0000 1.7170 76.800023.4251 354.0000 1.6640 77.200024.2676 361.0000 1.7310 77.400024.8081 37 9.0000 1.5720 77.700025.0391 388.0000 1.6170 77.800024.7 451 397.0000 1.5630 78.000025.2987 378.0000 1.5894 78.300025.8976 380.0000 1.5934 78.4000
S ASK
YEAR EM1969.0 15.8000 17.54CO 2581970.0 15.9000 17.3756 2571971.0 15 . 4 17.7562 25 4197 2.0 14 . 40'.'0 16.3430 2611973.0 13 . 9'j'OO 16 - 4756 2631974.0 14 . lOCiO 16.5690 2641975.0 14.3000 16.9096 27 3197 6.0 14.5000 17.7620 279197 7 . 0 14.7000 19.0697 2881978.0 14 .9000 20.7 563 2951979.0 15.5000 17.9461 2991980.0 15.3000 19.6302 3141981.0 15.9000 21.9126 3251982.0 16.4000 ■ 23.5050 3271983.0 16.6000 24.0436 3351984.0 16.7000 23.7124 3551985.0 17.4000 24.5765 2651986.0 18.4000 24.4532 3731987.0 19.3000 24-7845 4061988-0 20.2000 24.2350 358
H00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
AH 
1.3660 1.3670 
1.8590 1 - 4090 
1.4170 1.4880 1.5560 
1.6140 1.7780 1.7210 
1.5690 
1-5360 1.4240 
1.3500 
1.3640 1.2250 
1.2180 1.1810 
1.2691 1.3181
POP63.7000 69.2000 
69 .7000
70.400071.000071.700072.4000 
7 3.100073.6000 
7 4.1000 
7 4.600075.1000 75.3000
75.600075.8000 
75.9000
76.000075.800076.1000 7 6.2000
ALTA
YEAR E EN H AH POP1969.0 16.4000 18.3600 420.0000 1.4270 67.20001970.0 16.5000 17.4596 434.0000 1.5170 67.80001971.0 14.9000 18.9250 446.0000 1.5260 68.40001972.0 16.2000 18.1190 467.0000 1.5370 69.1000197 3.0 17.1000 17.1934 481.0000 1.5970 7 0.00001974.0 17.2000 17.5153 497.0000 1.6600 70.90001975.0 17.2000 17.7186 519.0000 1.6710 71.8000197 6.0 16.9000 18.2961 542.0000 1.7360 72.60001977.0 16.7000 19.4296 564. i)000 1.8190 73.50001978.0 16.5000 20.9545 593.0000 1.9270 7 4.30001979.0 15.1000 18.1152 622.0000 2.0050 74.90001980.0 15.8000 19.9659 662.0000 1.9900 75.40001981.0 17.4000 22.4285 697.0000 2.0470 75.80001982.0 18.5000 746.0000 1.9300 76.20001983.0 13.7000 24.5126 7 7 3.0000 1.9700 76.60001984.0 19.900O 24.5468 824.0000 1.7560 7 6.40001985.0 20.6000 2 4 .97'? 1 832.0000 1.7750 76.40001986.0 20.8000 24.8413 860.0000 1.6780 7 6.60001987.0 21.2000 25.1654 872 . 000') 1.7202 76.90001988.0 21.5000 25.7 650 848 . OO'O') 1.6087 77.2000
B. C
YEAR1969.01970.0
1971.01972.01973.0 1974-01975.0 1976-0
1977.0 1978 - 01979.0
1980.01981.01982.0
1983.0
1984.01985.0
1986.0
1987.01988.0
E
16.900017.100016.5000 
16.6000 16.700017.1000
17.5000
17.9000 18.400018.5000 18.600017.9000 
5000 7000 
6000 3000
20.9000 21.0000 22.6000 23.0000
18
181920
202020
19
19
19
19
1920 22 
19  21
2324
25 
25 25 252526
EH
5100 7126 4797 
7335 0271 
7858 
95 39 9033 
704 4 2160 
1325 0943 
3223 
3942 
2366 377 3 4783 2177 
87 65 
2154
5 9 8 . 0 0 0 0  
6 1 9  . 0 0 0 ' )
6 4 0 . 0 0 0 0
6 6 5 . 0 0 0 0
690.0000 
7 2 2 . 0 0 0 0749.0000767.0000
7 7 1 . 0 0 0 0
8 2 2 . 0 0 0 0857.0000
8 9 6 . 0 0 0 0
9 3 7 . 0 0 0 0
9 8 1 . 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 5 . 0  
1 07  5 . 0
1 1 1 0 . 0 
1 1 1 5 . . )
1 1 4 9 . 0
1 1 4 5 . 0
AH 1.5320 1.6010 1.6430 1.6730
1.7 260 
1.7400 1.90101.7 650 1.7480 1.7660 1.6210 1.6140 
1.6150
1.7380
1.7380 1.5760 1.5390 
1.5920 
1.5996 1.5874
POP70.7000
71.3000
71.8000 72.4000 
7 3.2000
74.0000 7 4.8000 7 5.600076.200077.2000
77.8000
78.2000 
78.6000 78.900079.3000 7 9.4000 79.5000
79.7000
80.000080.2000
APPENDIX II
4 - 1  (.ly
C o c h r a n e - O r c u t t  M e t h o d  AR(  1 )  C o n v e r g e d  a f t e r  19  i t e r a t i o n s  
I. t .'I' ■ h :K 1 1 . K' - t  1 1  :K =K 1 1  :K :K 4^ t  t  ;K 1 1 1 -  >K 1 1  )K -'K 1 1  1 : K  1 1 1  *  t  *  *  t  :K *  1 1 -  'K 1  :k  t  t  K *  1: t :  t  - W ^  1 1  *  t  ;k  *  ;K - t  t
D e p e n d e n t  variable is LG
2 0 0  o b s e r v a t i o n s  u s e d  f o r  e s t i m a t i o n  f r o m  1 t o  2 0 0
.■+. ;{•: 1.1 +■' 1 4- Mv 4: 'M :K t- *  :f-1 t :K ^  11- * 't t  :K :k t-’ :K 1 1 1  t  -K11 :K '-C I- -Ÿ-1 1 1  t $ t +' 1 t  *  :+. ^  f  t  -t't t. f  t  *  t.
R e g r e s s o r  Coefficient Standard Error T - R a t i o
D1 9 . 1 1 8 2 1 . 3 3 5 1 6 . 8 2 9 8
D2 9 . 0 6 6 9 1 . 2 6 1 6 7 . 1 8 6 7
D3 9.1153 1 . 3 3 3 2 6 . 8 3 7 2
D4 9 . 1 5 0 5 1 . 3 1 7 5 6 . 9 4 5 4
D5 9 . 0 4 4 8 1 . 4 0 5 5 6.4353
T>6 9 - 0 6 1 2 1 . 4 1 7 4 6 . 3 9 3 0
D7 8 . 9 5 2 4 1 . 3 9 3 7 6 . 4 2 3 6
D8 9 . 0 0 4  4 1 . 3 5 2 6 6 . 6 5 7 0
D9 9 .1136 1 . 3 9 0 1 6 . 5 5 5 9
D I O 8 . 9 1 9 3 1 . 3 9 1 3 6 . 4 1 0 6LY . 2 4 9 3 . 0 9 3 1 2.6788
LPT) - . 1 9 2 8 . 0 5 3 7 -3.5911
L E - . 6 0 9 1 . 1 0 3 3 - 5 . 8 9 7 0
LUN - . 0 3 4 8 . 0 2 3 0 - 1 . 5 1 2 7I.AH - . 4 5 8 1 . 0 6 2 1 - 7 . 3 8 1 7
LPOP - . 5 6 2 5 - 3 3 9 1 - 1 . 6 5 9 0LRÜ - . 2 3 8 7 . 1 2 3 7 - 1 . 9 3 0 4
:k. i'. k 1 1  -k t  ik :-k: 1 1  -k 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  •+• 1 1 1 1 1  k k t  + t  i k k k- k k k k k k :k k k k k k -k k k t  k :K -k :k :k -k t  k 1 1 1  -k- -k 1 11  :k it :k :k ■k :+•-1 1  ‘k +. t  k
K - S q u a r e d . 9 1 5 9 F -  s  t  a t  i  s  t  i  c  P' ( 1 7 , 1  & 1 ) 1 1 6 . 0 0 5 5
R-- B a r -  S q u a r e d . 9 0 8 0 S . E . o f  R e g r e s s ! o n . 0 4 9 8
R e s i d u a l  Sum of S q u a r e s . 4 4 9 2 M e a n  o f  D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e 6 . 6 2 6 7
S . D .  o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e . 1 6 3 9 M a X im u m  o f  L o g  - 1 i ]•:e 1 i h o o d 3 2 3 . 9 5 1 8
DW- s t a  t  i  s  t  i  o 2 - 1 2 7 9
k t k •)■ k k 'k 1 1 1 1  k 1 1  ik '-k :k 'k k k ;k t  'k ;k 1 1 1  k k k r. (■ k k .'k k k '+ k .+ ■+. k 1 1  ik k k 1 t  -k if. 1 1  =k -k i  k k 1 1  ;k k '1 k i k -k- k t  "i- ••kk k k -k k k
0 , P a r a m e t e r s  o f  t h e A u t o r e g r e s s i v e  E r r o r  S p e c i f i c a t i o n
k k .'k k :k ‘•k t  -k k 1 1 1  ik; 1 1  :k '+1 -I: ;k t  k t  '-k ik k -k- 'k k k ) k k k k k. -k k k t  k - t  k k t  k k ik k rk k k k ;k "k k t  k i  t  k k i k ik t i  k k k" k ik ■+ k ( :)■ t
U — . / 4 8  Y -+■ IT ( — 1 ) + V
( 1 2 . 1 2 8 3 )
T - r - a t i o ( s )  b a s e d  o n  a s y m p t o t i c  s t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  i n  b r a c k e t s  
t  *•• I ■ - t  i ;  t  1 1  t  >)••. t  . t  - t  ît; i t  - t  1 1 1 1 1  i t  1 1  i -  K h » ;f t  K k t  - t  1 1 1  ik  k  ik ;k t  ;k  t  ■+ k  t  - t  k  t  ;k t  i  1 1 1  ;k- -k ik t  k k  k  1 1  ik  1 1 - '  k  ik :k k  k k <
C o c h r a n e - C h - c u t t  M e t h o d  A R f  1 )  C o n v e r g e d  a f t e r  1 6  I t e r a t i o n s  
;k it it it it it it it it it it it 1 1  it it it it t  k  it it it -t- k  it. it it it it it it it it it it it it it k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  it k  k  it k  k  it it :t k  k  k  it :t k  t  k  t t it it t it k  t :t t t k  > 
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  LG
2 0 0  o b s e r v a t i o n s  u s e d  f o r  e s t i m a t i o n  f r o m  1 t o  2 0 0  
k  it if kit.k i t : k k k k k  k k  k k k k k k k  k  k  k k k k k  k  k k  k k k  k  k  k  k k k  k k  k k k  k k  kk-i'.k k  k k k k k  k 'A'- k  k k k k k k k i t  .4-. k k k k k  k  k k >
R e g r e s s o r C o e f f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d  E r r o r T - R a t i o
D Ï 8 . 3 5 2 9 - 9 5 8 3 8 - 7 1 6 6
D2 8 . 4 0 4 5 . 9 6 0 2 8 . 7 5 3 2
D 3 8 . 3 5 6 7 . 9 6 4 6 8 . 6 6 3 2
D4 8 . 4 0 0 8 . 9 5 4 1 8 . 8 0 4 6
D5 8 . 1 9 3 4 . 9 6 5 7 8 . 4 8 4 3
DG 8 . 2 0 5 9 . 9 7  3 5 8 . 4 2 8 9
D7 8 . 1 2 8 2 . 9 7 3 8 8 . 3 4 6 5
D0 8 . 2 3 6 i . 9 7 5 2 8 - 4 4 5 2
D9 8 . 2 8 8 9 - 9 6 7 9 8 . 5 6 4 1
D I O 8 - 0 8 5 8 . 9 6 5 9 8 . 3 7 1 3
LY . 2 1 3 6 - 0 8 9 0 2 . 4 0 1 7
LPÜ - . 1 8 8 1 - 0 5 3 9 - 3 . 4 9 0 1
1,E - . 6 0 6 1 . 1 0 2 8 - 5 . 8 9 5 7
LUN - . 0 4 1 1 - 0 2 2 1 - 1 . 8 5 8 6
LAH - . 4 6 1 5 . 0 6 1 6 - 7 . 4 9 3 8
LPOP - . 5 2 0 5 . 3 3 7  4 - 1 - 5 4 2 3
k  t k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k : t  k k  t-t t k  1 1  k  1 1  1 1
R -  S q .u a re d  . 9 1 5 6
R - B a r - S q u a r e d  . 081
R e s i d u a l  Sum o f  S q u a r e s  . 4 5 1 ! :
S . D . o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  . 1 6 3 9
D W - s t a t i s t i c  2 . 1 1 8 0
t k k k k . k k k k . k k k k k k k k k k k k - k k k k  1 1  i 1 1  )•.( t k  t  t t k
k  ( t .). -t. if k  k  k  -i'- k  k  k  k k  it it k  k  k  k  it k  A'- k  it i|. k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  t •
F “ S t a t i s t i c  F f 1 6 , 1 8 2 )
S - E . o f  R e g r e s s i o n
M e a n  o f  D e p e n d e n t .  V a r i a b l e
1.1 a x i m u m  o f  L o g - l i k e l i h o o d
1 2 3 . 3 2 2 9  
. 0 4 9 8  
6 . 6 2 6 7  
3 2 3 . 4 9 9 3
t t 1 1  t ' t it t- k  t k  1 1  I't k  k  k  it k  k  k't k  k  k  -t k  k  k  t  k  A- it k  k  k  k  it
P a r a m e t e r s  o f  t h e  A u  t . v . n ' e g r e s s i v e  E r r c '  r  S p e c i f i c a t i o n  
k  t k  t k k ' k  k k k k  k k k k  k  k i t k k  t k k k t  t t i-1 i 1 1  *- r i t  i t i i k t k k  t k k k k k - i  k k k k k k r  k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k -
- 7 6 6 9 k l U -  1 ) k V  
{ 1 2 . 9 0 1 9 )  \
T - r a t i o ( s )  b a s e d  o n  a.sym p<to t  ;i c s t a n d . a r d  e r r o r s  i n  b r a c k e t s  
k . k k ' . k k k . k k k k . . k k . k k . k . k k k . k i t  t.k.'t.kit i t  i i i- i i t; i t f i| + t .i-■» k  k.t f.k't. i t k k . t . k k i t k k  k k k k . t k  k  k k k k k k ' t k k k k k k k .
4 - 1  13)
C o c h r a n e - O r c u t t  M e t h o d  AR(  I )  C o n v e r g e d  a f t e r  1 6  i t e r a t i o n s  
k  \. A k k i t k  it K:K k k  k k  k k k k ' k k k  k k  k k k  k k : t  k k k  :t k  k k k k  :t k  k  k  k k  k k k i t  k k k k k k  k  k k k  k i t  i t k k  it k  k ; t  k  k-k- k  t - t  k k k it :t
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  LG
2 0 0  o b s e r v a t i o n s  u s e d  f o r  e s t i m a t i o n  f r o m  1 t o  2 0 0
i. t k k k k k k k k k k k k k : t k k k k k k k k k k i t k k k k k k k k ' k k k i t k k k  k k k k k i t k k k k k k k k k k k k i t k k i t k k k k k k k k k k k k k k
( e g r e s s o r C o e f f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d  E r r o r T - R a t i o
D Ï 7 . 2 0 0 6 . 6 7 8 8 1 0 . 6 0 7 5
D2 7 - 2 2 3 4 . 6 6 5 2 1 0 . 8 5 6 3
D3 7 - 1 7 0 5 . 6 6 6 6 1 0 . 7 5 7 4
D4 7 . 2 3 3 6 . 6 6 3 5 1 0 . 9 0 2 1
D5 7 . 0 0 8 8 . 6 7 1 3 1 0 . 4 4 0 2
1)6 7 . 0 1 7 9 . 6 8 3 8 l o . 2 6 3 9
D7 6 . 9 2 6 9 . 6 7 5 0 1 0  - 2 6 1 7
I 'S 7 . 0 2 8 3 . 67  34 1C). 4 3 6 6
1)9 7 . 1 0 6 9 . 6 8 0 4 1 0 . 4 4 5 3
D I O 6 . 9 0 6 4 . 6 7 5 2 1 0 . 2 2 8 0
LY . 1 4 6 6 . 0 7 1 7 2 . 0 4 5 2
LP'U - . 2 0 9 5 . 0 5 2 7 - 3 . 9 7 1 9
LE - . 7 4 7 0 . 0 6 6 0 - 1 1 . 3 1 8 9
LUN - . 0 4 9 5 . 0 2 1 5 - 2 . 2 9 7 8
LAH -  . 4 7 1 4 . 0 6 2 0 - 7 . 5 9 9 3
t . k k k k k k k k i t k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k ; t k k k k k k k  t i t  t k k k k i t k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k i t : t k k k k k k k k k k k k
R - S q u a r e d . 9 1 4 4 F - s t a t i s t i c  F ( 1 5 , 1 8 3 ) 1 3 0 . 3 5 8 2
R - B a r - S q u  a r e d . 9 0 7  4 3 . E .  o f  R e g r e s s i o n . 0 5 0 0
R e s i d u a l  Sum o f  S q u a r e s . 4 5 7 3 M e a n  o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e 6 . 6 2 6 7
S . D . o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a  r i a b 1 e . 1 6 3 9 M a x im u m  o f  L o g - 1 i k e 1 i h o o d 3 2 2 . 1 7 5 8
D W - s t a t i s t i c 2 . 0 9 2 7
1 1  it k  k  k  k  k k k  k  it k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  t k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  ;t k  k  k  it k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  t k  k  it k  k  k  k  k  k  k  t k  it k  i. k  k
P a r a m e t e r s  o f  t h e  A u t o r e g r e s s i v e  E r r o r  S p e c i f i c a t i o n
! ( t 1 1  k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k  k k k k  k  t k  k  k  1 1  t k k  k  k k k  k  k  i r- K k k k k k k  k k k k k  k k  k k k  k k k k  k k k  k k k  k k k  k t k
U -  - 7 3 7 0 k U i -  D - t -V
i 1 2 . 0 9 3 7 )
T - r a t i o ( s )  b a s e d  o n  a s y m p t o t i c  s t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  i n  b r a c k e t s
k it t' it it k  k  'k it k  k  it k  k  k  k  k  k  k  :t it k  k  k  k  k  k  H; it it it it 1 1 1  k  k  k  ii: t k  t k  k  it k  k  k  k  it k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  it it k  k  k  k  it k  y; it k  k  it k  it it
£ - 1 ci;
O r d i n a r y  L e a s t  S q u a r e s  E s t i m a t i o n
l; k k k k k k k k k  kk>K k k k k k  k k k k  k k k  k k k k  k k k k k k k k  k  k k k k  k k k k k k k k k k i t k  k k k k k  k k  k k k k  k it: k k k k k k k k k k  k :  
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  LS
2 0 0  o b s e r v a t i o n s  u s e d  f o r  e s t i m a t i o n  f r o m  1 t o  2 0 0  
k k k  k  k  k  k  ik k  k  k k k  k  k  k  k  k  iK k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k k  k  k  :i- K k  A- k k k k  A' k  k k k k k ih k k  k  k k k  k  k k k  k  k  k  k k  k  k k  k k  k  k  k k k  k k k  -k. k  :
R e g r e s s o r C o  e f  f  i  c  i  e n t S t a n d a r d  E r r o r T - R a t i o
D1 . 2 0 7  3 . 8 7 1 1 . 2 3 8 0
D2 . 3 2 8 4 . 8 7 4 7 - 3 7 5 4
D3 . 2 6 3 8 . 8 7 3 9 . 3 0 1 9
D4 . 2 8 1 4 . 8 7 5 0 . 3 2 1 6
D5 . 2 2 5 6 , 8 7 7 7 . 2 5 7 0
D6 . 2 5 0 8 . 6 8 2 2 . 2 8 4 4
D7 . 2 8 2 8 . 8 7 9 8 . 3 2 1 5
D8 . 2 4 7 5 . 8 8 0 3 . 2 8 1 2
D9 . 3 1 4 3 . 8 8 6 2 . 3 5 4 7
D I O . 2 9 2 0 . 8 8 2 1 . 3 3 1 0
LY . 1 4 0 2 . 0 6 6 6 2 . 1 0 6 1
L P G l - . 1 2 0 6 . 0 3 9 8 - 3 . 0 2 9 5
LPN - . 0 2 9 7 . 0 2 1 2 - 1 . 4 0 2 1
L S I . 4 9 5 5 . 0 6 3 6 7 . 7 6 9 9
LPOP . 3 9 0 6 . 2 1 4 0 1 . 8 2 4 9
k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k i  kkM: '(■ k k  i r- k k k  t k i r A i + t i r i V k k  k k k k k k  i‘. k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k  + 
R- 3 q u  a  r e d  . 8  2 5 7 F - s  u a t  i  s  t  i  c  F ( 1 4 , 1 8  5 ! 6 2 . 5 9 2  6
R - B a r - S g u a r e d  . 6 .125 ; .  E . c . f  R e g r e s s i o n  . 0 5 5 5
R e s i d u a l  Sum o f  S q u a r e s  . 57 '09  M e a n  o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  7 . 1 2 2 9
S . D .  o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  . 1 2 8 3  M a x i m u m  o t  L o g - l i k e l i h o o d  3 0 2 . 1 0 5 3
DW -  s  t a t i s t i  c  2 . 0 0
I', k k k  k k k k  k k  k k k  kkk -kkk - i t  k k  k k r k t  t k t i  f. ' \- a v v k -i i t i i i r t  i. k k k k \ k k  k t k" k k k k  k k k k k k  k k k k k k  k ;k k k k
%  ■+•
A- - 
k
k
T  e s t  S t  a  t  i  3 1 i  s
LM o i a i‘ s
f- k (-. k t t t t.t 1 1 t 1- ) ! 1 I t 1 t > t V i: :l » t t -t
+ LM ' e r i  11 k
K k it'- t- k t I i t f t t 1 i- i » t-' t t i. t )■ t- 1 t it-'. 1 ( 1
t C H I ­ Sût -t-
k ti
I C H I - CQ( ] .= I . 0 0 6 2 4-
1 t
t: C H I  - SQi 2 1= 5 1 7 . 0 0 2 3 -t-
it: t
A- C H I  - SC'J 1 ' =  . 8 3 9 1 ti
k  B : F u n c t i o n a l  F o r m  
k
k  C : N o r m a l i t y  
k
F( 1 , 1 9 8 ) =  . 8 3 4 2
k k  k k k k k ' k k k k k  k k k k  k k k k k k k k  k k k k  k t k k- k :| k i A k k i t- k i k k k k k k k  k k k k k  k k k  k k k  k k k k k  k k k k  k  k k k k  k
i' V e r s i o n
t: k i k k I k k A- it t k k. k k k k" t -t k i
F I 1 , 1 8 4 1 =  . 7 1 6 2
F t  1 , 1 8 4  1= . 9 3 0 3
N o  t  a p p l i e  a b 1 e
A : L a g r a n g e  m u l t i p l i e r  t e s t  o f  r e s i d u a l  s e r i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  
B i R a m s e y ' s  R ES ET t e s t  u s i n g  t h e  s q u a r e  o f  t h e  f i t t e d  v a l u e s  
C : B a s e d  o n  a  t e s t  o f  s k e w n e s s  a n d  k u r t o s i s  o f  r e s i d u a l s  
#  D : B a s e d  o n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  o f  s q u a r e d  r e s i d u a l s  o n  s q u a r e d  f i t t e d  v a l u e s
s  - 1
O r d i n a r y  L e a s t  S q u a r e s  E s t i m a t i o n  
A\ •+■ k: -t I k  K :K k- '¥■ 'M . h k: k  k k k h k (; k  k; k k  k  k  k k; k  k k: k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k k: k k  k  k  k= k  k  k k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  iK k  k  k  k k  k k  k A- k  k  k k k k  k  4 k
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  LS
2 0 0  o b s e r v a t i o n s  u s e d  f o r  e s t i m a t i o n  f r o m  1 t o  2 0 0  
k k  k  k k k  k k  k  k  k  k  k k  k k  k  k  k k k  k -f; k  k =1: k  K k •l'- k k  k  k h k  k  k k k k H-. k k t- A- k k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k  =K k  k :k ;k k  'k k k k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k k  A-
R e g r e s s o r
DÏ
D2
1)3
1)4
1)51)6
D?
I'8
D9
D I O
LY
L P G l
bPN
L S ILpiSP
LRCA
C o e f f i c i e n t  
- . 0 7 5 9  
. 0 3 8 1  
- . 0 2 9 6  
- . 0 0 9 0 3 2 9  
-  . ' . )696 
- . V 4 7 1  
- . 0 1 1 3  
—. 0 4 3 4  
. 0 2 0 5  
- . 0 0 7 4 2 6 0  
. 1 5 4 4  
- . 1 1 8 5  
- . 0 0 5 2 8 7  
. 5 0 1 2  
. 4 9 5 1  
- . 0 3 0 3
S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  
. 8 8 6 1  
. 8 9 0 6  
. 8 9 0 2  
. 8 9 0 9  
. 8 9 4 1  
. 8 9 8 9  
. 8 9 6 0  
. 8 9 6 1  
. 9 0 2 3  
. 3 9 9 0  
. 0 6 6 9  
. 0 3 9 7  
. 0 7 9 4  
. 0 6 3 5
. 0 1 9 3
T - R a t i o  
- . 0 8 5 6  
. 0 4 2 8  
-  0 3 3 2  
- . OlOi 
- . 0 7 8 1  
- . 0 5 2 4  
- . 0 1 2 7  
—. 0 4 8 4  
. 0 2 2 7  
- . 0 0 8 2 6 0 7  
2 . 3 0 7  3  
- 2 . 9 8 5 6  
- . 6 9 6 2 9  
7 . 8 9 7 9  
2 . 2 1 7 3  
- 1 . 5 7 3 0}. A. k, K k k k k K k k  k  k  A- k  k  i  k A- k  k k A- k k k  A- k  A- k A- k k k A- k t k k k ÿ K ü- k k t k k k k A- k  k  -'k k  A~ k k k -k k  k  k k :K k  l'- k 4' M- k k k  k k  .i-- A
R - S q u a r e d  . 8 2 8 0  F - s t a t i s t i c  F ( 1 5 , 1 8 4 )  5 9 . 0 5 0 3
R -  B a 1’ -  S q u a  r  e  d . 8 1 4  0  S:. E . o f  R e g  r  e s s i o n  . 0 5 5 3
R e s i d u a l  Sum o f  S q u a r e s  . 5 6 3 3  M ea n  o f  D e p e n d e n t ' V a r i a b l e  7 . 1 2 2 9
S . D .  o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  . 1 2 8 3  M a x i m u m  o f  L o g - l i k e l i h o o d  3 0 3 . 4 4 1 1
DW •- s  t  a t  i  s  t  i  c  2 . 0  (:> 9 3
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^  V, \\ .K y k k. k'. k t’ k k k k  k- t: k k A  t; k f. k A - k k k + A  A  t. i- A -  A  k l k A - k k \r A  k k y t t- A - k A  A - ( k  k k  k  k k K k A  A  A  A  A - r. A  I- k i. 4 i- k" k. k k f t
T e s t  S t a t i s t i c s  a LM V e r s i o n  i F  V e r s i o n  i
i
k 33 ; F u n c t i o n a l  1 F o r m  
k C : M o  r m a 1 i t y
4   r   i  c-Pi 4
A- k 4‘-y A- V- A- k 4". k K k 4' 4 4 4 4A 1 4 4 4 k 4 4': A. -4:: k 4
k C H I - S Q 4 1 1 = . 8 6 1 6 k
A k
A C H I - S Q ( 13 = 1.. 0 3 1 6 k
A C H I - S Q i 2 ) = 5 3 1 . 0 6 0 4 +
k 4
k G H 1 -S Q ( 1 ) = . 5 2 5 5 k
4
F(  1 , 1 8 3 : =  - 7 9 1 8  i
F {  1 , 1 8 3 ) =  - 9 4 8 8  •
M o  t  app> 1 i  c  a3:i 1 e
F {  1 , 1 9 8 ) =  . 5 2 1 7
k k .k k A' k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k  k k  k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k k k k k h A- k :t: k  k k  k  k k k A‘- k ;f'- k  k  k  k k k A- A. k  k  k  k k  k  k k  k k  k ;
A : L a g r a n g e  m u l t i p l i e r  t e s t  o f  r e s i d u a l  s e r i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n
B ; R a m s e y " s  R ES ET t e s t  u s i n g  t h e  s q u a r e  o f  t h e  f i t t e d  v a l u e s
#  C ; B a s e d  o n  a  t e s t  o f  s k e w n e s s  a n d  k u r t o s i s  o f  r e s i d u a l s
D : B a s e d  o n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  o f  s q u a r e d  r e s i d u a l s  o n  s q u a r e d  f i t t e d  v a l u e s
5 - 1  K 3 J
C o n v e r g e d  a f t e r  4 i t e r a t i o n s  
k k  k k k k k k k  k k  k  k  '-l: k  k  k  k k  k  A k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k  k k k  k k k k  k
C o c h r a n e - O r c a t t  M e t h o d  ARf  i ) 
k k  k k  k  k  k  k  k k k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k- k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k k  k  ; h k  k k  k 
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  LS
2 0 0  o b s e r v a t i o n s  u s e d  f o r  e s t i m a t i o n  f r o m  1 t o  2 0 0  
’ k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k k k k  k  k k k k k  k  k k k k  k  k  k  k k k  -k k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k k  k  k  k
T - R a t i o  
. 6 5 2 0  
. 8 9 4 3  
. 7 9 3 3  
. 8 3 5 2  
. 7 0 3 5  
. 7 5 6 5  
. 8 1 5 2  
. 7 6 7 9  
. 8 6 1 5  
- 8 4 0 3  
4 . 3 1 7  2 
- 2 . 3 4 0 5  
- - 9 9 7 6  
2 . 0 9 0 7  
- 1 . 4 0 0 0
i e g r e s s o r C o e f f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d  E r
D1 . 6 4 7 4 . 9 9 3 0
D2 . 8 8 8 7 . 9 9 3 7
D3 . 7 8 9 6 . 9 9 5 2
D4 . 8 3 0 7 . 9 9 4 7
D5 . 7 0 3 2 . 9 9 9 7
D 6 . 7 6 0 3 1 . 0 0 5 1
D7 . 8 1 6 6 1 . 0 0 1 7
DS . 7 6 9 0 1 . 0 0 1 5
D9 . 8 6 8 1 1 . 0 0 7  6
D I O . 8 4 3 3 1 . 0 0 3 6
LY . 3 8 2 5 . 0 8 8 6
L P G l - - 1 2 4 1 . 0 5 3 0
LPN - . 0 9 9 4 8 1 . 0 9 9 7
LPOP . 6 1 7  9 . 2 9 5 6
LRCA - . 0 3 2 7 . 0 2 3 4
A k :f'. k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k  k  k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  :i; k k  k ■ k. .k k
R - S q  u a r e d  . 8 1 45
R -  B a  .r -  S q u  a r e d  . 7 9 9 3
R e s i d u a l  Sum o f  S q u a r e s  . 5 7 7  4
S . D .  o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e  . 1 2 8 3
DW - s t a t i s t i c  2 . 0  3  C) 3
k -f-- k'- k k k  k  k  k k  k  k  k  k  k  k k k  k  k  k  k  k  k- k  k 1- k  k  +- k -f-- t  k  ■ 4 4
4' 4" 4 4" 4= k 4 I' 4. .4' k k. k A A- k k k -I’- k 1' +- k  4 4'- ;|'. 4: 4' k k;|. k k  k k k k  k  A~ k 4ir-. t  i s t i c  F ( 1 5 , 1 8 3 )
. E . o f  R e g r e s s i o n  
M e a n  o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e
5 3 . 5 6 5 1  
. 0 5 6 2  
7 . 1 2 2 9  
2 9 8 . 9 6 5 5t J a i  mum o f  L o g -  1 i k e  1 i h o o d
I 4- 4- I i 4 4; I f 4- k- k- k- t  k k A- 4: k A k- k' 4' k k  4: 4'- k  ‘t  :4( k :4: 4^ A A'- A- A k 4 4
1L r  1- o  r  S p.' e c  i  f  i  a t. i  n
t (• 4 4 i i J: 4- t- k  k I'- 4: A- k k 4: 4' k k A- 4" k 4 A ' K k A 4-- k  :4" 4 ■
F ' a r c i m e t e r s  o f  t h e  A u t o  
k k  k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k  » k k k k k k k  4; k  i i-. i-. 4 1 4 4 4 4 i 
U= . 5 1 5 4 k I J ( -  1 1 + V
4 7 . 7 9 0 4 )
T - r a t i o ( s )  b a s e d  o n  a s y m p t o t i c  s t a n d a r d  e r i - o r s  i n  b r a c k e t s  
k  k k  k k  k k  k  k  4: k  k  k  k  k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k  A k .4: k a a~ a a k -4: 4- k 4. i 1 t 4 4 1 4 1 k a a- 4 k '|. k; k  t  t  k 4:4 k' 4-. k  A k k; + k k A- k: A k k  k  k + -i
6 - 1  U-P
C o n v e r g e d  a f t e r  5 i t e r a t i o n s  
k  ■+ k  4 k  k  k k  k  k  ■ K k  k  |: k  k  k  k  k  k  k -t- '-K k  k  k- k  4 '-I- k  .4. k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  kCoohrane-Orcutt Method AR( 2 ).(• k. k  k  k  '-K 4= k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k: k  k  Dependent variable is LMR I 200 observations used for estimation from 1 to 200
;k k  :'t\ k  k  k  k  k  k  k k k  k  k  k  k  k  A  >4; k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  ;4'- k  k  k  k  k  k  4 k  k  k  k  k  k  4" k  4: k  k  k  k  k  k  -i' ••4: k  k  k  k k  k  k  ^4' k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k- k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k
Regressor Coeff icient Standard Error T-Ratio
D1 7.8894 1.8226 4.3287D2 7.7907 1.8186 4.2839
D3 7.8021 1.8203 4.2862D4 7.8878 1.8194 4.3354
D5 7.87 21 1.8285 4.30521*6 7.6989 1.8498 4.1619
D7 7.4788 1.8398 4.0649DS 7.3571 1.8426 3.9927
r>9 7 - 5888 1.8574 4.0858DIO 7.4933 1.8418 4.0684
4 LY -3453 - 1154 2.9921LPN -.7179 . 1440 -4.9848LUN -.2956 .0424 -6.9753LST - .0039513 .0016124 -2.4506LPUl -.2726 .0908 -3.0020
A k' { . k  k  k  k  k  A- k: k  k  k  k  -k k  k  A ' k  k  k' k  k: k k  k  k k  k  k  i". k  k  k  k  k  k  k  ;4'. t-k  k 4' 4'. 4'- A  A~ k 4- A k  A k k  k  A  A k  k  4= 4- k  k  k  4: k k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k  k  A- k
R-Squared .7845 F-statistic Ft 16,181) 41.1902:R-Bai'-Squa red .7655 S.E . o f Regress ion . 1054Residual Sum of Squares 2.0115 Mean of Dependent variable 4.7446S.D . o f De pendent Variable .2171 MaXiivtum r-f Log-like 1 ihood 173.4013I 'W-stati s t i c: 2.0342
4 4 4 A- 4 k  '4- k  4' k  k  k  A- k  A 4"k k k k k k k  k k k k k  k  4" k  A- 4- 4; :4 k  k  k  k  k  k k k  -4' A 4 4 A i . 4 4' | . 4‘. k  1 k  4" + k 4" 4'. k  -4'- 4 -4' k k  I- k  k  :4: :4 k  k- k  A k
P a r a m e t e r s  o f  t h e  A u t o r e g r e s s i v e  E r r o r  Cp'eo i  f  a i o n
< i t I 4. f- -i'. 4: k  4 4- k  4^ 4 I I :K k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k- k  4 k  k'- k  -4: k  k  k'- k- 4 k  k k  4: k  4 k  4 4-. 4 .4 4' 4" 4' 4 4 A I'- 4 k 4 I 4 i I r i 4 4 -4- 4- 4' k  k k  4: '4'- k' 4' 4 4" 4
^  U = . 4 y 4J 3 k U ( ~ 1 ) + — . 21 ( 4 k Id I — 2 ! V
4 6.5445) 4 -2.792?!
T - r a t i o  4 s  ) b a s e d  o n  a s y m p t o t i c  s t a n d a r d  e r r o - r s  i n  b r a c k e t s
4 4 »•- 4; k'. k  4 k  k. -4'. k  k  k  k  k  k  A k  k k  k  k  k  k k  k k  k; k\ f. k  k  k'- k k  k  k  k  k  4- 4. k k  |- + r -v i |- k f 4- 4' k  t  k  4' k  l- 4; A I k A- k  A- k  k  k  4'. k  k k  ); 1-. k  4
C o c h r a n e - O r c u t t  M e t h o d  AR(  I") C o n v e r g e d  a f t e r  7 i t e r a t i o n s  
k: k k  k. k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k k k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  ;K k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  :4' -k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  K k  h k-. k  k- k- k  k  
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  LMR
2 0 0  o b s e r v a t i o n s  u s e d  f o r  e s t i m a t i o n  f r o m  1 t o  2 0 0  
k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k k k  k  k  k  k  A  k  k  k  k  k  4-. k  k  k  k  k  k  ;4-. k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k
i e g r  e s s o r C o e f f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d  E r r o r T - R a t i o
D Ï 7 . 7 8 0 0 1 . 7 7 0 8 4 . 3 9 3 4
D2 7 . 6 9 5 1 1 . 7  6 4 5 4 . 3 6 1 1
D3 7 . 7 0 9 0 1 . 7  6 5 6 4 . 3 6 6 1
04 7 . 7 9 7 8 1 . 7 6 4 9 4 . 4 1 8 3
D5 7 . 7 7 8 2 1 . 7 7 3 5 4 . 3 8 5 8
0 6 7 . 6 0 9 2 1 . 7 9 4  5 4 . 2 4 0 2
I,»7 7 . 3 9 0 8 1 . 7 8 5 5 4 . 1 3 9 3
D8 7 . 2 5 7 1 1 . 7 8 7 3 4 . 0 6 0 5
D9 7 . 5 2 8 0 1 . 8 0 0 4 4 . 1 8 1 4
D I O 7 . 4 1 0 4 1 . 7 8 5 2 4 . 1 5 1 0
I ,Y - 3 6 7  8 . 1 2 2 7 2 . 9 9 6 5
LPU - . 1 9 0 2 . 1 0 9 9 - 1 - 7 3 0 5
LPN - . 7 1 5 4 . 1 5 7 0 - 4 - 5 5 7 0
LUN - . 2 7 6 4 . 0 4 2 8 - 6 . 4 5 2 1
L S T - . 0 0 3 6 4 7  2 . 0 0 1 7  3 5 0 - 2 . 1 0 2 1
4. -K k  -1-- k  k  k  '4' k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k k  k  k  ;4- k  k  k  -k k k  k k A- k k k + k  ;4 4 k i; k 4' 4- k k k k  k  k k  k k  :4i k k k  -'k k  k k  k  k  :4- k  k  k  k  k
R - S q u a r e d  
R - B a r - S q u a r e  d 
R e s i d u a l  Sum o f  S q u a r e s  
S - D . o f  De  p e n d e n t  V a r  i  a b 1 e DW-statistic
. 7 6 5 2 F - s t a t  i  :S t i c  F(15,183) 3 9 . 7 5 5 9
- 7 4 5 9 :::. E . o  f R e g r e s s i o n . 1096
2 - 1 9 9 3 M e a n  o f .[.'e r-e n d e n t  V a r  i  a b  ]. e 4 . 7 4 4 6
. 2 1 7 1 M a x i m u m o f  L c ' g -  1 i  k e  I  i h o o d 1 6 5 . 8 9 3 9
2 . 0 4 0 2
k k. '-k k 'k i k A k (. A- 1 A- -t A -I' 1 t I f t t 1 k ( k k 1 -k ■(: k k 1 A A- k' k k k A k k k k
P a r a m e t e r s  o f  t h e  A u t o r e g r e s s i v e  h r r - ;  r  ;'.r- - 
k  4". I . i ' . k k k k k  i . k k k - k y t k k y k k k k y 4 ; k k k k k k  k k k k  1 1  k k  4-4'.k k k ' i ; k k  + i t. t k 4 t i i t t 
^  . 4 4 6 1 k U ( — 1 )+V
( . 6 6 3 2 )
r  i c  a t  i o n
I 4- 4- i 4 4- 4 k k T 4: 4 4
T - r a t i o ( s )  b a s e d  o n  a s y m p t o t i c  s t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  i n  b r a c k e t s
k k k . k . k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k + : k k k k k k : t ;  t  k k k k  k k k k  k k k  t 4- k k i 4- i i 4 \ k k k  kkk:4 k k  4 i- k k  k kk  k k k . k k  k 4 k 4
6 - 1  Q3;
C o c h r a n e - O r c u t t -  M e t h o d  AR (  2 ) C o n v e r g e d  a f t e r  b i t e r a t i o n s  
-i; k k k k  k  k k  k  k  k k  k  k  k  k  k- k  k  k k  k  k  k k t  k  k k k- k k  k k  k  k  k  k k  k k k  k  k k k k k  k  k  k  k k k  k  k  k  k k  k k  k k. k i  k + A k k k k  k
Dependent variable is LMR » 200 observations used for estimation from 1 to 200
k k  k  k  k k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k  k k  k  k k  k  k  •t'- k k  k k  k k k k k k k k k k  k k  k  k  k  k-. k  k k  k  k  k k k  k k k k  k k k. k k  k  k  k k
Regressor C o e f f i c i e n t S t a n d a r d  E r r o r T - R a t i o
D1 9 . 1 8 4 4 1 . 8 2 9 5 5 - 0 2 0 3
D2 9 . 0 9 1 5 1 . 8 2 6 1 4 - 9 7 8 8
D3 9 . 1 0 8 6 1 - 8 2 8 0 4 - 9 8 2 8
I ' 4 9 . 1 8 7 0 1 . 8 2 6 6 5 - 0 2 9 6
;-'b 9 . 1 8 7 3 1 - 6 3 6 5 5 . 0 0 2 5
9 . 0 4 9 7 1 . 8 5 9 6 4 . 8 6 6 3
1)7 8 . 8 1 9 2 1 . 8 4 9 3 4 . 7  6 8 9
D8 8 . 6 9 9 9 1 . 8 5 2 1 4 . 6 9 7  3
D9 8 - 9 4 4 3 1 . 8 6 7  2 4 . 7 9 0 2
D l  0 8 . 8 2 6 2 1 . 6 5 0 6 4 . 7 6 9 4
4  LY . 7 67  6 . 1 7 3 2 4 . 4 3 3 0
LPM - . 7 5 4 9 . 1 4 1 3 - 5 - 3 4 3 7
LUM - . 2 4 6 2 . 0 4 4 5 - 5 - 5 2 6 9
:L,ST - 0 0 4 6 8 5 0 . 0 0 1 5 7 4 9 - 2 . 9 7 4 8
L i 'U l - . 2 5 9 1 . 0 8 8 1 - 2 . 9 4 0 6
i.Y j - -  5 2 6 6 . 1 6 8 8 - 3 - 1 1 9 0
k I k' f 1 k k k  k'. A k k k- k'. k k k  k  k k k- A -k k k A A k- ;i: k k k': k k k  k -k '\K -A k k k k  k k k k: k -t 'k k k i; t  k f- A A A A k k k 'K k :A 'k k  4 k A k k k A
R - S q u a r e d . 7 9 5 7 F - s t a t i s t i c  F ( 1 “7 , 1 8 0  ) 4 1  . 2 4 4 6
R- Ba r - S q u a r e d - 7 7 6 4 S . E .  o f  R e g r e s s i o n . 1 0 2 9
R e s i d u a l  Sum o f  S q u a r e s 1 . 9 0 7 0 M e a n  o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e 4 . 7  4 4 6
S . D . o f  D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a h 1 e . 2 1 7 1 M a x i m u m  o f  L o g - 1 i k e 1 i h o o d 1 7 8 . 6 8 0 3
DW • s t a t i s t i c 2 . 0 2 5 4
A s t V. i  k ). K k. k k k k k k  'k- + k  k  I k k  t-. k k. 11. k k k  -K K k  k k k k  k t  k  i. k  k k I +• k k i- k k k k k k k k: k k -k k k  k k k k k k k k k k k k i
P a r a m e t e r s  o f  t h e  A u t o r e g r e s s i v e  E r r o r  S p e c i f i c a t i o n
k k i I t k k k k -kk::kk:k kk  k;kk:k k:kk k k k k k  k k k k. k ki '  k I k k k  k k  k k k- k k k k k k k k  k k t- k k k k kk  k t k kk k k k k k k k k v i l
Uu - 5 0 0 4 + U f -  l ) - k  -  . 2 2 7 3 i n ( -  o ! + v
6 . 6 7 9 9 )  ( - 2 . 9 6 1 4 )
-ratio f s ) I'fased on asymptotie standsvrd errors in ):>rac]■:e ts 
k k k i k k. k k  ■kkk'-k k k k k k k k k  k k k k  k k k k k  k k k k  k k k k  k k k k k k  A--A k k k k :k k i  k k k  k;k- k k- k k-k- :kkkkk'- -k k k k  k -V- k- 4; k k k i
DLAG LEW DP fZi 22 23 24 DC)/ 0RDER=1 LAG=3 NOCONSTANT PREDICT=PEN
. REQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR= 15 CURRENT PAR= 273
DISTRIBUTED LAGS - LAG= 3 ORDER= 1 r# 65 REMAINING OBS.DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LEN
LAGGED VARIABLE =DPBUM OF LAG COEFFICIENTS = 0.78694■lEAN LAG (SEE KMENTA(1986, P. 527 ')) = 1.4803
R-SQUARE = 0.9991 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.9991
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE = 0.90180E-02STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE = 0.94963E-01
JEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 3.0478
_,0G OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = 64.4995^AW MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9991
•JODEL SELECTION TESTS - SEE JUDGE ET.AL.il985, P. 242 i AKAIKE (1969) FINAL PREDICTION ERROR- FPE = 0.10267E-0
(FPE ALSO KNOWN AS AMEMIYA PREDICTION CRITERION -PCi 
AKAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION- AIC = -4.5456
SCHWARZ(1978) CRIÏERION-SC = -4.2445
DEGRESSION
CRROR
"OTAL
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - FROM ZERO 
SS I>F MS607.39 7. 86.771
0.52304 58. 0.90l80E-v2607.92 9.3526
F
9621.930
ARIABLENAME
,1
■:.4
,»c.
;.'P;.'P
:)p
;:>p
ESTIMATEDCOEFFICIENT
4.0061 
3.9380 
3.7232 
3.5491
STANDARD
ERROR
0.13460 
0.13312 
0.13312 
0.13312
0.8237 2E-01 0.40520E-010.20138 0.66733E-01
0.19829 0.37309E-01
0.19519 0.24629E-01
0.19209 0.45795E-01
-RxTIO PARTIAL, STANi'xRlHZEJ' ELASTICITY5'8 I>F CC'RR . iV''EFF Î CTO IT AT MEANS
29.763 V .9688 1.18 O'.) 0.2831029.563 0.9684 0 . 6 0.3379227.969 0.9649 0 . 62::. 66 0.3194926.662 0.9615 11 . .'355 0.304552.0329 0.2579 (:/ . : ..1147 E-0 1. 0.19958E-013.0178 0.3684 0 . 1i 489E-'.) i -4.40515.3147 0.5723 '1.1 J3 12F-01 -4.33737.9252 0.7210 0. 11135E-0 1 -4.26954.1945 0.4824 0 . I0958E-01 -4.2017
- i V )e quation 1 OF 3 EQUATIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LI
R-SQUARE = 0.2534/ARIANGE OF THE ESTIMATE = 0.46215E-01
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE = 0.21498
#EAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = -0.11991 ,0G OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -29.4230 
<AW MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.3942
•lODEL SELECTION TESTS - SEE JUDGE ET.AL.(1985, P. 242 ) 
AKAIKE (1969) FINAL PREDICTION ERROR- FPE = 0.49296E-01(FPE ALSO KNOWN AS AMEMIYA PREDICTION CRITERION -PC) AKAIKE (1973) INFORM.ATION CRITERION- AIC = -2.9411
SCHWARZ ( 1978 ■) CRI TER I ON-SC = -2.7283
ASYMPTOTIC
'ARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STAMDARDIZED ELASTICITYNAME COEFFIC I ENT ERROR -------- CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
>1 4.3113 0.68169 6.3244 0.4385 5.1984 -3.59554.3874 0.70072 6-2613 0.4350 5.2902 -3.6590
*3 4.2971 0.67147 6.3995 0.4427 5.1813 -3.5837>4 4.4644 0.70950 6.2923 0.4367 5.3830 -3.7232
>5 4 .471>£) 0.72329 6.1893 0.4309 5.3976 -3.7334'(:> 4.4798 0.7 3099 6.1265 0.4 274 5.4016 -3.7360i7 4.4935 0.72767 6.1752 0.4301 5.4181 -3.7475
'8 4.1269 0.69636 5.9262 0.4158 4.97 60 -3.4417
■'9 4.2509 0.70464 6.0327 0.4220 5.1256 -3.5451
• !(•' 3.6621 0.57830 6.3325 0.4390 4.4 156 -3.0541
!N 0.42796E-01 0.11946E-01 3.5824 0.2664 0.65365 -3.0914J- -0.14345E-06 0.46117E-07 -3.1085 -0-2332 -0.22656 0.19861
0.5G133E— (.) 4 0.98i.'C3E-05 5. 7.277 0.4042 0.76934“^ ■•OP -0.83120E-01 0.1246IS-01 -6.6706 -0.4576 -1.32 L6 50.907ip -0.107 26E 0.22901E-04 -4.6636 -0.3398 -0 . 1.6632 0.45626].) -i1.738 1.4483 —8 . Li.)“-'i / -0.5302 -o.33L33 0.49901
EQUATION 2 OF 3 EQUATIONS'EPENDENT VARIABLE = L2
3 - a w .
R-SQUARE = 0-6115ARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE = 0.10921TANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE = 0.33046#:AM OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = -0.28369 .OG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -29.4230 
:AW MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.6980
lODEL SELECTION TESTS - SEE JUDGE ET.AL.(1985, P.242) AKAIKE (1969) FINAL PREDICTION ERROR- FPE = 0.11649(FPE ALSO KNOWN AS AMEMIYA PREDICTION CRITERION -PC) 
AK AIKE (1973) IN FORM ATION CRITERION- AIC = -2.0 812
SCHWARZ(1978) CRITERION-SC = -1.8683
ASYMPTOTIC
/ A R I A B L E E S T I M A T E D STANDARD T - R A T I O P A R T I A L S T A N D A R D IZ E D E L A S T I C I T Y
■ NAME C O E F F IC IE N T ERROR C O R K. C O E F F I C l  ENT AT  MEANS
a 1 2 - 8 7 3 1 . 1 0 7 5 1 1 . 6 2 4 0 - 6 6 7  6 7 - 2 8 4 0 - 4 . 5 3 7 8
'2 1 3 . 0 4 0 1 . 1 3 7 0 11  - 4 69 0 . 6 6 2 7 7 - 3 7 8 4 - 4 . 5 9 6 6
1 2 - 8 3 7 1 . 0 9 3 7 1 1 . 7 3 7 0 . 6 7 1 2 7 . 2 6 3 7 - 4 . 5 2 5 1
•>4 1 3 . 2 2 4 1 . 1 5 1 7 1 1 . 4 8 2 0 . 6 6 3 1 7 . 4 8 2 4 - 4 . 6 6 1 3
'5 1 3 . 4 2 3 1 - 1 7 2 1 1 1 . 4 5 2 0 . 6 6 2 1 7 - 595 : . - 4 . 7 3 1 6
) 6 1 3 . 5 6 8 1 ,  16)06 11 - 4 9 3 0 . 6 6 3 4 7 . 6 7 7  3 - 4 . 7 8 2 8
)'7 1 3 - 4 2 6 1 . 1 7 3 1 1 1 . 4 4 4 0 . 6 6 1 9 7 . 5 9 6 5 - 4 . 7  3 2 4
8 1 2 - 7 1 0 1 . 1 2 9 1 1 1 . 2 5 6 0 . 6 5 5 7 7 . 1 9 1 7 - 4 . 4 8 0 2
.’9 1 2 . 5 8 5 1 . 1 4 6 9 1 0 . 9 7 3 0 . 6 4 6 1 7 . 1 2 1 V — 4 - 4 3 6 2
■1C> 1 1 . 4 8 2 0 . 9 5 8 4 2 1 1 . 9 8 0 0 . 6 7 8 8 6 . 4 9 6 8 - 4 . 0 4 7 4
IN 0  - 6 6 S 2 4 E - 0 1 0 . 1 8 4 1 3 E - 0 1 3 . 6 2 9 2 0 . 2 6 9 6 0 - 4 7 8 9 6 - 2 . 0 4 0 3
;:T - 0 . 9 9 3 0 3 E - 0 ' “ 0 - 7 0 4 4 2 E - 0 7 - 1 . 4 0 9 7 - 0 . 1 0 3 1 — . / 4 2 5'. ' ■ V' 1 0  - 5 8 1 1 5 E - 0 1
0 - 6 7 2 0 0 E - Ü 4 0 . 1 4 9 4 8 E - 0 4 4 . 4 9 5 5 0 . 3 2 7  7 0 - 4 4 3 4 5 -• 6 . 14  81
:DP - 0 . 2 0 6 4 3 0 . 1 9 4 5 2 E - 0 1 - 1 0 . 6 1 3 - 0 . 6 3 3 5 -  1 . 5 4' . '3 5 3 . 4 3 9
\ P L - 0 . 1 0 7 2 6 E - 0 3 0 . 3 5 2 0 3 E - 0 4 - 3 . 0 4 6 8 — O . .0.' 4 5 ... u . 4 0 3 3 5
'LH., - 1 1 . 7 3 8 2 . 2 2 6 4 - 5 . 2 7 2 4 - 0 . 3 7  6 0 — . .1 >'.i5 0 . 8 1 9 5 1
EQUATION 3 OF 3 EQUATIONS
■EPENDENT VARIABLE = L3
R-SQUARE = 0-8499ARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE = 0.84439E-01
TANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE = 0.29058
mAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = -0.44503 ,00 OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -29.4230 
AW MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.8890
lODEL SELECTION TESTS - SEE JUDGE ET.AL.(1985, P.242) 
AKAIKE (1969) FINAL PREDICTION ERROR- FPE = 0.900Ô8E-01
(FPE ALSO KNOWN AS AMEMIYA PREDICTION CRITERION -PC) .AKAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION- AIC = -2.3384
SCHWARZ(1978 ) CRITERION-SC = -2.1255
TRIABLE . NAME
.'1
ESTIMATEDCOEFFICIENT
ASYMPTOTIC 
STANDARD ERROR
13.257 
13-163 13.465 
13.553 
13-703 
13.775 
13.899 
13.316 12.926 
12.327 
-0.44298E- ■0.413:;.3E- 
0. 19093E- 
0.17970 ■0. 10726E- -11.738
0.99412 
1.0201 0.98366 1.0357 
1.0594 
1.0613 
1.0542 
1.0248 
1.0389 0.87416 
•01 0.16556E-01 -07 0.63011E-07 
-04 0.1387 2E-04 
0.16898E-01 
-03 0.3Ù955E-04 
1.9577
T-RAT10 PARTIAL STANDARDICORR. COEFFICl
13 . 335 0 .7171 5.3030
12 . 903 0 .7055 5.2655
13 . 66)6 0 .7261 5.386313 . 086 0 .7105 5.4215
12 .935 0. 7064 5.4816
12 . 98() 0- 7076 5.5103
13 . 184 0 .7131 5.5598
12 .993 0.7080 5.326512 . 4 ‘i .. 0 .6925 5.170514 . 101 0.7 362 4.93106756 -0. 2022 -0.22446
O' - 65588 -0. 0505 -0.21846E1 .3764 0 -1056 0.8907
-10 . 634 -0. 6343 -0.94769
4649 -0. 2583 121449959 -0 .4196 -0.15028
AT MEANS
-2.9788 -2.9578 
-3.0257 
-3.0454 
-3.0792 
-3-0953 
-3.1231 
-2.9921 -2.9044 — 2. /699 
0.86218 
0.15418E-01 
-1.1135 
29.653 0.65228 
0.90219
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APPENDIX IV
List Of Software Used In The Study
* Lotus release 2.0 has been used for data entering and some 
data manipulations.
* D-FIT version 2.0 has been used to estimate the various 
equations of the model.
* Shazam version 6.0 has been used to estimate the 
distributed lag structure for the fuel efficiency equations 
and the sales ratio of four different classes of new cars 
equations.
* TSP version 5.0d has been used to estimate and simulate the 
model.
* Harvard Graphics, HG, has been used in creating the graphs.
* Finally, I have used Professional Write, PW, version 2.0 
for typing this thesis.
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